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Abstract 
The Effects of Ageing, Individual Differences and Limited 
Resources on Consumer Decision Making 
Jennifer Marie Kerss 
This thesis presents six original experiments investigating the relationship between age-
related gains and losses in cognitive and emotional abilities and consumer decision making. Novel 
tasks designed to closely resemble real consumer decisions were used to assess how older and 
younger adults fare when making everyday decisions. 
Experiments 1 and 2 examined the relationship between consumer decision making and 
measures of fluid intelligence, crystallised intelligence and numeric ability in older and younger 
adults. The data revealed that numeric ability and fluid intelligence independently predicted 
consumer decision making in older adults. In Experiment 1, participants made factual and 
inferential decisions about utility suppliers. Findings were corroborated in Experiment 2 using a 
larger sample and an additional consumer decision task based on selecting a mobile phone 
provider. Experiment 2 also revealed numeric ability as an independent predictor of young adult’s 
consumer decision making. 
Experiment 3 assessed the interplay between age, cognitive resources and emotion 
regulation. Cognitive resources were assessed by the number of times older and younger adults 
decided to stick with a pre-selected option, switch to an alternative option or decide in the future. 
Results suggested that older and younger adults required differing amounts of resources to 
regulate emotions in accordance with different emotion regulation strategies. Older adults made 
better consumer decisions when instructed to regulate their emotions by way of reappraisal and 
younger participants made better consumer decisions when instructed to regulate their emotions 
using suppression. These results were contrary to what was expected based on previous research 
on emotion regulation. Because of this, two exploratory experiments were conducted on young 
adults in an attempt to identify a reliable methodology for inducing and measuring affects more 
typically associated with self-regulation. These experiments revealed some surprising findings. 
Participants exposed to manipulations high in terms of cognitive demand made better subsequent 
consumer decisions than participants placed in less demanding conditions. It was hypothesised that 
participants exposed to demanding manipulations were primed to make more adaptive consumer 
decisions. 
A final experiment tested the effect of age and instruction manipulation on consumer 
decision making. The relationships between cognitive measures of individual differences and 
decision making were again measured. Results substantiated previous findings revealed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 insofar that fluid intelligence was found to independently predict consumer 
decision making performance in older adults. Fluid intelligence and numeric ability predicted 
consumer decision making in younger adults. In terms of instruction effects, younger and older 
adults made better decisions when asked to do so in a rational manner compared to an intuitive 
manner. 
It is believed that this work represents some of the first of its kind to study the impact of 
ageing on cognitive ability and decision making using tasks representative of existing consumer 
decisions in terms of context and response options. The findings presented provide a valid and 
unique insight into how cognitive and emotional ability changes with age and the subsequent 
implications this has when making consumer decisions. This thesis concludes with the theoretical 
and practical implications for the ageing consumer. 
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 Chapter 1 
1.1  Overview of Purposes and Aims 
The UK population is ageing and is projected to continue ageing over the 
next few decades (Office for National Statistics, 2012). The ability to make good 
decisions for longer is important, particularly when old age is accompanied by 
major life-transitions such as retirement and poorer health. To date, research 
investigating how older adults fare when making everyday consumer choices has 
received little attention. This is surprising given the wealth of evidence suggesting 
that ageing is associated with declines in many abilities key to good decision 
making. Work which has been conducted is relatively limited in scope: studies 
have mostly been unrelated to real consumer decisions and have either 
concentrated on the impact of ageing on cognitive ability or decision performance. 
This thesis attempted to address some of the limitations present in previous 
research and extend our understanding of the relationship between age and 
applied decision making. The current work presents a range of novel and unique 
tasks developed to closely resemble the types of decisions individuals are faced 
with in the real world, both in terms of decision environment (e.g. selecting a 
utility company) and structure (i.e. deciding to stick with a pre-selected option). 
The relationship between decision quality and age-related changes in cognitive 
variables (e.g. fluid intelligence, crystallised intelligence and numeric ability) in 
applied settings were assessed.  Furthermore, it was observed that the reality of 
making a decision in a consumer environment often requires individuals to engage 
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in some form of emotion regulation. A unique experiment studied the effects of 
self-regulation on consumer decision-making in younger and older adults. Taken 
together it is thought that this body of work represents an original and valid 
contribution by extending both the practical and theoretical range of previous 
research on age and decision-making.  
1.2  Introduction to Decision Making 
A decision can be characterised as a choice between two or more options 
or alternatives (e.g., choosing a car); these options may also include the decision to 
stick with the status quo (e.g., do nothing or make no change) (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1999). There is still some debate regarding how individuals make 
decisions. Normative models of decision-making assume that a decision is the 
product of conscious, deliberative processes. However, other researchers have 
proposed that some decision-making might be automatic (e.g. Ferreira, Garcie-
Marques, Sherman & Sherman, 2006; Stanovich & West, 2000). Traditional models 
of decision-making are based on the idea that good decisions are made when 
individuals weigh up the costs and benefits against the probability of a given 
outcome. For example, Subjective Expected Utility model (SEU) provides a set of 
rules for combining beliefs (probabilities) and preferences (utilities) in order to 
make a decision. In other words, the SEU model states that individuals trade off the 
utility of a certain outcome (positive or negative) against its probability. This 
theory demonstrates how decisions should be made if people are rational and try 
to maximise their subjective expected utility (Fishburn, 1991).  
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 Normative models of decision-making such as SEU can be seen as 
demanding in terms of cognitive resources, and evidence suggests that individuals 
are often unable to meet these demands to make decisions in this way. For 
example, Lichtenstein, Slovic and Zink (1969) found that participants ignored 
expected utility when making decisions even after the experimenters had carefully 
explained the concept to them. One explanation for this finding is that combining 
the assumed, and often substantial, quantities of information may simply exceed 
the individual’s computational capacity.  
This explanation illustrates a fundamental problem inherent with SEU 
models; they do not account for individual’s limited processing capabilities. In 
response to this, Simon (1947) developed a model of Bounded Rationality in an 
attempt to more accurately explain decision-making processes. The model of 
Bounded Rationality takes into account the cognitive limitations of the decision 
maker. Instead of assuming that individuals are able to make all the computations 
assumed in SEU, Bounded Rationality proposes that people make decisions based 
on simpler mechanisms known as satisficing. Satisficing creates mental ‘short cuts’ 
that allow the decision maker to end the search once an alternative that meets or 
succeeds a specific aspiration level has been found (Earl, 1983) (see also 
Gigerenzer and the ABC Research Group, 1999). 
In terms of the type of decisions an individual can make, people have a 
number of choice options available to them. This includes the opportunity to stick 
with a current option, select an alternative, or decide not to make a choice. Dahr 
(1997) proposed that each of these options varied in terms of the cognitive 
resources needed to implement it whereby the least demanding strategies can be 
viewed as either sticking with a pre-selected option or opting not to make a choice. 
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It is thought that individuals who may be limited in terms of cognitive resources 
(due to age-related cognitive decline or fatigue) will select less demanding 
strategies when faced with making a decision (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; Mata, 
Schooler and Rieskamp, 2007). 
Many of the deliberative processes needed to make decisions are affected 
by executive function. For example, research has shown that executive function is 
involved with cognitive functions such as planning and problem solving (Ward & 
Allport, 1997), switching from one task to another (Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996), 
directing mental attention (Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996), resisting interference 
(Engle & Holiman, 2002), performing novel tasks, response inhibition, strategy 
generation and application, and flexible action (Denckla, 1996). 
A central theme of the current thesis is the assumption that both younger 
and older adults have limited resources with which to deal with complex decisions. 
How people make decisions, particularly when age-related cognitive declines place 
restrictions on available cognitive reserves, is investigated. Traditional models of 
decision-making propose that cognitive resources are critical for making optimal 
decisions, therefore it seems reasonable to expect that as individuals age, their 
decision-making may become worse.  In what follows, literature on age differences 
in consumer decision-making is reviewed. Thereafter, cognitive changes associated 
with ageing are considered and finally, research linking differences in decision-
making ability to age-related cognitive changes is outlined.     
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1.3  Ageing and Consumer Decision-Making 
This thesis examines age differences in consumer decision-making, and 
specifically how cognitive functions and numeric ability influence quality of choice. 
Despite variations in context, many consumer decisions place similar demands on 
the decision maker. For example, consumers are often faced with choices that 
require them to compare two or more options. Furthermore, Hibbard and Peters 
(2003) point out that many decisions share similar features such as the use of 
information that includes technical terms and complex ideas, comparisons of 
multiple options on several variables, and/or the decision-maker to weight factors 
according to individual values, preferences and needs. Making a good decision may 
be further compounded because the information provided to the decision-maker is 
unfamiliar and the amount of information may exceed his or her processing 
capacity. This section outlines studies that focus on three processes assumed to be 
key to decision making; comprehension, strategy selection and information search.  
Good comprehension in a decision-making context means that an 
individual understands the available options and how each option rates on one or 
more dimensions (Hibbard, Slovic, Peters, & Finucane, 2002; Radvansky, 1999). 
Comprehension is essential to competent decision-making because information 
must be understood before it can be used sensibly in a judgement or decision 
(March & Heath 1994). 
Schaie and Willis (1993) found that increasing the complexity of stimuli 
and questions can lead to decreased understanding amongst older adults. In their 
study, they assessed older adults’ comprehension of prescription drug labels and 
medication charts by asking participants factual questions (e.g. ‘what are the side 
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effects of this medication?’) and inferential questions (e.g. ‘for how many days will 
this supply of medication last, if taken according to directions?’). Results showed 
that fewer errors were made by older adults in the factual questions (3%) 
compared with the inferential questions (16%). When presented with a slightly 
more complex stimulus (a 4 x 4 medication chart), comprehension errors 
increased to 13% for factual questions and 23% for inferential questions.  
In another study, Hibbard, et al., (2002) examined young and older adults’ 
comprehension of health insurance plans using two types of multiple choice 
questions. The first type of question required participants to identify one piece of 
information from a table (factual questions). The second type of question required 
participants to identify and combine information from two places in the table 
(inferential questions). Analysis revealed that both younger and older adults had 
more difficulty in understanding the information as the problem became more 
complex. When participants were asked to identify only one piece of information 
relatively few errors occurred. In contrast, multiple options and inferential 
questions were more challenging and led to more errors for both younger and 
older adults, with older adults performing significantly worse in both conditions.  
Work by Hanoch, Wood, Barnes, Liu and Rice (2011) provided further 
evidence that increased choice led to poorer decision making. Hanoch et al., (2011) 
asked older and younger adults to select a drug plan with the lowest cost from a 
choice set with either three or nine options. Results indicated that the rate of poor 
decisions increased as the number of plans was increased and, this trend was even 
more pronounced for older participants.  
 Finucane, Mertz, Slovic and Schmidt (2005) argued that personal 
characteristics and experience should also be taken into account when explaining 
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differences in decision-making. Their experiment presented participants with 
questions that increased in complexity over three domains: health, finances and 
nutrition. Individual variables such as physical condition and cognitive abilities 
were also measured. The researchers found that participants performed 
significantly better on simple rather than complex tasks and made fewer errors on 
factual questions vs. inferential questions. They also report that older adults made 
more comprehension errors as complexity increased across the three domains.  
Finucane et al., (2005) proposed that individual differences, such as 
cognitive ability and social attitudes, may have accounted for variances in older 
adults’ performance. Taken together, these studies (Finucane, et al., 2005; Hanoch, 
et al., 2011; Hibbard, et al, 2002; Schaie & Willis, 1993) suggest that there are 
important differences between older and younger adults’ capabilities in the 
comprehension of information in decision making and, that these differences may 
be affected by individual differences.  
Another factor important for good decision-making is the ability to 
recognise and apply the best strategy for a given task. Adaptive strategy selection 
assumes that people select a strategy that is successful in a specific situation and 
can change their strategy use to changing environments (Mata, Schooler, & 
Rieskamp, 2007). Despite declines in cognitive ability and comprehension (e.g. 
Schaie, 1994), a growing body of evidence suggests that older adults do not always 
show deficits in decision-making abilities; instead, it is thought that they may use 
different strategies in their decision making. Mata, et al., (2007) investigated the 
impact of (cognitive) ageing on the ability to select decision strategies as a function 
of different environmental structures. Participants had to select which was the 
most expensive diamond from a set of 50 pair comparisons. Participants had 
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access to a number of cues including size, overall proportions, colour and clarity of 
a diamond. Results indicated that older adults tended to look up less information 
and take longer to process it as well as preferring to use less cognitively 
demanding strategies. Despite this, Mata et al., (2007) observed that both young 
and older adults seemed to be equally adaptive at adjusting their information 
search and selecting a decision strategy.  
Alternative explanations for age differences in strategy selection are based 
on the idea that individuals use simpler strategies in an attempt to avoid conflict 
when making complicated choices. The literature suggests that the context and 
complexity of a problem significantly influences decision strategy selection (Payne, 
1976; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988; Tversky & Simonson, 1993). With regard 
to older adults, Baltes et al., (1999) proposed that they use different strategies 
compared to young adults because deficits in fluid intelligence sets limits on the 
cognitive effort that can be utilised, therefore constraining the range of possible 
strategies that can be accessed in a particular situation. For example, information-
intensive strategies are likely to be difficult for individuals with memory 
limitations. However, selecting simpler strategies also affects the decision process 
in that they tend to require less information (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). In support 
of Baltes et al., (1999), Shugan (1980) suggested that the costs of decision making 
to an individual were associated with his/her processing capability, the complexity 
of the choice, time pressure and other factors. In line with this thinking, others 
have argued that older adults may rely more on strategies that require fewer 
cognitive resources (Gigerenzer, 2003; Hess, Germain, Swaim, & Osowski, 2009; 
Sanfey & Hastie, 1999).  
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Recently, Hanoch et al., (2011) provided further evidence in support of 
this hypothesis. In Hanoch et al’s., (2011) study, participants completed a 
computer-based program that allowed the researchers to observe their 
information acquisition process while selecting a medical insurance drug plan. 
Participants were presented randomly with information about either three or nine 
drug plans. Their task was to select the least expensive drug plan for a hypothetical 
friend. Participants were required to move a computer mouse to view information 
hidden beneath labelled boxes. Once the cursor moved from one box to the next, 
the previous box closed and a new one opened. Results showed that older adults 
tended to select less beneficial drug prescription plans and that their information 
search was less effective. When making a choice, older adults were more likely to 
evaluate the attributes within a particular plan rather than compare multiple plans 
using a specific factor (e.g. total annual cost). Hanoch et al., (2011) suggest that 
differences in decision quality may be due to differences in search patterns rather 
than age. 
The finding that older adults tend to seek less information before making a 
choice has been shown in a number of studies. Johnson (1990) assessed older and 
younger adult decision-making by presenting participants with a choice of six cars 
that they could purchase. Before choosing, each participant could acquire 
comparative information such as fuel economy, riding comfort, maintenance cost, 
safety record, handling, interior roominess, purchase price, styling and resale 
value. No one car represented a clear optimum choice. Participants were able to 
select which information they wanted to view, however they could only view one 
piece of information at a time. The results showed no differences between age 
groups for choice of car. However, older adults selected fewer pieces of 
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information than younger adults and that they spent longer viewing the 
information.   
In a further study by Johnson (1993), participants were asked to choose an 
apartment to rent. Older and younger adults were presented with information 
about each apartment (the brightness of rooms, closet space and kitchen facilities) 
and then asked to select the apartment that they felt presented the best choice. 
Older adults, compared with young ones, spent more time considering less 
information. These findings were supported by Mata and Nunes (2009) meta-
analysis of the impact of pre-decisional information search on decision quality. 
They found that ageing was significantly associated with a decrease in information 
search with little affect on the decisions quality. However, the idea that older 
adults always seek less information is still subject to debate: a recent study by 
Wood, Hanoch, Barnes, Liu, Cummings and Rice (2011), found that older adults 
made worse decisions despite a tendency to search more information and spend 
less time viewing each piece of information.  
Further research supporting the notion that older adults seek less 
information compared to young adults was presented by Rafaely, Dror, and 
Remington (2006). In their first experiment, they studied the extent to which 
younger and older adults based their decisions on a single variable: outcome 
payoff. The results showed that both younger and older participants responded to 
this information. In a second study, they investigated younger and older adults’ use 
of information under increased task demands by providing information on 
outcome probability as well as payoff.  Results from the second study showed that 
younger adults responded to both payoff and probability whereas older adults 
ignored payoff, basing their decisions on probability information alone. Both 
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experiments showed no significant age difference in decision quality and 
demonstrated older adults to be selective in the information they process. 
Other researchers propose that older adults are not always worse at 
decision-making because they lack the capacity to engage in cognitively demanding 
strategies. In fact, theories of successful ageing suggest that increases in experience 
may even lead to better adaptive capacity (Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger, 
1999). Blanchard-Fields, Chen and Norris (1997) found that age was a significant 
predictor of the problem solving strategy employed. Their experiment examined 
age differences in problem-solving strategies for situations in three domains: 
consumer, home management and conflict with friends. Results showed that older 
adults used more efficient, problem-focused strategies compared in each condition 
to younger adults. Blanchard-Fields et al., (1997) argued that middle-aged and 
older adults used better strategies when faced with these problems because of 
accumulated experience.   
In summary, comprehension, strategy selection and information search 
have been established as key to making good decisions. However, research has 
provided mixed evidence in terms of the relationship between age and decision 
quality; some findings suggest the ageing has a distinct negative impact on decision 
making quality (e.g. Finucane et al., 2005; Schaie & Willis, 1993), where older 
adults were shown to be more susceptible to the effects of framing, be more 
inconsistent in their choices (Malloy, et al., 1992) and worse at comprehending 
both simple and complex information (Hibbard, et al., 2002). However, other 
studies have shown no age differences in decision-making. It is unclear whether 
older adults are using different search strategies due to increased experience or 
due to increased limitations in their executive capacity. Understanding how age-
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related changes in cognitive functions affect comprehension, strategy selection and 
information search is key to predicting decision-making performance in older 
adults.  
Taken together, the literature presents mixed evidence in terms of a clear 
age-related decline in decision-making aptitude. It seems that older adults may 
compensate for increasing limitations in ability however, still tend to make 
comparatively poor choices. Based on the literature, one possibility for this pattern 
of data is that it is due to general declines in cognitive functions. 
1.4  Ageing, Individual Differences and Decision-Making 
Age-related changes in cognitive functions have been shown to have 
consequences for decision-making. In order to understand how cognitive ability 
may impact decision-making, the components of intellectual functioning must be 
considered. The lifespan theory of intellectual development proposed by Baltes 
(1987) characterised two distinct components central to intellectual functioning: 
the mechanics and pragmatics of cognition. Baltes (1999) defined the mechanics of 
cognition as being the biological and genetically predisposed characteristics of the 
brain while the pragmatics of cognition to be associated with knowledge acquired 
through culture and experience.  
The notion of a two-component model of intellectual development is not a 
novel idea. Baltes (1987) model can be seen as drawing conceptually from Horn 
and Cattell’s (1967) theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence (Gf-Gc). These 
theories are similar in that they not only propose a two-component aspect to 
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intelligence, but also that age affects fluid (mechanic) and crystallized (pragmatic) 
abilities differently. 
Evidence in support of the Two-Component model is most clearly 
illustrated by the difference between fluid and crystallised abilities (Schaie, 1994). 
In one study Horn and Cattell (1967) found age-related declines in fluid 
intelligence, whilst crystallised test scores remained stable. Cunningham, Clayton 
and Overton (1975) demonstrated that younger people had significantly higher 
scores on a test of fluid intelligence (Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices) than 
older people, while age differences on a crystallised test of vocabulary remained 
relatively insignificant. Similar results using a battery of fluid and crystallized tests 
were found by Hayslip and Sterns (1979). 
Longitudinal and cross-sectional data from the Seattle Longitudinal Study 
(SLS) (Schaie, 1994) and the Berlin Ageing Study (BASE) (Lövdén, Ghisletta, & 
Lindenberger, 2004) provide further support for the Two-Component model. 
Cross-sectional findings from the SLS show virtually linear negative age differences 
from young adulthood to old age in fluid abilities such as inductive reasoning, 
spatial orientation, perceptual speed and verbal memory. In contrast, crystallised 
abilities continue to improve until middle age (40 years) and then show gradual or 
no decline until about the age of 70 (Schaie 1994, 1996). Longitudinal findings 
from the SLS show a similar pattern of results, however the data is more 
homogeneous and shows lower levels of age-related decline across all abilities. 
BASE (Lövdén, et al., 2004) provides more evidence of differing age-gradients 
associated with fluid and crystallised intelligence. Cross-sectional analysis 
illustrated a pattern of decline during adulthood in fluid capabilities such as 
perceptual speed and spatial orientation. On the other hand, crystallised skills such 
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as verbal knowledge appeared to be maintained and, only showed weak declines in 
very old age.  
In summary, a range of studies provide evidence in support of a Two-
Component model of intelligence whereby ageing affects fluid and crystallised 
cognitive functions differently.  
1.5  Ageing and Fluid Intelligence 
It has been shown that ageing is associated with a decline in general fluid 
intelligence (e.g. Schaie, 1994), where fluid intelligence is viewed as the ability to 
solve novel problems (Horn & Cattell, 1967). Three essential constructs proposed 
by Baltes, et al., (1999) in determining the rate of age-related changes in cognitive 
and intellectual functioning are processing rate (Salthouse, 1996), working 
memory (Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996) and inhibition (Zacks & Hasher, 1997).   
1.5.1  Speed of Processing 
The first construct proposed by Baltes, et al., (1999) is processing rate. 
The most influential theory explaining age-related changes in processing rate is the 
speed of processing theory (Salthouse, 1996). This accounts for the common 
notion that as age increases, the speed of cognitive operations slows down. 
Salthouse’s (1996) theory proposed two distinct mechanisms: the limited time 
mechanism and the simultaneity mechanism. The limited time mechanism 
assumes that with ageing, relative cognitive operations are executed too slowly to 
be completed successfully in the available time. In complex tasks where many 
operations (e.g. retrieval and rehearsal) need to be performed, ability may be 
15 
 
influenced by the number of operations an individual can complete in the available 
time. Older adults therefore may be at a disadvantage because they process 
information more slowly. 
The simultaneity mechanism assumes that slower processing reduces the 
amount of information simultaneously available for higher level processing 
(Salthouse, 1996). A number of studies have shown speed of processing to be a 
good predictor of age-associated variances in performance on memory and 
reasoning tasks. For example, Salthouse (1994d) demonstrated that increased age 
was associated with lower accuracy and, longer decision time. In addition, 
Salthouse demonstrated that the relationship between age and decision accuracy, 
as well as age and decision time, were affected by a slower rate of cognitive 
operations. A battery of tasks for measuring cognitive performance was presented 
to participants. This included standard measures of processing speed such as The 
Letter Comparison test. This task required that participants inspect pairs of three, 
six or nine letters and then write an S if the two pairs were the same and a D if they 
were different. Performance was measured by the number of correct responses 
produced within 30 seconds. The results of this study are consistent with the view 
that a slower speed of processing reduces the amount of information 
simultaneously available which, in turn affects the quality of cognitive 
performance (see Salthouse, 1996). 
1.5.2  Working Memory 
Working memory has also been shown to change with age, leading to 
significant differences in older and younger adult decision-making. Working 
memory refers to a system or mechanism for temporarily maintaining information 
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needed during the execution of a cognitive task (Baddeley, 1986). Age-related 
declines in working memory have been found in a variety of tasks including 
measures of simple span, storage and processing (e.g. Babcock & Salthouse, 1990; 
Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005; Kail & Salthouse, 1994).  
Span is often used as a basic measure of mental capacity, in particular, 
immediate mental capacity. Measures of span can be simple or complex. Simple 
span measures require participants to merely passively store information, often 
verbal in form. Complex working memory measures impose simultaneous 
processing and storage demands. Trade-off between processing and storage 
functions was investigated by Daneman and Carpenter (1980). In their study, they 
used a working memory span measure whereby participants were required to 
read and comprehend a series of sentences while also trying to remember the final 
world of each sentence. Results revealed that the number of words recalled (span) 
was correlated with measures of comprehension. Research suggests that older 
adults appear to have smaller span whether assessed by simple or complex 
measures, and individual differences in span are important predictors of 
performance on other tasks, including language comprehension and reasoning 
tasks (Zacks, Hasher & Li 2000). For example, Multhaup, Balota and Cowan (1996) 
found that older adults articulated words slower than younger adults and that this 
contributed to reduced span measures. However, research on age differences in 
simple span measures and working memory span are not always consistent: 
studies which rely upon vocabulary may overestimate older adults’ ability because 
older adults generally perform better than younger adults on this dimension 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980).  
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There is still some dispute as to whether age-related declines occur most 
for storage or for processing operations. Craik (1986) proposed that age-related 
differences in memory are a consequence of age deficits in essential processing 
resources, such as attentional working memory capacity. The presumed age-
related declines in processing resources means older adults are less able to carry 
out resource-demanding encoding and retrieval operations as compared to young 
adults.  However, reliable age differences have been reported between memory 
tasks that measure storage and those that focus on storage and processing 
operations. As this brief review indicates, the relationship between age and 
memory has been researched extensively, however as this is not the focus of the 
work presented in this thesis, only a few studies have been evaluated (see Bower, 
1988). 
1.5.3  Inhibitory Control 
The third process identified by Baltes, et al., (1999) is inhibitory control. 
Lustig, Hasher and Zacks (2007) suggested three functions of inhibition: (i) 
controlling access to attention’s focus, (ii) deleting irrelevant information from 
attention and working memory, and (iii) suppressing strong but inappropriate 
responses. These three components work together to help ensure that mental 
representations form a coherent story relative to the current goals of cognitive 
function.  
Hasher and Zacks (1988) proposed that age differences in working 
memory were due to reductions in inhibitory efficiency among older adults. Their 
theory suggests that the functional capacity of working memory is reduced with 
ageing because less efficient inhibitory processes are unable to prevent irrelevant 
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information from entering or being maintained in working memory. It is thought 
that the presence of irrelevant information in working memory may lead to poorer 
encoding, retrieval and comprehension by older adults (McDowd, 1997).  
The second function of inhibition is to delete irrelevant information from 
the focus of attention. It is thought that older adults’ ability to regulate information 
that is no longer relevant is reduced, and therefore this accounts for their 
increased production of irrelevant information relative to relevant information. 
The inhibition deficit hypothesis would then suggest that older adults’ deficits in 
working memory tasks are not a function of reduced capacity, but instead due to 
an increased inability to ‘delete’ unnecessary information so that available 
resources can be used efficiently. Finally, the ‘restraint’ function prevents 
inappropriate responses from gaining control over thought and/or action so as to 
allow consideration of more relevant responses. 
Research examining the inhibition deficit hypothesis was conducted by 
Carlson, Hasher, Zacks and Connelly (1995). They found that when older adults 
were asked to read aloud a piece of text with distractions inserted in unpredictable 
locations, their reading speed was significantly decreased. It was proposed that 
older adults were less able to ignore the distractions. Findings from studies on 
‘directed forgetting’ (Zacks, Radvansky, & Hasher, 1996) showed that older adults 
were less able than younger adults to suppress the continued processing and 
retrieval of items which had already been studied and cued to be forgotten. These 
‘cued to be forgotten’ items were shown to produce more interference with the 
retrieval of items still to be remembered in older adults. Age-related reductions in 
inhibitory control may account for increases in irrelevant information being 
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processed in working memory. It is thought that a consequence of this could be 
interference at encoding and retrieval.  
In summary, age-related cognitive declines in fluid intelligence have been 
reliably established. However, there is still debate surrounding the related nature 
of the constructs outlined above. Some researchers consider speed of processing, 
working memory and inhibitory function to be separate with different predictive 
worth (e.g. Salthouse, 1996); others consider them to be interdependent, even 
sharing basic neurological processes (Li, Lindenberger, & Sikström, 2001). Despite 
incongruity in opinions and findings regarding the relatedness of these constructs, 
it is clear that the role of each component should be considered in thinking about 
age-related declines in fluid intelligence. Furthermore, the empirical question 
regarding how well fluid intelligence predicts age differences in consumer decision 
making remains open.  
1.6  Ageing and Crystallised Intelligence 
Despite well documented age-related declines in fluid intelligence, 
crystallised intelligence is thought to remain comparatively stable from middle age 
into older adulthood (Horn & Cattell, 1967; Lövdén, et al., 2004).  Crystallised 
abilities conceptualise the roles of culture and experience in the acquisition of 
knowledge-based intelligence. Crystallised knowledge may come from normative 
cultural exposures such as in formal schooling or from individual experiences such 
as work-related expertise. It is thought that crystallised intelligence measures the 
amount of knowledge a person has acquired during his or her lifetime. Crystallised 
capabilities are typically measured using psychometric tests to assess verbal 
20 
 
ability and basic knowledge about the World. For example, it is often measured 
using simple direct questions, such as asking a person to define words, i.e. tell me 
what audacious means? These types of questions can only be answered correctly if 
an individual already has the necessary knowledge available to them (Horn & 
Cattell, 1967). Individual differences in these domains are closely linked to years of 
education and other aspects of social stratification (Baltes, Staudinger, & 
Lindenberger, 2002).  
Another measure of crystallised intelligence is person-specific knowledge. 
Person-specific knowledge has been assessed by comparing the performance of 
younger and older experts both inside and outside their domain of experience 
(Bartlett, Halpern, & Dowling, 1995; Hambrick, Meinz, & Oswald, 2007). Research 
in this area has provided mixed results. Typically, findings suggest that expertise 
benefits both young and old adults; however, these benefits are usually limited to 
the domain in which the individual is expert. Furthermore, expertise does not 
provide complete immunity from cognitive declines. 
Morrow, Menard and Stine-Morrow (1999) compared young and older 
adult pilots with young and older novices on their memory for narrative passages 
concerning aviation or non-aviation themes. For both ages, expertise was 
associated with increased memory for the aviation-related narrative however, 
older adults in both conditions performed worse in recalling aviation and non-
aviation passages as compared to younger adults. Meinz (2000) provided further 
evidence suggesting that any benefit of experience is limited. Pianists from a wide 
range of experience and age range were tested on measures for musical memory 
and musical perceptual speed. Results indicated no significant interactions of age 
and experience on memory or perceptual speed, however there was evidence to 
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suggest that experience in older adults partially mediated the negative effects of 
cognitive ageing. In another study, the effects of expertise were shown to have no 
attenuating effects as age increased. For example, Charness (1982) studied bridge 
players varying in age (21-71) and skill. Results indicated that skill declined with 
increasing age and ceased entirely by age 60. The following considers how age-
related changes in fluid and crystallised abilities may impact decision-making in 
older and younger adults. 
1.7  Ageing, Fluid and Crystallised Intelligence, and 
Decision-Making 
As outlined above, research on age related changes in decision-making 
have provided mixed results. For example, older adults are more likely than young 
adults to use non-compensatory search strategies, which require fewer 
comparisons. While using non-compensatory search strategies reduces cognitive 
load, it also decreases the chances of identifying the best available option (Hanoch 
et al., 2011; Johnson, 1990). Older adults are more likely to choose suboptimal 
options as the number of alternatives increases (Besedes, Deck, Sarangi & Shor, 
2009), and to make mistakes when applying decision rules (Bruine de Bruin et al., 
2007). Other decision-making skills seem to improve with age. Older adults are 
more likely to discontinue investments that are no longer paying off (Strough et al., 
2008), and are better at resisting the influence of irrelevant options on choices 
(Kim & Hasher, 2005).  Sometimes age seems to be unrelated to decision-making 
skills, such as following the rules of probability theory when judging risks (Bruine 
de Bruin et al., 2007). 
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Recent reviews (Hanoch et al., 2007; Peters et al., 2007) proposed that 
these mixed findings may reflect age-related decreases in fluid cognitive ability 
and marginal changes (or increases) in crystallised intelligence. Fluid cognitive 
abilities show linear declines with age while crystallised abilities remain relatively 
stable (Salthouse, 1991). Cunningham, Clayton and Overton (1975) demonstrated 
that younger people had significantly higher scores on a common test of fluid 
intelligence (Raven’s Progressive Matrices) than did older people, while age 
differences on a crystallized test of vocabulary were relatively insignificant. 
Hayslip and Sterns (1979) found similar results using a battery of fluid and 
crystallized tests, and Rabbit et al., (2004) report accelerated decline in fluid 
intelligence, but no significant decline in crystallised intellectual measures of 
vocabulary (see also Singer et al., 2003)  
Consistent with the idea that age-related changes in fluid and crystallised 
abilities can explain mixed findings in the decision literature, Stanovich and West 
(2008) speculate that making good decisions requires having enough experience to 
recognise which decision rule applies and enough fluid ability to implement it. 
Furthermore, they note that experience and fluid cognitive ability are 
interdependent for two reasons. First, fluid ability may reduce the experience 
needed to master new decision-making rules. Second, fluid cognitive ability will 
facilitate the application of a rule only if individuals have sufficient experience to 
recognise that the rule applies. Based on this, Stanovich and West (2008) predict 
two patterns in the relationship between fluid and crystallised intelligence and 
decision-making.  
The first pattern predicts that on decision tasks that require no experience 
to detect a normative rule, individuals with higher fluid cognitive ability should be 
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better at applying the rule correctly. Because fluid cognitive ability declines with 
old age, older adults should perform worse on these tasks. The second pattern 
predicts that on decision tasks which require experience to detect a normative 
rule, increased experience and fluid ability will lead to better performance. 
Because experience increases with age, it is thought that older adults may rely on 
this to moderate or even overcome age-related declines in fluid intelligence. The 
few studies that have examined the relationship between decision-making 
performance, specific cognitive ability and age provide support for the two 
patterns proposed by Stanovich and West (2008). 
Hansson, Rönnlund, Juslin and Nilsson (2008) presented data suggesting 
that in circumstances where individuals need no experience to understand a 
normative rule, fluid ability is an important factor in being able to apply it 
correctly. In their study Hansson et al., (2008) tested participants in three different 
age groups (35-40 years, 55-60 years and 70-75 years). Cognitive measures of fluid 
and crystallised intelligence were recorded. All participants were presented with a 
probability judgement task where they made the best guess about the population 
of a country and then asked to assess the probability that a pre-stated interval 
would include the true population figure. For example, participants were 
presented with the following problem, “The population of Burma lies between X 
and Y million. What is the probability that this statement is correct: 0%, 10%, 20%, 
30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% or 100%?” The results showed a negative 
relationship between age and using more appropriate (e.g., wider) credible 
intervals, which was affected by fluid cognitive ability.  
Strough, Mehta, McFall and Schuller (2008) provided support for Stanovich 
and West’s (2008) second proposed pattern of findings whereby older adults made 
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better decisions than young adults on a task which required both fluid cognitive 
ability and experience (or crystallised intelligence). Stough et al., (2008) 
investigated the relationship between cognitive ability, age and the sunk-cost 
fallacy. The sunk-cost fallacy is a decision-making bias that reflects the tendency to 
invest more future resources in a situation in which a prior investment has been 
made (e.g., the tendency to spend more time watching a boring film one has paid to 
watch than to watch a boring, but free, film). In this study older and younger adults 
were presented with two pairs of vignettes. Each pair consisted of one vignette 
involving investments and one analogous vignette involving no investment. For 
example, one of the investment vignettes said, “You paid $10.95 to see a movie on 
pay TV. After five minutes you are bored and the movie seems pretty bad.” In the 
no-investment analogue, the sentence about the $10.95 payment was removed. 
After reading each vignette, participants selected one of five options for future 
time investment (e.g. stop watching entirely, watch for 10, 20 or 30 more minutes 
or watch until the end). Participants reported education level and completed 
several tests of verbal and fluid intelligence. Results revealed that older adults 
were less likely than younger adults to commit to the sunk-cost fallacy and more 
likely to make normatively correct consistent decisions across investment and no-
investment analogues. Furthermore, performance was shown to be only weakly 
correlated with scores on fluid and verbal intelligence.  
Finally, Bruine de Bruin et al., (2011) investigated the relationship between 
age, cognitive ability and a measure of decision-making competence. Bruine de 
Bruin et al., (2011) asked participants to complete a validated measure of Adult 
Decision Making Competence (A-DMC), and a measure of fluid cognitive ability 
(Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices). Results revealed that after controlling for 
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fluid cognitive ability, tasks on which performance decreased with age (resistance 
to framing and applying decision rules), the negative relationships were lessened 
by age-related declines in fluid ability. Tasks where performance did not decrease 
with age (consistency in risk perception, recognising age-group social norms, 
over/under confidence and resistance to sunk costs), were found to be positively 
and independently correlated with both fluid cognitive ability and age.  
In summary, the literature clearly suggests that fluid intelligence declines 
with age, but, declines in crystallised intelligence are comparatively limited; some 
data even implies that crystallised intelligence increases with age (Schaie, 1994). 
Research has shown a relationship between changes in these intelligences and 
declines in decision-making ability. However, recent work proposes that fluid and 
crystallised ability are not the only individual differences that affect decision-
making. Relevant knowledge is imperative to making good decisions within a given 
domain. In terms of consumer decision-making, one area of relevant knowledge is 
numeric ability. In the next section, the implications of good numeric ability on 
decision making is considered and research on ageing, numeracy and decision-
making is discussed.      
1.8  Ageing, Numeric Ability and Decision Making 
Research on age, cognitive ability and decision-making has made progress 
over recent years, yet the relative importance of numeric ability has only lately 
received attention (e.g. Peters, et al., 2007). Currently there is no general 
agreement on the definition of numeracy, however many researchers have 
attempted to broadly classify the key processes associated with this construct. For 
26 
 
example, Peters et al., (2006) define numeracy as “the ability to process basic 
probability and numerical concepts” (p. 407). Research has shown that having 
inadequate numeric skills is associated with increased biases in judgement and 
decision-making (e.g. Reyna, Nelson, Han & Dieckmann, 2009) and lower 
comprehension and use of numeric information (Peters et al., 2007). Consequently, 
lower levels of numeracy may place an important barrier to individual’s 
understanding of financial, health and consumer domains. Furthermore, evidence 
suggests that poor numeracy skills may be associated with economic and social 
disadvantage, including poor health, living in deprived neighbourhoods and 
disadvantaged housing conditions (Jenkins, Ackerman, Frumkin, Salter & Vorhaus 
2011).  
To date, the literature provides a mixed picture in terms of how numeric 
ability is related to fluid and crystallised intelligences. For example, Kroesbergen, 
Luit, Ven Lieshout, Loosbroek and Van de Rijit (2009) found that numeric ability in 
5-7 year olds was strongly correlated with both crystallised intelligence (measured 
by a Dutch verbal task; Taal Voor Kleuters, 1996) and fluid intelligence (measured 
by Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices). However, other research has shown 
numeracy to be linked with either crystallised intelligence (Schaie and Willis, 
1989; 1993) or fluid intelligence, (Kyttala & Lehto, 2008).  Furthermore, recent 
literature has shown numeric ability to be independent of other measures of 
intelligence (see Banks & Oldfield, 2006; Weller, Diekmann, Tusler, Merty, Burns & 
Peter’s, 2012; Wood et al., 2011).  
In review of these findings, it seems that numeric ability might test 
relevant knowledge in terms of numeric rules as well as the application of this 
relevant knowledge for novel problem solving. Therefore it is argued that numeric 
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ability reflects aspects related to both fluid intelligence and crystallised 
intelligence. In other words, numeric ability is a test of a specific capability within 
the particular domain of mathematical knowledge. On this basis, this thesis will 
regard numeric ability as a unique measure of intelligence.  
Research suggests that individuals differ substantially in numeric ability 
(Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) and that many people do not possess even basic 
numerical skills. The Skills for Life Survey (SfL) commissioned by the Department 
for Education and Skills (2002/3), consisted of a population sample of adults aged 
between 16 and 65. Data from this study suggested that 15 million adults in 
England possessed very low levels of numeracy and that respondents in the oldest 
age group (55-65) were most likely to be classified at the lowest level. In 2002, the 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) sought to provide data about literacy 
and numeracy proficiency of those beyond the age of 65. ELSA assessed numeracy 
through five questions, which required successively more complex numerical 
calculations. Respondents were divided into four groups based on their answers to 
the numeracy questions. The results showed an overall trend for numeracy to 
decrease with age: 51% of adults in their fifties were classified as being in one of 
the bottom two numeracy groups, 62% for people in their sixties, 72% among 
people in their seventies and 78% for those aged eighty and above. These findings 
support data from the Seattle Longitudinal Study (Schaie, 1994), which suggested 
that numeric ability tends to rise until approximately middle age before declining 
steadily until age 60 whereby another lower plateau is reached. Furthermore, 
current research investigating the relationship between numeracy and age 
suggests that as a group, older adults evidence lower levels of numeracy than 
young adults (Banks & Oldfield, 2007; Peters, et al., 2007).  
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Numeric ability has been shown to have important consequences in terms 
of health and wealth. To date, the health domain has seemingly been the primary 
focus of much research in regard to numeracy. Indeed, many health-related tasks, 
such as reading food labels, refilling prescriptions, measuring medications, 
interpreting blood sugars and understanding health risks require good numeracy 
abilities (Rothman, et al., 2008). For example, patients often have to make 
decisions based on information acquired from tables, charts or text. Information 
about many consumer products (i.e. financial services, nutritional values in food or 
utility expenses) is acquired in the same manner. Therefore, despite a focus 
towards reviews of research associated with decision-making and health, it is 
reasonable to assume that numeracy is as important in other domains (e.g. 
financial). 
With regards to health, Fasolo, Reutskaja, Dixon and Boyce (2010) 
investigated how people understood information presented on the National Health 
Service (NHS) website. In their study, participants had to compare and select a 
hospital they would choose to attend based on a number of indicators such as 
waiting time, cleanliness and distance. Results indicated that younger and more 
highly numerate participants engaged in more cognitively demanding strategies 
and attempted to make tradeoffs. Older (and less numerate) participants found it 
harder to process different pieces information and tended to rely on summative 
measures to overcome these difficulties.  
Williams, Parker, Baker, Parikh, Pitkin, Coates et al., (1995) found that many 
patients could not read and understand basic numeric medical information 
including instructions on medication bottles, standard appointment slips or 
financial information. In their study 19-33% of patients could not determine the 
number of pills of a prescription they should take. Apter, Cheng, Small, Bennett, 
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Albert, et al., (2006) showed that asthma patients who had been prescribed 
inhaled steroids and had low levels of numeracy were more likely to have a history 
of hospitalizations and asthma-related emergency room visits.  
In the financial domain, numeric ability has been shown to be associated 
with prosperity. For example Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) found that American 
citizens who were less numerate were less likely to accumulate wealth. And 
furthermore, individuals who could not perform a 2% interest rate calculation 
were much less likely to plan for retirement. Similar patterns of results have been 
found in other countries. For example, in the Netherlands, those who could 
perform a 2% interest calculation were found to be much more likely to plan for 
retirement, and in Italy, those able to do this calculation were more likely to 
participate in private pension plans (Van Rooij, Lusardi & Alessie, 2011). 
In terms of ageing, numeric ability and wealth, surveys suggest that older 
adults with high numeric ability tend to be wealthier. For example, the Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) assessed people aged 50 and 
above in 11 European countries. The survey included questions on demographics, 
physical and mental health, employment, income, assets, social activities, and 
expectations. Results indicated that numeracy was generally low amongst the 
older population however, older participants with higher numeric ability were 
found to be more likely to own stocks and general investments (Christelis, Jappelli, 
& Padula 2010). In addition, Banks (2006) found a positive correlation between 
numeracy and prosperity. Among 50-59 year old men, those with the highest 
numerical ability were also in the highest wealth quintile, while those with the 
lowest numeric ability were over six times more likely to be in the poorest wealth 
quintile. Similar results were established for women aged 50-59 and for both men 
and women aged 60-74.  
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Numeric ability is found to be linked with many important decisions 
associated with health and finances. Studies and surveys have shown that numeric 
ability among populations across in America and Europe tends to be low. In 
addition, lack of numeracy is not only widespread but is particularly severe among 
some demographic groups, specifically the elderly.  
Many important decisions require the individual to be proficient with 
numbers. How age impacts decision-making in the real world has received 
surprisingly little attention given the significant consequences of making poor 
choices. Furthermore, research investigating the association between age, 
decision-making and numeric ability has provided mixed findings. 
Numeracy has been found to be a significant predictor of comprehension 
and decision-making performance by Wood et al., (2011). Wood et al., (2011) 
examined the impact of increasing choice options for prescription drug plans in 
younger and older adults. Measures of executive functioning, speed of processing, 
working memory, crystallised intelligence and numeric ability were also taken. 
Their results revealed that numeracy was a robust independent predictor of 
decision-making ability, regardless of age.  
Other research has not always found age-related declines in tasks 
requiring numeric comprehension. Tanius, Wood, Hanoch and Rice (2009) found 
no significant effects of age on performance when participants were asked to 
compare and select a prescription drug plan. Although, numeric ability and speed 
of processing were found to be significant predictors with participants who scored 
highly on these measures making better choices.  
Further research suggests that older adults can be as adept as younger 
adults in decision-making involving numbers. Specifically, previous research 
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reports that adults use at least two types of strategies (exhaustive and non-
exhaustive) to solve numeric problems, and they adjust their strategy to the 
problem and situation characteristics. Exhaustive strategies require that 
cognitively demanding verification processes be implemented before making a 
choice (e.g. encoding numbers and calculating the correct solution). Non-
exhaustive strategies do not require all verification processes to be completed 
before a decision is made; an individual may simply retrieve a solution directly 
from memory. Geary and Wiley (1991) demonstrated that both older and younger 
adults engaged in exhaustive and non-exhaustive verification strategies and were 
equally adaptive in their strategy selection. In their study, a simple addition task 
was presented to older and younger adults and verbal reports of their strategy 
selection were recorded. Both age groups reported using non-exhaustive strategies 
(i.e. solving 4 + 9 by directly retrieving 13 from memory) and exhaustive strategies 
(i.e. solving 4 + 9 by calculating 10 + 4 – 1). Young adults used exhaustive 
strategies on easier problems more often than older adults (7% vs. 2%) and non-
exhaustive strategies less often than older adults (88% vs. 98%).  
Further evidence in support of adept strategy selection in older adulthood 
was presented by Geary, Frensch and Wiley (1993). In their study, participants 
were presented with simple and complex subtraction problems. Results indicated 
that the subtraction skills of the older adults were better developed than those of 
younger adults. In explaining these findings, the authors proposed that older 
adults’ early education in basic mathematics was superior to that of young adults, 
however the effect of practice throughout adulthood may also have contributed to 
the advantage of the older group. On this basis, it was thought that increased 
practice may have lead older adults to rely more upon non-exhaustive, retrieval 
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based processes or be more adept at selecting an appropriate strategy for 
particular problems.  
So far, the literature reviewed suggests that age-related changes in 
cognitive abilities cannot be characterized by mere declines, but are in fact 
complicated and potentially malleable. Arguably, even more interesting than the 
weaknesses are the relative strengths that older adults display. Findings 
demonstrate age-related gains in emotional functioning (e.g. Carstensen & Mickels, 
2005). This pattern stands in contrast to the substantial body of literature 
documenting age-related declines in processes that are effortful, deliberative and 
resource intensive. Next, age-related changes in emotional functioning are 
outlined. Then emotion-regulation strategies used by older and younger adults are 
considered, followed by an evaluation of these strategies within a model of limited 
resources.  
1.9  Ageing, Emotion and Decision-Making 
Research provides convergent evidence that self-regulation, especially 
emotional functioning, is spared from age-related decline (Charles & Carstensen, 
2004). Furthermore, some research suggests that emotional functioning improves 
with age (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005). The finding that gains in emotional 
functioning occur despite well-documented declines in effortful cognitive 
processing raises intriguing questions. How developmental changes affect 
decisions that draw on both emotional and cognitive processes may have different 
implications for young and old adults. It is proposed that identifying areas of 
preserved functioning along with areas of deterioration may help in determining 
methods to compensate for age-related losses.  
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Evidence suggests a positivity bias as people age where older adults 
appear to attend to and remember emotionally positive information more than 
they do negative and neutral information. Charles, Mather and Carstensen (2003) 
conducted a study in which older and younger adults were tested on recognition 
and recall memory subsequent to viewing a number of positive, negative and 
neutral images. Results from the first study revealed that the ratio of positive to 
negative material accurately recalled by participants increased with age. Further 
research by Mather and Carstensen (2003) provided additional evidence for the 
increased favouring of positive over negative material with age. In their study, 
pairs of faces (one neutral and one showing positive or negative emotion) were 
presented to participants on a computer screen simultaneously for 1000 ms, 
followed by a small grey dot that appeared in the location where one of the 
photographs had been. Results showed that younger adults responded to the dot 
probes for positive and negative trials equally fast. Older adults however, were 
significantly faster when the dot appeared behind a positive face indicating older 
adults attended to positive faces most. 
John and Gross (2004) propose that this normative shift in emotion 
regulation in older adults is due to age-related cognitive limitations. It is assumed 
that negative emotions such as anger and frustration are energy and resource 
consuming (Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998), therefore older adult’s declining cognitive 
resources may lead them to avoid sources of negative emotion and instead engage 
in less resource-demanding positive affect. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that older adults have greater control over their emotions which permits them to 
selectively enhance positive emotions and selectively reduce their experience of 
negative emotions (Gross, Carstensen, Pasupathi, Tsai, & Skorpen, 1997).  
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Gross (1998) defined emotion regulation as “the process by which we 
influence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience 
and express them” (p.224). Gross identified two distinct forms of emotion 
regulation: reappraisal and suppression and, proposed that emotions are regulated 
either by manipulating the input to the system (“antecedent-focussed” emotion 
regulation - reappraisal) or by manipulating its output (“response-focussed” 
emotion regulation - suppression). This process model of emotion sees reappraisal 
as occurring early on in the emotion-generative process, by engaging executive 
cognitive control processes to reformulate the meaning of a situation and therefore 
determining the sequence of emotions before emotion-led responses have been 
generated (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008). Suppression is thought to come 
later in the emotion-generative process, and relies on the individual to consciously 
manage and modify the behavioural aspects of their emotional responses. 
It is thought that reappraisal and suppression may have different cognitive 
costs based on differing self-regulatory demands. For example, emotion regulation 
that requires sustained self-monitoring and on-going self-corrective action during 
an emotional event (i.e. suppressing emotional expression) may require the 
continual expenditure of cognitive resources which in turn could result in impaired 
executive processes. In contrast, using reappraisal as a form of emotion regulation 
may not require continual self-regulatory effort. Entering into a situation after 
having construed it in less emotional terms may pre-empt a strong emotional 
response and therefore the need to expend self-regulatory effort is diminished, 
leaving executive functions intact.  
The suggestion that there may be cognitive implications as a result of 
emotion regulation has been studied by a number of researchers. Lazarus and 
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Alfert (1964) provided some of the first evidence that emotion regulation has 
measurable beneficial consequences. In their study, participants were shown a film 
depicting a circumcision ritual while the accompanying soundtrack was 
manipulated. In one condition, participants heard a soundtrack designed to 
minimise the negative emotional impact of the film (by denying the pain and 
potential physical harm involved in the surgery) while emphasising the positive 
aspects of the procedure (the joy derived by the boys from their participation in a 
significant tribal ceremony). In another condition, participants heard no 
soundtrack at all. Results from this study showed that participants in the sound-
track condition evidenced slower heart rate, lower skin conductance levels and 
more pleasant mood ratings.  
In order to test the hypothesis that suppression and reappraisal may affect 
memory differently Richards and Gross (2000) conducted the following study: All 
participants were told that they would see several slides of people who had all 
been severely injured and that they would hear each person’s name, occupation 
and type of accident. Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions, the 
expressive suppression condition and the reappraisal condition. Participants in 
expressive suppression condition were told to keep facial muscles still and not 
make any facial expressions. Participants assigned to the reappraisal condition 
were instructed to think about what they were seeing in an objective and analytical 
manner so as to watch the film in such a way that they did not feel anything at all. 
The results from this experiment supported the hypothesis that different forms of 
emotion regulation have different cognitive consequences. Participants in the 
suppression condition showed poorer memory for information presented during 
the emotion-eliciting slides. However, participants in the reappraisal condition 
36 
 
showed no evidence of diminished memory. A second finding was that despite 
changes to emotion experience and behaviour, suppression did not seem to lessen 
affective emotional experience. 
In terms of age-related changes in emotion regulation, it is thought that 
older adults learn to make greater use of reappraisal and less use of suppression 
(John & Gross, 2004). This supports the notion that older adults are more adept at 
regulating affect in a less cognitively exhaustive manner. John and Gross (2004) 
provided data in support of this claim. Using a retrospective design, a sample of 
women in their early 60’s were asked to complete the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ) twice, one with respect to how they were in their early 20’s 
and once with respect to how they were now. Results indicated that the use of 
reappraisal increased with age and the use of suppression decreased.  
Consistent with the findings of John and Gross (2004), a correlational study 
conducted by Gross, et al., (1997) found that older adults reported greater control 
of their inner experience of emotion but were less able to control their external 
expression of emotion. Furthermore, recent work by Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields 
(2009) suggests that emotion regulation of inner emotional experience requires 
fewer cognitive resources for older adults than for young adults.  Taken together, 
these findings support the notion that older adults are better able to regulate their 
emotions than young adults.  It is proposed that preserved abilities (such as 
emotion regulation) could be employed to support other, weakened areas (such as 
cognitive ability). 
Many models of decision-making propose that good decisions require a 
number of exhaustive cognitive processes. These cognitive processes can be seen 
as placing a significant burden on the individual’s resources. Because ageing is 
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associated with fewer cognitive resources, older adults may face an increased 
disadvantage when making complex decisions compared with young adults. How 
older adults adapt to regulatory exertion, has received little attention. 
The limited resource model proposes that the self has limited reserve of 
resource resembling energy or strength (Schmeichel, Vohs and Baumeister, 2003). 
This stock is expended when it is used to regulate a response by either changing or 
overriding an intuitive reaction. Schmeichel (2007) defines self-regulation as any 
attempt to override or alter one’s thoughts, feelings or behaviours. One of the 
central predictions of the limited resource model is that exertion of resources will 
be followed by a period of diminished capacity. In other words, regulating one 
response may result in poorer regulation of a concurrent response. Furthermore, 
self-regulation in one domain may lead to diminished ability to self-regulate in 
other domains because regulatory capacity is reduced (although regulatory 
strength should return to its previous level after sufficient rest; Muraven, Tice & 
Baumeister, 1998). The state of reduced regulatory powers stemming from prior 
exertion has been termed ego depletion (Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman, & Vohs, 
2008). Research has shown that inducing a state of ego depletion can have both 
cognitive (Pocheptsove, Amir, Dhar & Baumeister, 2008) and physiological 
consequences (Gross 1998; Muraven, Tice & Baumeister, 1998). 
Recent work suggests that the self’s limited resource is not used only for 
self-regulation but also for other cognitive functions including choice and decision-
making (Schmeichel, 2007; Vohs, Baumeister, Schmeichel, Twenge, Nelson & Tice, 
2008). In addition, it has been proposed that self-regulation shares a high degree 
of conceptual overlap with executive control (Schmeichel, 2007). It is assumed that 
in order to persist at a task, several executive control processes are required, such 
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as focussing attention, inhibiting the impulse to give up, and updating working 
memory. Pocheptsove et. al., (2008) provided support for a proposed link between 
self-regulation and executive function. They conducted a number of studies where 
findings suggested that both self-regulation and cognitively effortful processing 
involved in making choices draw on the same limited resource required for 
executive control. In one study, they found that resource depletion inhibited the 
executive processes required to make effortful trade-offs between difficult choices. 
Participants were asked to choose between two mobile phones on the basis of 
pictures and detailed descriptions; they also had the option to defer their decision 
and not select either phone. Results indicated that 42 per cent of participants in 
the depleted condition chose to defer their decision compared with only 27 per 
cent of control participants. The finding that self-regulation and cognition draw on 
the same resources used for executive functioning could have implications for 
consumer’s decisions. As demonstrated by Pocheptsove et al., (2008) decisions 
made in a state of ego-depletion can affect choices with financial implications.  
In summary, research suggests that ageing is associated with a greater 
focus on emotional content, which in later life may compensate for limited 
cognitive resources. Understanding how emotion regulation interacts in terms of 
facilitating or mediating cognitive costs could be important to recognising its role 
in decision-making. To date, researchers investigating ageing and decision-making 
have studied either emotional or cognitive processing but rarely both. This is 
surprising given that age-related changes in basic cognitive and emotional 
functions may have important consequences for the lives of older adults.  
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1.10  Summary  
Nowadays, older adults are faced with an abundance of choice and more 
information than ever before. This comes at a point in their lives when their ability 
to deliberate carefully about important decisions may be declining. Therefore, it is 
essential to examine how older adults fare when faced with everyday consumer 
decisions.  
To date, there has been little research on how ageing impacts older adults’ 
decisions about consumer products, and the research which has been conducted 
provides mixed findings. In addition, the relationship between discrete cognitive 
processes, numeric ability and real consumer decisions has received little 
attention. Furthermore, the effects of emotional processing and self-regulation on 
decision-making in older adults has yet to be researched. The application of age-
related gains in emotion-regulation in minimising the impact of resource depletion 
could provide insights for improving older adult’s decision making. Indeed, the 
research outlined in this chapter on cognitive ageing has demonstrated that there 
are both patterns of decline and compensation associated with increased age. This 
thesis presents six experiments designed to clarify the relationship between age-
related gains and losses in cognitive and emotional abilities, and consumer 
decision-making within realistic domains. 
Specifically, the current body of work evaluates the extent to which 
measures of fluid intelligence, numeracy and crystallised ability independently 
contribute to consumer decision-making in younger and older adults. 
Furthermore, the degree to which older and younger adults are reliant upon less 
resource demanding decision strategies is examined. Finally, the different impact 
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of emotion-regulation strategies on applied decision-making in younger and older 
adults is evaluated.    
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 Chapter 2 
2.1  Introduction 
Every day, individuals are faced with decisions, which may incur small or 
significant consequences. There has been growing interest in the relationship 
between age differences in decision-making and cognitive ability (Bruin de Bruin, 
et al., 2011; Hanoch, et al., 2007; Mata et. al., 2007). How older adults cope when 
making everyday choices could have an important impact on their quality of life 
with implications for their physical and financial wellbeing (Jenkins et al., 2011).   
As outlined in Chapter 1, research presents mixed findings in terms of 
demonstrating differences between younger and older adults decision-making. 
While there is some evidence suggesting that older adults tend to use less 
information when making decisions (which may lead to poorer performance), 
other findings imply that older adults can compensate for deficiencies in cognitive 
ability by relying on crystallised abilities. How older adults make up for age-related 
cognitive decline may have important implications for the quality of older adults’ 
choices; yet most research has typically only examined the impact of age on either 
cognitive ability or on decision performance. 
This chapter examines younger and older adults’ performance when 
making consumer decisions likely to be encountered by individuals in their 
everyday lives. Original tasks were developed which required participants to make 
decisions within the contexts of choosing a utility supplier and a mobile phone 
company. Two experiments are presented which investigate whether decision-
making ability varies as a function of age.  
42 
 
A secondary aim of the current chapter was to evaluate the relationship 
between a range of abilities and performance on the consumer decision task. As 
outlined in Chapter 1, research on ageing has shown that a wide variety of 
cognitive abilities decline with age, including reasoning, processing speed and 
working memory (Salthouse, 2004; Schaie 1993). These capabilities are generally 
categorised as fluid intelligence, that is, they relate to the ability to generate, 
transform and manipulate information (Salthouse 2010). While fluid intelligence 
and executive functions reflect cognitive capabilities important for processing 
information in novel situations, crystallised intelligence reflects a stable reserve of 
knowledge acquired through experience, culture and education (Carroll, 1993; 
Cattell, 1987; Salthouse 2010).  
Although research on fluid intelligence shows uniform declines with age, 
research on crystallised intelligence shows it to remain relatively stable until very 
old age (Horn & Cattell, 1967; Li et al., 2004; Salthouse 2004, 2006, 2010). This 
pattern of results may be what explains the varied data relating to decision-making 
and ageing. Recent reviews (Hanoch et al., 2007; Peters et al., 2007) speculate that 
these mixed results reflect age-related decreases in fluid ability and increases in 
experience, or crystallised intelligence. Much of the ageing literature sees that 
decision-making ability varies as a function of age-related changes in fluid and 
crystallised ability. For example, Salthouse (2010) points out that compensatory 
changes in fluid and crystallised ability are key in allowing most older adults to 
function effectively and independently. And Stanovich and West (2008) propose 
that making normatively appropriate decisions requires both the experience to 
recognise the correct decision rule to use and enough fluid ability to implement it.  
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To date, relatively few studies have examined the relationship between age-
related changes in decision-making and cognitive abilities. Research examining the 
impact of ageing and the associated changes in cognitive processes on real world 
decision-making is even scarcer. Furthermore, given that many important 
decisions require the individual to be proficient with numbers, surprisingly little 
attention has been given to how older adults are faring in a world where beneficial 
choice is dependent upon numeric skill.  
The relationship between age and numeric competence is still unclear. In 
longitudinal studies of ageing (e.g. Lövdén, et al., 2004; Schaie 1994b), evidence 
suggests age-related declines in numeric processing. This is unsurprising given 
that decisions involving numeric information require cognitive ability to process, 
and cognitive abilities tend to decline with age. For example, results from health 
plan choice studies suggest that elderly decision makers do not always 
comprehend even fairly simple numeric information (e.g. Park et al., 1999; 
Finucane et al., 2002; Hibbard et al., 2001), and others (Hanoch et. al., 2009) have 
found that older age was associated with more errors when choosing a health 
insurance plan. 
However, other studies have provided data implying older adults make 
decisions based on numeric computations as adeptly as young adults (Chen &un, 
2003; Duverne & Lemaire, 2004; Geary & Wiley, 1991). Furthermore, in another 
study modelled on a health insurance plan, older age was not a significant 
predictor of decision-making performance, but rather numeracy and speed of 
processing were found to affect performance (Tanius et. al., 2009). 
With regards to everyday decision-making, consumer choices can be seen 
as often based on complicated numeric material. Research suggests that older 
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adults may be at a disadvantage when making these sorts of decisions as they tend 
to have lower levels of numeracy (Banks & Oldfield, 2007; Wood et al, 2011). In 
light of the above, the current chapter has two key objectives: First, to evaluate the 
impact of ageing on applied consumer decision-making and second, to investigate 
the extent to which fluid and crystallised intelligence, numeracy, processing speed 
and experience independently contribute to decision-making in younger and older 
adults. 
2.2  Experiment 1 
The aim of this study was to examine differences in younger and older 
adult’s decision-making for consumer problems. It was predicted that older adults 
would make comparatively worse decisions than young adults and, both younger 
and older adults would perform worse on complex consumer problems compared 
to simple ones. In addition, it was anticipated that differences in decision aptitude 
could be explained by differences in cognitive abilities or task specific knowledge 
(gained through experience).  
2.3  Method 
2.3.1  Participants 
Sixty five participants took part in the study; 31 young adults (21 female), 
aged 18-25 (Mean Age = 19.8, SD =1.25), and 34 older adults (29 female) aged 63 
to 85 (Mean Age = 71.57, SD = 5.27). Older adults were paid £6 per hour for their 
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time, and were recruited from the South West of the UK. Young adults received 
course credits for their participation and were recruited from the university.  
2.3.2  Materials 
With the exception of the Energy Supplier Decision Task, all measures used in 
this experiment were selected because they had been utilised in previous studies 
investigating age and decision-making. Furthermore, each measure has been validated 
with diverse populations and was considered to represent a reliable method of 
investigating intelligence or ability.  
Energy Supplier Decision Task: A decision task was designed to evaluate 
individuals’ ability to select a utility supplier. This framework provided a good 
opportunity to investigate an existing problem faced by many UK households. 
Furthermore, the information needed to make a decision in this domain is numeric 
in nature, i.e. price and the amount of energy used (kWhs).  
In maximising the ecological validity of the experiment, marketing 
information provided by existing utility companies was used as a model for the 
materials in the present research. Real information presented to customers 
regarding tariffs for both gas and electricity are illustrated in Appendix 1A, figures 
1-3.  
The depiction of a two-band price structure (Tier 1 and 2) and price per 
kWh (kilowatt-hour) in table format was used in the present experimental 
material. Furthermore, it was decided that all numbers be presented as whole so as 
to simplify calculation processes. In total, a matrix comprising 16 individual values 
per kWh was presented to participants. While the table presented to participants is 
a simplified version of tariff information normally distributed by energy suppliers 
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in the UK, it was nonetheless designed to accurately mimic those faced by 
consumers. A matrix which included information about costs of four energy 
suppliers was presented to participants (see Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1 Table of Energy Suppliers Depicting the Cost of Electricity and Gas for Four 
Energy Suppliers 
 
Participants were given 8 different hypothetical scenarios that differed in 
the amount of gas and electricity used. In each scenario, information about energy 
suppliers’ prices for two electricity and gas bands was provided (electricity in band 
one and band two/ gas in band one and band two). The table informed participants 
that the price of electricity in “band one” was applied to a block of 1000kWh each 
year. When this had been used all other kWh would be charged at “band two” 
rates. Participants were told that the price of gas in “band one” was applied to a 
block of 6000kWh each year. When this had been used, all other kWh would be 
charged at “band two” rates.   
After reviewing the information, participants were asked to solve 8 
problems. Problems 1-3 were factual questions and required the individual to 
Tariff 
 
Central 
Utilities 
Energy 
West 
Light 
House 
Powerfuel 
Band One Electricity Price Per kWh 
This price applies to a block of 1000 kWh 
each year. When this has been used, all other 
kWh will be charged at Band Two rates 
 
15p 
 
16p 
 
18p 
 
15p 
 
Band Two Electricity 
Price Per kWh 
 
 
8p 
 
6p 
 
5p 
 
8p 
Band One Gas Price per kWh 
This price applies to a block of 6000 kWh 
each year. When this has been used, all other 
kWh will be charged at Band Two rates. 
 
4p 
 
5p 
 
6p 
 
4p 
 
 Gas Band Two 
Price Per kWh 
 
 
3p 
 
2p 
 
1p 
 
2p 
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identify one piece of information from the table. For example: Looking at the table, 
please indicate which Energy Supplier you think charges the most for Electricity in 
Band One. A complete list of the factual questions presented to participants can be 
found in Appendix 1B. 
Each question was followed by four response options whereby the 
participant was forced to choose only one of these as correct. Problems 4-8 were 
inferential questions requiring participants to identify and combine information 
from two places in the table. For example: Sue uses 10,000 kWh of Gas each year. 
Looking at the table, which Energy Supplier is best value for Sue? All inferential 
questions required the participant to calculate the cheapest Energy Supplier. A 
complete list of the inferential questions presented to participants can be found in 
Appendix 1C. In order to correctly answer these questions, participants had to 
compare gas price information in “band one” and “band two” for each of the four 
energy suppliers. 
Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices: This task was designed to measure 
two main components of general intelligence: the ability to think clearly and make 
sense of complexity, as well as the capacity to store and reproduce information. 
Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) has been widely used to measure 
general fluid intelligence. For example, Cunningham, Clayton and Overton, (1975) 
used Raven’s (SPM) alongside the Wais III vocabulary sub-task to test fluid and 
crystallised intelligence respectively in both older and younger adults. More 
recently, Bruine de Bruin et al., (2007) employed Raven’s SPM to assess general 
fluid intelligence in a study of individual differences in adult decision-making 
competence. Missier, Mantayla and Bruine de Buin, (2012) utilised Raven’s SPM 
and a numeracy scale (Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer, 2001) to study the relationship 
between executive functioning and general cognitive abilities. In general, research 
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has shown that scores on this measure of cognitive fluid ability tend to decrease 
with age (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2003). 
All participants completed sections B, C and D of Raven’s SPM. Sections A 
and E were omitted from the task because standardised data suggested that 
variability in scores for each of the two age groups tested in these sections were 
minimal. See Appendix 1D for examples of problems presented to participants. 
 All participants solved the same problems in the same order (from easy to 
hard). All participants completed the task at their own speed, without interruption, 
from the beginning to the end of the test. Three sections consisting each of 12 test 
items were presented whereby participants had to identify the missing segment 
required to complete a larger pattern. Participants recorded their answers by 
writing down the number of the option selected as being correct on a specially 
devised answer sheet. A person’s score on the test was the total number of 
problems solved correctly out of a total of 36. 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III Vocabulary Scale: This sub-test of the 
Wais-III assesses learning and memory. Crystallised intelligence measures the 
amount of knowledge a person has acquired during his or her lifetime (e.g. Alan, 
2001; Alfredo, 2007; Walter, Cunningham, Clayton, & Overton, 1975). The 
vocabulary subscale of the Wais-III was used because (like Raven’s SPM) it is 
considered a well-established and reliable measure of crystallised intelligence. 
Previous research where older and younger adults have been compared on 
cognitive variables including crystallised intelligence measured by this scale 
include Cunningham, Clayton and Overton, (1975), Isingrini and Advazou (1997) 
and Phillips, MacLeon and Allen (2002). 
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 The vocabulary subscale of the Wais-III required that all individuals were 
presented with a series of words both orally and visually. Words were presented 
visually on a card to the participant and the examiner would simultaneously point 
and say: “Tell me what                   means.” A total of 33 words were then orally 
defined by the participant. Responses to items 1-33 were scored 0, 1 or 2 points. A 
2-point response was achieved if the participant showed good understanding of 
the word. A 1-point response was classified as not incorrect but showing poverty 
of content and a 0-point response was given for providing obviously wrong 
responses. See Appendix 1E for the complete set of words presented to 
participants. 
Digit Comparison Task:  The digit comparison task (Finucane et al, 2005) 
evaluates speed of processing. Previous research using the digit comparison task 
has found it to be a fast and robust measure of processing speed. Studies on age 
differences in cognitive processing that utilised the current digit comparison task 
include Finucane et al., (2005), Hedden, Park, Nisbbett, Ji, Jing & Jiao, (2002), 
Tanius et al., (2009) and Wood et al., (2011). As this test had been reliably 
established in the associated literature, it was decided that the digit comparison 
task would be used to measure speed of processing in the present study. 
Participants were asked to quickly determine whether or not two numerical 
figures were the same. Three, 45-second conditions were administered. This task 
was scored by summing the total number of correct digit comparisons across all 
three sections. See Appendix 1F for examples of the digit comparison task 
presented to participants. 
Numeracy Scale: An 11- item numeracy scale (Lipkus, et al., 2001) was used 
to evaluate numerical ability. This scale has been used recently by a number of 
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researchers investigating age differences in decision-making, (see Galesic, Garcie-
Retamero and Gigerenzer, 2009; Tanius et al., 2009 and Wood et al., 2011) and was 
therefore considered an appropriate and reliable measure for this experiment. 
Questions presented participants with hypothetical scenarios in which the 
individuals’ aptitude to understand probability was examined, (e.g. “Imagine that 
we roll a fair, six-sided dice 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you 
think the dice would come up even (2, 4 or 6)”? Answers were marked as either 
correct or incorrect. Participants received one point for each correct response, 
thus the maximum score for this scale was 11. See Appendix 1G for a copy of the 
numeracy questionnaire presented to participants. 
Demographic Questionnaire: Participants’ age, gender, education and 
income were recorded.  Participants’ experience with making decisions about 
energy suppliers was also assessed. This was done by asking three questions: 
whether they were responsible for the payment of energy bills, whether they had 
changed supplier in the last year, or whether they had ever complained about a 
billing error. See Appendix 1H for a copy of the demographic and experience 
questionnaire presented to participants. 
2.3.3  Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and without time limit. The 
experiment consisted of six tasks: Utility decision task, demographic questionnaire, 
standard progressive matrices, Wais-III vocabulary scale, digit comparison, and the 
numeracy scale.  
Prior to testing, participants were given a short introduction to familiarise 
themselves with the various tasks. It was made clear that calculators were not 
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allowed to be used however, scrap paper and pens were provided and the 
participants informed that they could use these should they wish to make notes in 
order to aid them with their answers. 
2.4  Results  
The impact of ageing on consumer decision-making was examined. Table 
2.2 depicts performance on predictive measures of ability for both younger and 
older adults. 
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics for Younger and Older Participants 
 Young Old 
           M SD M SD 
Age (years) 21.77 5.01 71.41 5.26 
Numeracy  9.00 1.61 6.97 2.48 
Digit Comparison 74.18 12.64 57.63 13.05 
Vocabulary  38.63 5.93 44.41 10.72 
RAVENS 32.21 1.82 28.89 4.2 
 
The data in Table 2.2 is consistent with previous literature on cognitive 
ageing so far as age is associated with declines in processing speed, fluid 
intelligence and numeracy. Scores on the vocabulary task show that older adults 
outperformed their younger counterparts in this domain. An independent samples 
t test showed a significant difference in the scores for numeracy, t (71) = 4.11, p < 
.01, digit comparison, t (71) = 5.51, p < .01 and fluid intelligence, t (71) = 4.33, p < 
.01 whereby young participants did better than old participants. Older adults 
performed significantly better than young adults on the vocabulary task, t (71) = -
2.76, p < 0.1.  
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Table 2.3 The Percentage of Factual and Inferential Questions Answered Correctly by 
Younger and Older Adults   
      Young Adults       Older Adults 
 M SD M SD 
Factual 92.98 13.77 83.8 24.75 
Inferential 65.26 25.33 59.43 35.14 
 
Table 2.3 shows that younger and older adults performed better on factual 
compared to inferential questions and, that younger adults performed better on 
both question types than older adults. To see if these findings were significant, a 2 
X 2 ANOVA (Age X Question Type) was conducted. Results showed that there was 
no significant main effect of age, F (1, 71) = 2.67, p >.05, η² = .04, although older 
adults showed a trend to perform worse than younger adults. However, a 
significant main effect of Question Type (Factual vs. Inferential) F (1, 71) = 44.97, p 
<.01, η² = .39 was found. As Table 2.2 shows, factual questions were answered at 
significantly higher rates than inferential problems. Finally, results indicated no 
significant interaction between Question Type and Age F (1, 71) = .19, p > .05, η² = 
0.  Please refer to Statistics Appendix 1 for all summary tables corresponding to 
Experiment 1. 
To test the hypothesis that older adults are compensating for declines in 
fluid intelligences by relying on crystallised abilities, a univariate ANOVA (Age X 
Question Type) was performed with vocabulary as a covariate. Analysis revealed a 
main effect of age, F (1, 66) = 7.81, p < .01, η² = .11 and a marginal effect of 
question type (factual vs. inferential), F (1, 66) = 3.02, p = .09, η² =.04. No 
interaction between problem type and age was revealed, F (1, 66) = .16, p >.05, η² 
= 0. This shows that older adults seemed to rely on crystallised ability to moderate 
the effects of declines in other cognitive abilities. 
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When fluid intelligence was entered as a covariate alongside crystallised 
intelligence, the main effect of age disappeared F (1, 65) = .79, p > .05, η² = .01. A 
main effect of question type emerged F (1, 65) = 9.99, p <.01, η² =. 13. A main effect 
of vocabulary was revealed F (1, 65) = 7.88, p <.01, η² =.11 along with a main effect 
of fluid intelligence F (1, 65) = 7.6, p <.01, η² =. 11 No significant interaction was 
found between question type (factual vs. inferential) and age, F (1, 65) = .31, p 
>.05, η² = .01.  A significant interaction was found between age and vocabulary F 
(1, 65) = 6.86, p <.01, η² =. 1. Finally, an interaction between question type, fluid 
intelligence and age was not significant, F (1, 65) = 3.27, p >.05, η² =.05. This means 
that when crystallised and fluid ability are accounted for, age no longer predicted 
decision-making performance. Decision-making ability on each type of question 
was independently affected by fluid ability. 
When numeracy was added as a covariate alongside measures of 
crystallised and fluid intelligence, no significant main effect of age was found, F (1, 
64) = .06, p > .05, η² = 0. A significant effect of question type was established, F (1, 
64) = 9.84, p < .01, η² = 13. No significant interaction was found between age and 
numeracy, F (1, 64) = 1.89, p >.05, η² = .03. Although, a significant interaction 
between question type (factual vs. inferential) and age was revealed, F (1, 64) = 
4.65, p <.05, η² = .07.  
Next the relationships between performance on factual and inferential 
questions with fluid, crystallised abilities, speed of processing and numeracy were 
examined. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2.4.  
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Table 2.4 Pearson Correlation Matrix among Predictive Measures of Ability and 
Factual, Inferential Questions and Both Questions Combined for Young and Old 
Adults. 
 Predictors 
 Group Numeracy Digit 
Comparison 
Vocabulary Ravens 
Factual Young -.28º -.08 .23 .21 
Old .38* .10 .43* .10 
Inferential Young .04 -.01 .03 .01 
Old .59** -.06 .45** .69** 
Combined  Young -.05 -.03 .1 .07 
Old .64** -.02 .53** .62** 
        *p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 ºp <.1 
The correlation matrix in Table 2.4 shows that there were no relationships 
between the predictor variables and younger adults’ performance on factual or 
inferential questions. Although a marginally significant negative correlation 
between numeracy and performance on factual questions was revealed. This 
finding is in the opposite direction to what might be predicted. Results indicated 
that older adults’ performance on the energy supplier decision task was 
significantly correlated with numeracy, Ravens and vocabulary for inferential 
questions, while factual questions were only found to have a significant 
relationship with numeracy. When data on factual and inferential questions were 
combined, results indicated no significant relationships for young adults’ 
performance and any predictive measures. For older adults, highly significant 
relationships between overall performance on the decision task and numeric 
ability, crystallised intelligence and fluid intelligence were found. 
Having found significant correlations between performance on numeracy, 
vocabulary and fluid intelligence and older adults’ performance on inferential 
questions, a number of regression analyses were performed to see if any of these 
variables could independently predict performance. Numeracy, fluid intelligence, 
crystallised intelligence and speed of processing were entered as predictive 
variables. In total, three independent stepwise analyses were run for each age 
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group with factual, inferential and combined scores for both problem types 
entered as dependent variables.  
Table 2.5 Multiple Regression Analysis for Younger Adults Decision Making Ability 
and Predictive Measures of Performance. 
Question Predictors β t Sig R² Δ R² 
 
Factual 
Numeracy -.31 -1.66 .11  
.16 
 
.05 Fluid Intelligence .2 1.15 .26 
Vocabulary .07 .34 .73 
Speed of Processing -.06 -.34 .74 
 
Inferential 
Numeracy .09 .47 .65  
.01 
 
-.12 Fluid Intelligence -.06 -.31 .76 
Vocabulary .09 .43 .67 
Speed of Processing .06 .29 .77 
 
Combined 
Numeracy -.01 -.06 .95  
.01 
 
-.12 Fluid Intelligence .01 .06 .96 
Vocabulary .1 .5 .62 
Speed of Processing .03 .17 .87 
 
Data from Table 2.5 shows that for young adults, no predictive measures 
of performance could significantly predict aptitude on factual questions, inferential 
questions or types of questions combined.  
Table 2.6 Multiple Regression Analysis for Older Adults Decision Making Ability and 
Predictive Measures of Performance. 
Question Predictors β t Sig R² Δ R² 
 
Factual 
Numeracy .21 .99 .33  
.25 
 
.14 Fluid Intelligence -.12 -.61 .55 
Vocabulary .39 1.83 .08º 
Speed of Processing .15 .86 .4 
 
Inferential 
Numeracy .33 1.92 .07  
.52 
 
.46 Fluid Intelligence .49 3.2 0** 
Vocabulary .03 .2 .85 
Speed of Processing -.11 -.77 .45 
 
Combined 
Numeracy .35 2.06 .05*  
.53 
 
.47 Fluid Intelligence .36 2.4 .02* 
Vocabulary .17 1.01 .32 
Speed of Processing -.03 -.24 .81 
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01, ° p< .1 
The data in table 2.6 shows a different pattern of results for older adults. 
For factual questions, no predictive measures could significantly account for 
decision-making performance, although fluid ability was found to be marginally 
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significant. For inferential questions, fluid intelligence was revealed as a highly 
significant predictor of decision-making ability. For inferential and factual 
questions combined, numeracy and fluid ability were both found to independently 
predict decision-making aptitude. 
Due to the finding that older and younger adults showed no significant 
difference in decisions about selecting a utility company (except when a measure 
of crystallised intelligence was added as a covariate), it was proposed that task 
specific experience may account for older adults’ apparent proficiency in decision 
making. The data from three questions aimed at assessing experience were 
analysed using Chi Squared. The three questions asked were (i) if the participant 
was responsible for paying their utility bills, (ii) if the participant had changed 
their utility supplier in the last year and (iii) whether the participant had ever 
contact their utility company regarding billing company regarding billing errors.  
Results indicated that there was a significant association between age and 
responsibility for paying utility bills, χ² (1) = 17.97, p < .01, whereby older adults 
were more likely to be responsible for payment of utility bills than their younger 
counter parts. There was no significant association between age and whether an 
individual had changed utility supplier in the last year χ² (1) = 1.59, p > .05, nor 
was there a significant association between age and whether an individual had 
ever contacted their utility supplier regarding billing errors, χ² (1) = .48, p > .05. 
Finally, a univariate ANOVA (Age X Responsibility for payment of bills X 
Total number of factual and inferential questions answered correctly) was 
conducted. Results revealed a significant effect of age on performance, F (1, 68) = 
3.94, p<.05, η² = .06. However, there was no main effect of responsibility for 
payment of bills on performance, F (1, 68) = 1.75, p >.05, η² = .03. Finally, there was 
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no significant interaction between age and responsibility for payment of bills, F (1, 
68) = .49, p>.05, η² = 01. This analysis shows that there was no difference between 
those who had responsibility for payment of bills and those who didn’t and their 
performance on the consumer decision task. 
2.5  Discussion 
How older adults fare when making consumer choices has received little 
attention. A unique task was developed to assess older and younger adult decision-
making when selecting a utility supplier. In addition, measures of ability were 
included to assess the extent to which fluid and crystallised intelligence, numeracy, 
processing speed and experience could independently predict quality for both 
complex and simple consumer problems.  
The data from Experiment 1 indicated that although younger adults scored 
better on both factual and inferential questions, their performance was not 
significantly better than that of older adults. This finding is contrary to previous 
findings which suggest that older adults’ comprehension (and performance) 
should be somewhat worse than younger adults for both question types (Finucane, 
et al. 2002; Willis & Schaie, 1993).  The present findings are surprising given that 
age was associated with declines in fluid intelligence, processing speed and 
numeracy. 
In attempting to explain why older adults’ performance on the energy 
supplier decision task was not significantly different to younger adults, it was 
proposed that older adults may rely more heavily on crystallised intelligence 
(Stanovich & West, 2008). Scores on the vocabulary task showed that older adults 
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significantly outperformed their younger counterparts in this domain. These 
findings are consistent with the notion that vocabulary tasks are assumed to reflect 
crystallised intelligence and that crystallised abilities are maintained from early to 
late adulthood (Craik & Salthouse, 2000). It is proposed that older adults were 
utilising their greater crystallised knowledge to compensate for declines in fluid 
intelligence. Indeed, when a measure of crystallised intelligence was added as a 
covariate, a significant effect of age emerged. When fluid intelligence was added as 
a covariate alongside a measure of crystallised intelligence, the effect of age 
disappeared. This finding implies that age effects are the result of cognitive decline, 
however, Experiment 1 clearly suggests that crystallised intelligence can 
compensate for age-related declines. Therefore, these findings can be seen to 
provide strong support to predictions made by Stanovich and West (2008).  
Further analysis revealed that fluid ability provided the best model for 
predicting older adults’ decision-making performance on inferential questions and, 
that fluid and numeric abilities could independently predict factual and inferential 
questions combined. These findings support previous work by Tanius et al., (2009) 
and Wood et al., (2011) who also found numeric ability to be a robust predictor of 
decision aptitude in older adults. These results highlight the independent role of 
numeric ability in older adult decision-making. Furthermore, they provide some 
support for the compensatory function of crystallised intelligence as a mediator to 
age-related declines in fluid abilities, in other words, when making some consumer 
decisions, older adults seem to rely on crystallised intelligence to make up for 
losses in other cognitive abilities.  
Analysis on predictive measures of performance and younger adults’ 
decision-making revealed only a marginal negative relationship between numeric 
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ability and aptitude on factual questions. This finding implies that increased 
numeric ability lead to poorer decision making performance. However further 
scrutiny showed no measures of cognitive ability to significantly predict young 
adults decision making performance on factual or inferential problems. The 
mechanisms young adults rely on when making decisions about utility companies 
are still unclear. 
Both young and old adults were better at answering factual questions and 
worse at answering inferential questions. These findings are consistent with 
previous work, and replicate that of Schaie and Willis (1993) and Finucane, et al., 
(2002). In practical terms, this finding suggests, individuals may be at a 
disadvantage when making consumer decisions where information is complex. It 
should be noted that the consumer problems presented to participants in 
Experiment 1 were simplified versions of literature supplied to customers by 
utility companies. If participants were having difficulties in solving these problems, 
this may indicate a worrying trend in terms of people’s ability to make good 
consumer choices outside of the lab.    
This study also assessed the role of experience. As has been reviewed in 
the ageing literature, older adults may have an advantage in adaptive strategy 
selection because of their richer experience (Baltes et al., 1999). Results revealed 
that although older adults were significantly more likely to be responsible for 
payment of utilities, this experience did not affect the quality of their decision-
making. 
It was informally observed that older adults spent longer completing the 
energy supplier decision task. In addition, it was noted that older adults often took 
substantially longer to complete the Ravens standard progressive matrices. This 
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could be because older adults took longer in processing information (as evidenced 
by slower speed of processing). It may be that older adults put more effort into 
completing the task than young adults. Alternatively, it may imply that older adults 
were more motivated when completing the energy supplier task, and that 
individual differences in motivation accounted for their apparent aptitude. To 
investigate this, it was decided that a scale measuring need for cognition should be 
included in the second study.  
In conclusion, Experiment 1 showed no significant difference in 
performance between participants in each age group on the energy supplier 
decision task. However, analysis showed that an age difference did emerge when 
crystallised intelligence was taken into account. In addition, the key role of 
numeracy and fluid intelligence as independent predictors of ability on the 
consumer choice task were revealed.  
2.6  Experiment 2 
A second experiment was conducted to confirm and extend the findings 
from Experiment 1 but with a larger sample and on a wider range of problems. An 
additional decision task was developed (identical in structure to the energy 
supplier task), whereby questions were based upon selecting a mobile phone 
provider from a range of options. Given that mobile phones are a relatively new 
technology, associated mainly with younger generations, it was assumed that 
young adults would have more experience in making decisions in this domain 
compared to older adults. Therefore it was predicted that older adults would be 
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unlikely to rely on experience to aid their performance when making decisions in 
this domain. 
To prevent older adults from spending an excessive length of time 
completing the Ravens task, a time limit was imposed. Other researchers have also 
restricted available time for completion of the Ravens task, e.g. Carpenter, Just and 
Shell (1990).  
Finally, a scale was introduced to investigate whether results from 
Experiment 1 could be partially explained by differences in need for cognition. 
Need for cognition was investigated using a scale which has been shown to 
correlate with performance on decision making and judgement tasks (Cacioppo, 
Petty, & Kao, 1984).  
2.7  Method 
2.7.1  Participants 
One hundred and twenty eight participants took part in the study; 65 
young, aged 18-25 (Mean Age = 21.14, SD =5.34), and 63 older adults aged 63 to 85 
(Mean Age = 71.74, SD = 5.59). Older adults were paid £6 per hour for their time 
and were recruited from the South West of the UK. Young adults were university 
students and received course credits for their participation.  
2.7.2  Materials 
The materials and procedure were nearly identical to those used in the first 
study. The most important difference was the introduction of a new consumer 
decision task and a questionnaire measuring need for cognition. This meant that 
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participants in Experiment 2 were presented with a total of four factual questions 
and four inferential questions for each of the two topic tasks (energy suppliers and 
mobile phone companies). In addition participants completed sub-sections B, C 
and D from Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices, the vocabulary scale from the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III, the digit comparison task, the numeracy scale 
and a demographic questionnaire.  
Mobile Phone Provider Decision Task: 
This task examined young and older adults’ ability to identify which of four 
mobile phone providers was the cheapest. A matrix comprising information about 
the costs of four mobile phone providers was presented to participants (see Table 
2.5).  
Table 2.7 Information about the Cost of Phone Calls and Text Messages for Four 
Mobile Phone Companies 
 
Participants were given eight vignettes which described how many minutes 
and text messages a given individual might use. Participants then had to use the 
Tariff Speakn-
Text 
Connect-
UK 
Mobinet Green-
Phone 
Band One: Price Per Minute                                       
This price applies up to the first 300 
minutes, once this limit has been 
reached, Band Two prices apply. 
10p 
 
15p 
 
16p 
 
9p 
 
Band Two: Price Per Minute 
 
8p 
 
11p 
 
10p 
 
9p 
Band One: Price per Text Message                           
This price applies up to the first 100 text 
messages, once this limit has been 
reached, Band Two prices apply. 
10p 
 
1p 
 
10p 
 
9p 
 
Band Two: Price Per Text Message 
 
5p 
 
6p 
 
2p 
 
4p 
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matrix to identify which of the four mobile phone companies provided the 
cheapest deal based upon the requirements given in each vignette. The matrix 
provided information about two tariffs for minutes and text messages for each of 
the mobile phone providers: price of minutes in “band one” and “band two”, and 
price of text messages in band one and band two. The matrix informed participants 
that the price of minutes in band one applies to the first 300 minutes and that once 
this limit had been reached, band two prices apply. Similarly, the matrix also 
notified participants that the price of text messages in band one applied to the first 
100 text messages and that once this limit had been reached, band two prices 
would apply.  In total, the matrix contained 16 individual values ranging between 
one pence and 16 pence. Like the energy supplier table, this matrix was designed 
to be representative of actual sales material presented to consumers by mobile 
phone providers, albeit in a simplified version. 
After reviewing the information, participants were asked to answer 8 
problems. Problems 1-4 were factual questions and required the individual to 
identify one piece of information from the matrix (see Appendix 2A). Each question 
was followed by four response options whereby the participant was forced to 
choose only one of these as correct. Problems 5-8 were inferential questions 
requiring participants to identify and combine information from two places in the 
table, (see Appendix 2B). To correctly answer these questions, participants had to 
locate and combine information from more than one place in the table. 
Need for Cognition. 
An 18 item need for cognition scale (Cacioppo, et al., 1984) was presented 
to participants. This scale was considered to be a robust measure of need for 
cognition with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of +.90 (Cacioppo, et al., 1984). A 
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copy of the 18 item need for cognition scale presented to participant can be found 
in Appendix 2C. 
Demographic and Experience Questionnaire: Participants’ age, gender, education 
and income were recorded.  Participants’ experience with each consumer domain 
was also assessed. Participants were asked questions about their interaction with 
energy supplier companies and mobile phone providers. See Appendix 2D for a 
copy of the demographic and experience questionnaire presented to participants. 
2.7.3  Procedure 
All participants were tested individually. Apart from the Ravens Standard 
Progressive Matrices, no time limit was set for completing any other component of 
the experiment. However, the time it took each participant to complete both the 
energy supplier task and the mobile phone task were recorded. In total, 
Experiment 2 consisted of eight discrete tasks: Energy supplier decision task, 
Mobile phone company decision task, demographic questionnaire, Ravens 
standard progressive matrices, Wais-III vocabulary scale, digit comparison, 
numeracy questionnaire and need for cognition scale. All participants were 
presented with either the energy company or the mobile phone provider decision 
task first. The presentation of these tasks was counterbalanced across both age 
groups, as was the order of the questions within each decision task according to 
five different sequences.  
Prior to testing, participants were given a short brief to familiarise 
themselves with the various tasks. The use of calculators was not permitted; 
however scrap paper and pens were provided and participants were informed that 
they could use these should they wish to aid them with their answers. 
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2.8  Results 
The data in table 2.8 is consistent with data in Experiment 1 showing 
declines in processing speed, fluid intelligence and numeracy as a function of age. 
Furthermore, older adults performed better than younger adults in the vocabulary 
task (measuring crystallised abilities). 
Table 2.8 Descriptive Statistics for Young and Old Participants  
Predictive Measures Young Old 
 M SD M SD 
Age 21.14 5.34 71.74 5.59 
Ravens 31.61 2.39 26.07 5.03 
Digit Comparison 75.83 13.42 57.5 13.8 
Numeracy 9.47 1.4 7.71 2.16 
Need for Cognition 63.26 9.9 57.33 12.85 
Vocabulary 58.12 9.76 64.28 15.66 
 
An independent samples t test showed that young participants did 
significantly better than old participants on scores for numeracy, t (126) = 5.49, p < 
.01, digit comparison, t (126) = 7.62, p < .01 and RAVENS, t (125) =7.93, p < .01, 
and on need for cognition, t (126) =2.93, p < .01. Finally, older adults performed 
significantly better on the vocabulary task than younger adults t (120) = -2.63, p < 
.01. 
Table 2.9 Descriptive Statistics for Young and Old Participants for Topic and Question 
Type. 
Problem Type Condition Young Old 
 
 
 
Factual 
 M % SD M % SD 
Utility Task 95.90 11.04 84.66 27.16 
Phone Task 85.77 18.2 71.96 30.98 
 
Inferential 
Utility Task 51.66 24.39 44.97 29.73 
Phone Task 70.13 26.02 55.03 25.73 
Average time taken to 
complete task (min) 
Utility Task 9.4 4.57 13.37 6.58 
Phone Task 9.78 4.53 13.43 6.78 
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Table 2.9 shows the percentage means and standard deviations for the 
number of correct decisions older and younger adults made in both decision 
contexts. The data suggests that younger adults performed better than older adults 
on all questions; and that all participants scored better on factual questions 
compared to inferential questions. Younger adults completed both tasks an 
average of approximately 4 minutes more quickly than older adults. A t test 
confirmed that younger adults completed the utility task significantly faster than 
older adults, t (128) = 3.97, p < .01. Young adults also completed the mobile phone 
task significantly more quickly than older adults, t (128) =-3.59, p < .01.  
A 2X2X2 (Age X Question type X Topic) repeated measures ANOVA was 
used to analyse the data. Results indicated a significant main effect of age (old vs. 
young), F (1,126) = 18.97, p<.01, η² = .13. Please refer to Statistics Appendix 2 for 
all summary tables corresponding to Experiment 2.  
A significant main effect of question type (factual vs. inferential) was 
revealed, F (1,126) = 231.38, p <.01, η² = .65, but no significant interaction was 
found between age and question type, F (1,126) = .18 p >.05, η² = 0. This data 
replicates the results of Experiment 1 whereby it seems both younger and older 
adults had more difficulty in identifying the correct answer as the problems 
became more complex. In contrast with the findings from Experiment 1, the data 
from the current study suggests that older adults were not as successful as 
younger adults at making accurate judgements. 
There was no significant main effect of topic (utility supplier vs. mobile 
phone company), F (1,126) = .48, p >.05, η² = 0 and no significant interaction was 
found between age and topic, F (1,126) = 1.78, p >.05, η² = .24. This data suggests 
that both young and old adults found each topic equally demanding. In addition, no 
significant interaction between question type (factual vs. inferential), topic (energy 
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company vs. mobile phone supplier) and age (young vs. old) was established, F 
(1,126) = .51 p>.05, η² = 0. 
Although many of these findings are consistent with those of Experiment 1, 
the data from the current study indicates a main effect of age. This suggests that 
age did impact performance on the decision making task. Further analysis revealed 
that when vocabulary was used as a covariate, the effect of age remained robust F 
(1,119) = 17.42 p <.01, η² =.13 and a main effect of question type (factual vs. 
inferential) was stable, F (1,119) = 10.1, p <.01, η² = .08. No significant interaction 
was revealed between question type and vocabulary, F (1,119) = .02 p >.05, η² = 0. 
Finally, no significant interaction was revealed between age and question type, F 
(1,119) = .06, p >.05, η² = 0.  
When fluid intelligence was added alongside vocabulary as a covariate, the 
main effect of age disappeared F (1,117) = .39, p >.05, η² = 0, as did the main effect 
of problem type F (1,117) = .6, p >.05, η² = .01. No significant interaction was 
revealed between age and question type, F (1,117) = .58, p >.05, η² = .01, 
vocabulary and question type, F (1,117) = .18, p >.05, η² = 0, or fluid intelligence 
and question type, F (1,117) = 1.98, p >.05, η² = .02. This finding suggests that the 
age differences in decision-making ability can be explained by differences in fluid 
intelligence (as seen in Experiment 1). 
When numeric ability was added as a covariate alongside vocabulary and 
fluid intelligence, the main effect of age remained absent F (1,116) = 1.63, p >.05, 
η² = .01 as did the main effect of problem type, F (1,116) = .1.41, p >.05, η² = .01. No 
significant interaction was found between age and question type, F (1,116) = .11, p 
>.05, η² = 0. No interaction was revealed between question type and vocabulary, F 
(1,116) = .06, p >.05, η² = 0. However significant interactions were found between 
question type and fluid intelligence, F (1,116) = 5.89, p <.05, η² = .05 and question 
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type and numeracy, F (1,116) = 6.58, p <.01, η² = .05. This data suggests that 
participants with lower levels of fluid and numeric ability were more affected by 
question difficulty. In other words, individuals who scored poorly on measures of 
fluid intelligence and numeracy found inferential questions more difficult than 
participants who scored highly on these measures. 
Because no significant difference in performance in either topic domain 
was established, the data from the utility and mobile phone company problems 
were combined. To examine whether there were any relationships between 
predictive measures of performance and aptitude on factual and inferential 
problems for younger and older adults, a series of Pearson correlations were 
carried out.  
Table 2.10 Pearson Correlation Matrix among Predictive Measures of Ability, 
Questions Type and Combined Topics for Young Old Adults 
  Predictors 
Question Group Numeracy Digit 
Comparison 
Ravens Need for 
Cognition 
Vocabulary 
 
Factual 
Young .14 .28* .25* -.06 .01 
Old .34** .25* .57* .32* .09 
 
Inferential 
Young .4** .16 .21 .03 -.04 
Old .51** .28* .44** .24 .18 
 
Combined 
Young .38** .37* .3* 0 -.03 
Old .5** .31* .6** .33* .16 
*p < 0.05 **p<0.01 
The pattern of data for older adults displayed in Table 2.10 shows a strong 
relationship between performance on factual and inferential questions and fluid 
intelligence and numeracy. The pattern of results was less clear for young adults, 
however once the data from both question types was combined, numeracy, digit 
comparison and Ravens were all found to be significantly related to performance 
on the decision making task. 
A multiple regression analysis was performed next. Numeracy, fluid 
intelligence, crystallised intelligence, speed of processing and need for cognition 
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were entered as predictive variables. In total, three independent analyses were run 
for each age group with factual, inferential and combined scores for both problem 
types entered as dependent variables. The data from the two topic domains were 
collapsed so that the total number of factual and inferential questions correctly 
answered by either age group could be analysed. 
Table 2.11 Multiple Regression Analysis for Younger Adults Decision Making Ability 
and Predictive Measures of Performance 
Question Predictors β t Sig R² Adjusted R² 
 
Factual 
Numeracy 0 -.01 .99  
 
.15 
 
 
.07 
Fluid Intelligence .23 1.71 .09º 
Vocabulary -.08 -.57 .57 
Speed of Processing .31 2.4 .02* 
 Need for Cognition .01 .09 .93 
 
Inferential 
Numeracy .36 2.74 .01*  
 
.2 
 
 
.12 
Fluid Intelligence .11 .79 .43 
Vocabulary -.17 -1.31 .2 
Speed of Processing .1 .84 .41 
 Need for Cognition .03 .22 .83 
 
Combined 
Numeracy .78 2.14 .04*  
 
.24 
 
 
.17 
Fluid Intelligence .2 1.58 .12 
Vocabulary -.17 -1.35 .18 
Speed of Processing .24 2 .05* 
 Need for Cognition .03 .22 .83 
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01, ° p< .1 
Table 2.11 shows that for young adults, performance on factual questions 
could be independently predicted by speed of processing. Furthermore, fluid 
intelligence was a marginally significant predictor of consumer decision-making on 
these types of problems. In terms of inferential decision-making, numeracy was 
revealed to be a highly significant independent predictor of performance. 
Numeracy and speed of processing were also found to be significant predictors of 
performance when both factual and inferential problems were combined. 
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Table 2.12 Multiple Regression Analysis for Older Adults Decision Making Ability and 
Predictive Measures of Performance 
Question Predictors β t Sig R² Adjusted R² 
 
Factual 
Numeracy .1 .84 .4  
 
.44 
 
 
.38 
Fluid Intelligence .59 4.49 0** 
Vocabulary -.18 -1.49 .14 
Speed of Processing -.02 -.16 .87 
 Need for Cognition .12 .89 .38 
 
Inferential 
Numeracy .46 3.52 0**  
 
.36 
 
 
.3 
Fluid Intelligence .18 1.25 .22 
Vocabulary .08 .66 .51 
Speed of Processing .17 1.3 .2 
 Need for Cognition -.16 -1.15 .26 
 
Combined 
Numeracy .33 2.78 .01*  
 
.5 
 
 
.46 
Fluid Intelligence .47 3.75 0** 
Vocabulary -.06 -.57 .58 
Speed of Processing .08 .72 .48 
 Need for Cognition -.02 -.14 .89 
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01 
Table 2.12 shows that fluid intelligence was a highly significant predictor of 
older adults’ decision-making ability for factual questions. For inferential 
questions, numeracy was found to be a highly significant independent predictor of 
performance. When both factual and inferential problems were combined, both 
numeracy and fluid ability were found to independently predict decision-making 
performance.  
Data from the six questions aimed at assessing experience were analysed 
using a Chi-squared. Results indicated that older adults were most likely to be 
responsible for payment of utility bills, χ² (1) = 36.52, P <.01, most likely to have 
changed their utility supplier in the last year, χ² (1) = 5.86, P <.05, and contacted 
their utility supplier in the last year, χ² (1) = 6.83, P <.05.  
With regard to participants’ interaction with mobile phone companies, 
young adults were most likely to own a mobile phone, χ² (1) = 17.53, P <.01, be 
responsible for paying their mobile phone, χ² (1) = 8.17, P <.05, and have changed 
their mobile phone company in the last year, χ² (1) = 18.78, P <.01. 
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Over all, these findings indicate that younger adults have much greater 
interaction with mobile phone companies while older adults are much more 
engaged with utility suppliers. Finally, analysis exploring whether experience with 
utility suppliers and mobile phone companies affected decision making 
performance was conducted. A number of ANOVAs (age X experience X Total 
number of factual and inferential questions answered correctly) were performed. 
Results revealed a main effect of age on decision performance across all measures 
of experience. No main effects of experience on decision performance for either 
topic was found.  
2.9  Discussion 
Experiment 2 sought to extend and replicate the findings from Experiment 
1 by adding a few changes to the method. A sample twice as large was used; an 
additional consumer task was introduced and a scale measuring individual need 
for cognition was added.  
Data from Experiment 2 was consistent with both previous literature and 
the findings in Experiment 1: younger adults out-performed older adults on 
measures of fluid intelligence, speed of processing and numeric ability whilst, 
older adults did better on a measure of crystallised intelligence. Interestingly, 
Experiment 2 revealed a significant main effect of age, whereby younger adults 
made better consumer decisions than older adults and furthermore, that when 
fluid intelligence was added as covariate, the effects of age disappeared. This 
finding replicates that found by Experiment 1 and suggests that age differences in 
decision-making are affected by fluid intelligence.   
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Further data replicating findings from Experiment 1 showed both young 
and old participants found complex problems more difficult than simple problems. 
This finding supports previous research (e.g. Hanoch, et. al., 2011; Hibbard, et. al., 
2002; Schaie & Willis, 1993) whereby comprehension is compromised as decision 
environments becomes more complex. 
The results illustrated that adding fluid intelligence and numeracy created 
the best model for predicting performance on inferential consumer decisions for 
older adults. This finding supports our prediction regarding the key role of 
numeric ability in making consumer choices. 
In addition, the data also suggests that domain specific knowledge cannot 
explain choice. It seems that even when presented with a consumer decision in a 
relatively unfamiliar domain (selecting a mobile phone company), older adults 
were able to perform to an equivalent level as when making decisions in a familiar 
domain (selecting an energy supplier). That is, experience had little effect. 
Finally, the notion that older adults’ performance was influenced by 
increased need for cognition was not supported for two reasons. First, older adults 
performed poorly compared to young adults on the need for cognition scale. 
Second, need for cognition was unrelated to performance on the consumer 
decision task. Therefore this data suggests that need for cognition cannot account 
for consumer decision-making ability in these domains. 
2.10  General Discussion 
In a country where millions of older adults are living in fuel poverty and are 
faced with increasing rises in the price of basic commodities, the need to make 
sound financial decisions is imperative. The current research aimed to investigate 
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age differences in consumer decision-making. In attempting to explain the 
differences factors thought to predict performance including numeracy, fluid and 
crystallised intelligence, speed of processing, need for cognition and experience 
were investigated. It was proposed that age-related limitations in cognitive ability 
may affect older adult’s ability to make good consumer decisions. Furthermore, the 
idea that older adults may compensate for declines in fluid intelligence by relying 
more on other abilities such as knowledge gained through experience, crystallised 
intelligence or numeracy was investigated.  
Data from Experiment 1 indicated that young and old adults were equally 
adept at making factual and inferential decisions when selecting an energy 
supplier. These findings are interesting for two reasons; first, older adults 
performed significantly worse than young adults on most predictive measures of 
ability; and second, previous research suggests that older adults tend to perform 
poorly on decision making exercises compared to young adults. Analysis revealed 
that when a measure of crystallised intelligence was added as a covariate, a main 
effect of age emerged (perhaps because older adults in this experiment scored 
particularly highly in terms of crystallised ability and crystallised ability is 
associated with relevant knowledge). A main effect of age was already apparent 
from the data for Experiment 2 whereby younger adults were more adept at 
making consumer choices than older adults. Most interestingly, the main effect of 
age could be removed from both experiments when fluid intelligence was added as 
a covariate. In addition, numeric ability was found to independently predict 
performance on the decision-making task for both young and old adults. These 
findings add further support to the idea that fluid intelligence and numeric ability 
play important independent roles in consumer decision making. These findings are 
consistent with ideas proposed by Stanovich and West (2008) who thought that 
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making good decisions required having enough experience to recognise which 
decision rule applies and enough fluid ability to implement it. With regards to 
Experiments 1 and 2, decisions were made in a consumer context where the 
decision rule was numeric in nature. Therefore, good numeric ability was crucial in 
recognising which rule to apply and fluid intelligence was important in terms of 
having the capacity to apply it.  
The data from Experiments 1 and 2 is consistent with the idea that decision-
making is affected by different processes for old and young adults. In Experiment 
2, numeric ability was found to independently predict decision performance for 
younger adults on inferential questions. However, no other cognitive measures of 
ability were found to significantly predict decision-making aptitude in younger 
adults for either experiment. For older adults, numeric ability and fluid intelligence 
were consistently found to predict performance in decision making in Experiments 
1 and 2. These results are consistent with previous research by Peters, et al., 
(2006), Tanius et al., (2009) and Wood et al., (2011) who found that numeracy was 
a strong independent predictor of performance in similar decision tasks. These 
findings imply that in the case of older adults’ financial decision making, 
performance is highly dependent upon numeric ability. Taken together, previous 
research and data from Experiments 1 and 2 may have important financial 
consequences when considered in terms of making decisions outside of the 
laboratory. Individuals with poor numeric ability may be at increased risk of 
making bad consumer choices with serious financial implications. In support of 
this argument, Banks and Oldfield (2006) reported that individuals with good 
numeric ability were more than two and a half times more likely to be in the 
highest wealth quintile. Those with the worst numeric ability were over 6 times 
more likely to be found in the poorest wealth quintile. Overall, it seems that data 
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from the current study and previous research support the idea that numeric ability 
is an independent skill, integral to making sound consumer decisions. 
The data raises important practical implications. It is well established that 
little can be done to halt most age related cognitive declines. However, if numeric 
ability is malleable, it may have the potential to be improved, even in later life. This 
is an exciting possibility as it suggests that numeracy skills in older populations 
have the potential to be developed in order to support their consumer decision-
making. Previous studies have demonstrated that educational interventions 
designed to target low-literacy individuals in making health choices can benefit 
these individuals (DeWalt et al., 2006). This finding has also been shown to be true 
of numeracy. For example, Nicol and Anderson (2001) showed that numeric ability 
could be improved in adults with mild learning disabilities by implementing a 
maths training programme, using either a computer or teacher lead course.   
The current experiments have a number of limitations. First, the decision-
making tasks had been simplified and therefore do not necessarily capture the 
complexity of these problems that people are faced with in everyday life. Second, 
the tasks were well structured and well defined with regards to the dimensions of 
relevant information (for example, prices are displayed as whole numbers and the 
amount of available information to compare is comparatively small), and therefore 
differ from making real-life decisions, which have more complicated features. 
Furthermore, participants were forced to make a choice, whereas when faced with 
choices in the real world, consumers have the option to abstain from making a 
decision. Third, the decisions that participants made did not involve significant 
consequences and thus may not necessarily reflect real-life decision-making. It is 
possible that participant performance could have been improved if incentives were 
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included. Indeed, it is important to note that consumers making choices outside of 
the laboratory could be more liable to influence from other factors (e.g. emotions) 
which may place increased limitations on their decision-making ability.  
It is becoming ever more important that individuals are able to use numeric 
information in making financial choices, medical decisions and many other vital 
evaluations. The need for a clear understanding of what influences decision-
making abilities as we age is imperative. Identifying the types of tasks which are 
most challenging for older adults, and how age related potential and limits develop 
is key in order that judgement and decision aids can be tailored optimally.  
Chapter 3 explores how older adults adapt to consumer environment 
structures given that age-related cognitive declines may place limitations on their 
decision-making ability. In an attempt to maximise the validity of the research, 
participants were provided with three decision options available to consumers in 
the real world: to stick with a predetermined choice, to switch to an alternative 
option or, to decide in the future. Furthermore, it is important to consider that the 
reality of decision-making in a consumer environment often requires individuals 
to engage in some form of self-regulation. The literature suggests that older adults 
have a positivity bias and are better at regulating their emotions. However, it has 
also been well documented that older adults have comparatively fewer cognitive 
resources on which to draw when making decisions. How older adults balance 
increases in affective control and declines in cognitive ability when making 
consumer choices may have important implications for their quality of life. Next, 
how older adults may optimise their restricted cognitive reserves by using 
emotion regulation to lessen the effects of age-related cognitive decline is 
considered in the context of Baumeister, et al’s., (1998) strength model.  
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 Chapter 3 
3.1  Introduction 
Chapter 2 identified and measured how cognitive and numeric abilities 
affect consumer decision-making performance in young and old adults. The results 
suggested that numeric and fluid ability were good predictors of decision-making 
capability for older adults. It is important to note that the problems presented to 
participants in Chapter 2 only required that one alternative be selected. However 
when making a decision in the real world, people often have the opportunity to 
stick with a pre-selected option, select an alternative option (switch), or to avoid 
making a decision by deferring (do not make a choice) or postponing the decision 
(decide to make a decision in the future). Consumers can exercise a number of 
defer-choice options; this may include deciding to seek more information on 
existing alternatives or searching for new alternatives. Given the evidence 
suggesting that older adults have limited cognitive resources, it seems reasonable 
to expect they may tend to select less demanding strategies when making 
decisions, this might involve attempting to avoid making a decision or choosing to 
stick with a pre-determined option. As will be outlined, much of the literature has 
concentrated on the circumstances where participants simply defer making a 
decision. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the conditions where 
participants opt to decide in the future, despite this representing a valid response 
to many of the types of decisions faced by consumers. A primary aim of 
Experiment 3 was to measure age differences in the number of times older and 
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younger adults chose to stick, switch or decide in the future when presented with a 
preselected option.  
A secondary aim was to assess age differences in decision-making in a 
manner that reflected the real world. It is acknowledged that individuals are 
subject to many factors, which may impact their ability to make good consumer 
choices. These factors include affect, emotion and motivation. Experiment 3 
examined the extent to which older and younger adults were influenced by tasks 
that required emotional regulation prior to decision-making. 
3.2  Choosing to Defer or Decide in the Future 
Dahr (1997) and Shafir and Tversky (1992) proposed that an individual 
will be more likely to defer choice when the decision environment becomes more 
complex. For example, research has shown choices involving conflict cause people 
to defer more often than when choices are easy (Shafir & Tversky, 1992). The 
literature proposes two dominant viewpoints in explaining why individuals defer 
choice (Karni & Schwartz, 1977; Tversky & Shafir, 1992 ). On the one hand, some 
researchers propose that the no-choice option should be chosen when none of the 
alternatives are seen as attractive, or when there are benefits to further search 
(Karni & Schwartz, 1977). Conversely, research into pre-decisional processes 
suggests that consumers may decide not to choose in order to avoid making 
difficult trade-offs (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Decision avoidance can be defined as a 
tendency to avoid making a choice or by postponing it by seeking an easy way out 
that involves no action or change (Wesseler, Weikard & Weaver, 2003). 
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Tversky and Shafir (1992) conducted a number of studies to investigate 
why individuals chose to defer choice.  In one study, participants were asked to 
imagine that they were making a choice between two student apartments. They 
were presented with information about the monthly rent and distance from the 
university campus. Each apartment had one bedroom and a kitchenette. 
Participants were then given the option to choose between two apartments or to 
continue to search for alternative apartments. Results indicated that the decision 
to defer choice was dependent upon the difficulty of choosing among the options 
under consideration. Tversky and Shafir (1992) concluded that when the choice 
involved conflict, people were more likely to seek a new option than when the 
choice was easy.  
In another experiment, Tversky and Shafir (1992) illustrated that decision 
conflict increased the tendency to select both the default option and the tendency 
to defer choice. Two conditions existed. In the first condition, participants were 
asked to imagine that they were considering buying a CD player but had not yet 
decided which model to buy. They were asked to imagine that they pass a store 
that is having a one-day clearance sale that offers a popular SONY player for $99, 
well below the list price. Participants were then asked whether they wanted to buy 
the SONY CD player, or wait until they had learnt more about various other models. 
In the second condition, participants were asked to imagine the same scenario as 
in condition one, with the addition of a top of the line AIWA CD player priced at 
$159 (again, well below the list price) being available in the sale. Participants were 
then asked if they would like to buy the AIWA player, the SONY player or, wait 
until they had learnt more about various models. The results from this study 
suggested that the addition of a second CD player significantly increased the 
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tendency to delay a purchase. When the SONY CD player was available alone, it 
could be seen as representing a “good buy,” and the same may also be true for the 
AIWA. However, when both models were available, Tversky and Shafir (1992) 
proposed that the decision-maker faced a conflict between the better priced SONY 
and the higher quality AIWA. It was proposed that the difficulty in resolving this 
conflict lead participants to defer their decision and put off the purchase.  
The findings outlined by Tversky and Shafir (1992) supported previous 
work by Shapard (1964), who noted that although people experience little 
difficulty in evaluating alternatives when considering only one attribute, their 
ability to weigh or combine separate attributes is not as good. Although there is no 
precise definition of conflict, it is generally assumed to depend upon the degree to 
which the alternatives under consideration have different advantages and 
disadvantages (Dahr, 1997). 
In a number of studies, Dahr (1997) demonstrated that the attractiveness 
difference between alternative options can influence the conflict between different 
options, and thus affect the probability that an individual will defer their choice. In 
one study all participants were presented with a choice set with two non-
dominated alternatives for four different choice problems. The alternative options 
were described on five features: three good and two bad. For example, participants 
were shown information about two holiday destinations. Destination A was listed 
as having the following attributes: good theatres and clubs, good restaurants, 
attractive beach, bad weather possible and frequent traffic jams. Destination B had 
the following features: beautiful scenery, good museums, plenty of good party 
spots, has a pollution problem and unfriendly tourists. Participants had three 
options, to look for other holiday destinations, choose destination A or choose 
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destination B. Participants were assigned to one of two conditions: those in the 
experimental group were asked to think about each feature for two alternatives 
and then rate the extent to which it made them more or less likely to choose each 
option. Participants in the control condition were simply instructed to read the 
information about the alternatives carefully before making their decisions. Results 
indicated that 40 per cent of participants in the control condition decided to look 
for other holiday destinations, this number increased to 54 per cent when 
participants were first asked to rate the importance of each feature. These findings 
provide evidence supporting the notion that the inability to clearly identify the 
best choice among alternatives results in increases in the decision to defer choice. 
As outlined above, opting to defer choice can be seen as a way of avoiding 
making a decision. Wesseler et al., (2003) suggested that decision avoidance may 
take the form of postponing making a decision. It is proposed that deferring a 
choice (i.e. deciding not to make a choice) and opting to postpone making a 
decision (i.e. to decide in the future) may incur very different psychological 
interpretations and therefore, potentially different responses. In other words, 
providing participants with the option to decide in the future suggests that if 
participants choose not to make a decision now, they should expect to do so at 
some forthcoming point in time, whereas choosing to defer implies that a decision 
will not be revisited. Taken together, it is not unreasonable to propose that 
selecting to defer or to decide in the future may incur different costs in terms of 
psychological resources. To date, research on deciding to make a decision in the 
future is scarce. This is surprising given that opting to make a decision in the future 
represents a valid response to many consumer decisions. 
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3.3  Choosing to Stick 
The choice to stick with a pre-selected option can be viewed as arising 
from similar decision conditions as the choice to defer. The role of effort in 
explaining why people tend to stick with a pre-selected option has been widely 
discussed (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008).  
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) found that people showed a strong and 
robust tendency to stick with what they have (the status-quo) even when it had 
been randomly allocated. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) developed two 
versions of a number of decision questions: neutral and status quo. In the neutral 
version, participants were presented with a novel decision whereby they were 
required to make a selection from several alternatives, all of which were 
comparatively equal. Participants were given information about financial 
investments and instructed to imagine that they had received a large sum of 
money and were considering investing it in either one of four portfolios: a 
moderate-risk company, a high-risk company, treasury bills or municipal bonds. In 
the status quo version, participants were presented with the same scenario 
whereby they were again required to make a selection from a number of 
alternatives however, this time, they were told that a significant portion of the 
money was already invested in a moderate-risk company. In this status-quo 
condition, one of the options presented was equal to selecting the status quo. Many 
different scenarios were investigated, all using the same experimental design. 
Results from this study show that an alternative became significantly more likely 
to be selected when it was designated as the status quo.  
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Hartman, Doane and Woo (1991) tested the status-quo bias in a field 
setting using a survey of California electric power consumers. Initially, consumers 
were divided into two groups: one with much more reliable service than the other. 
Each group was then asked to select a preference among six combinations of 
service reliabilities and rates, with one of the options designated as the status quo. 
The results demonstrated a clear status quo bias, 60.2 per cent of consumers in the 
high reliability group selected their status quo as their first choice. In addition, 
58.3 per cent of consumers in the low reliability group also chose to stick with the 
status quo as their first option. In other words, people tended to stick with their 
electricity supplier regardless of service. The status quo bias has been observed 
both inside and outside of the laboratory.  
Similarly to the literature on status-quo bias, most existing research on the 
effects of default options concludes that default options affect choice by taking 
advantage of consumers’ processing limitations. Researchers have often seen 
status-quo bias and default preferences as representing a very similar idea, namely 
that individuals are highly prone to keeping with customary (status-quo) or 
default options even when other alternatives are available (Loewenstien, Brennan 
& Volpp, 2007). For example, Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse (2002) showed that 
consumers who were obliged to opt out of an e-mail list were as much as twice as likely 
to participate in the list than consumers who could explicitly choose between receiving 
and not receiving the e-mails. Similarly, Park, Jun, and MacInnis (2000) found that 
consumers presented with a fully loaded car and given the opportunity to remove 
optional features to save on cost ended up with a more expensive set of features than 
those presented with a basic model and given the opportunity to add features for more 
money. 
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In line with a cognitive limitations explanation of decision-making, 
Wesseler, Weikard and Weaver (2003) suggested that people might avoid making 
a decision (i.e. stick with a pre-selected option or postpone the decision) so that 
they can conserve energy (or resources). In other words, individuals perceive the 
cognitive effort required to compare competing alternatives to be too costly. 
Peoples’ resources are subject to many demands. How young and old adults 
reconcile these demands and make good decisions when resources are limited is 
an important question. To date, no research has empirically investigated the 
relationship between ageing and the following decision options: to stick (with a 
pre-selected option), switch or choose to decide in the future. Given stark 
convergent evidence that ageing is associated with declines in many abilities key to 
good decision-making, it is predicted that older adults will attempt to conserve 
resources by selecting strategies which are least demanding of their cognitive 
reserves. In other words, older adults will choose to stick with a preselected option 
or choose to decide in the future more often than young adults.    
3.4  Ageing, Limited Resources and Decision-Making  
Findings provide strong evidence that self-regulation, in particular, 
emotional functioning, is spared from age-related decline, if not enhanced with age 
(Charles & Carstensen, 2004). This pattern is in stark contrast to the substantial 
body of literature documenting age-related declines in cognitive ability. How 
ageing affects decisions that draw on both emotional and cognitive processes may 
have different implications for young and old adults. Experiment 3 seeks to 
examine how areas of preserved functioning may help in determining methods to 
compensate for age-related declines in fluid ability and decision-making. When 
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making choices outside of the laboratory, individuals are subject to many affective 
factors. These factors can be seen as competing for resources, yet regulating them 
can also be costly in terms of cognitive reserves. The consequences of these factors 
on decision-making can be considered in the context of the Strength Model 
(Muraven, Baumeister & Tice, 1998). The Strength Model proposes that acts of 
self-regulation (cognitive, emotional or behavioural) all draw upon one, limited 
supply. Furthermore, all acts involving self-control, volition or initiative rely on 
this resource (Baumeister, Muraven & Tice, 2000). It is thought that this resource 
is easily depleted (a process known as ego-depletion). Ego-depletion has been 
reported across a variety of tasks in physical, intellectual and emotional domains. 
The relationship between ego-depletion and decision-making may have important 
implications in terms the type of choice a consumer will make.  
Dewitte, Pandelaere, Briers and Warlop, (2005) showed that participants 
were significantly more likely to select a product compliant with that presented on 
a poster after a period of ego-depletion. In their study, participants were assigned 
to one of three ego-depletion conditions: high, low and no ego-depletion. This was 
manipulated by means of an information search task on the Internet under time 
pressure. Following the manipulation procedure, participants were required to 
select one brand from a selection of brands for several product categories. One of 
these brands was made salient by means of a poster display. These results suggest 
that ego-depletion can increase the effect of salient situational cues, such as a 
supporting poster display on consumers’ choice. An alternative explanation is that 
participants viewed the brand depicted in the poster as a default selection. Any 
attempt to process alternative options can be seen as requiring an increased 
expenditure of effort. Both these explanations are supported by Baumeister et al., 
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(1998) strength model whereby ego-depleted individuals will seek to conserve 
resources by reducing the level of elaboration used when making a choice. 
Likewise Pocheptsova et al., (2007) found that depleted individuals were more 
likely to engage in flawed decision strategies in an attempt to conserve energy by 
taking short cuts instead of engaging in effortful processes.  
Other research has revealed that seemingly unrelated functions such as 
emotion and executive function seem to draw from the same limited resource. 
Indeed, decision-making is often done in the context of competing distractions and 
affective responses. Schmeichel (2007) investigated whether attempts to control 
emotional responses deplete the capacity for executive control. Participants were 
shown two short film clips, which were intended to elicit negative emotions. One 
clip depicted disgusting eye surgery and the other clip showed sad children 
describing family hardships. Some participants were instructed to exaggerate the 
outward expression of their emotions as they watched, whereas other participants 
were instructed to simply express their emotions. Results showed that 
exaggerating the expression of negative emotional responses reduced subsequent 
working memory span. Other researchers have shown that emotion regulation 
effects memory both in laboratory settings (Richards & Gross, 2000) and outside 
the laboratory environment (Richards, 2000). The finding that emotion regulation 
and cognition draw on the same resource used for executive functioning could 
have implications for consumer decision-making.  
Research provides compelling evidence in support of the strength model, 
however self-regulation may not always have a depleting effect on reserves. 
Specifically, it is thought that different forms of emotion regulation incur different 
consequences, which vary as a function of age.  
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Two forms of emotion regulation were defined by Gross: reappraisal and 
suppression. Reappraisal is thought to take place early on by engaging executive 
control processes to redefine the meaning of a situation and thus determine the 
subsequent sequence of emotions.  Suppression takes place later and requires the 
individual to consciously manage and modify the behavioural aspects of their 
emotional responses. It is proposed that reappraisal entails less cognitive effort 
compared to suppression and therefore, when regulating emotions using this 
method, executive functions are more likely to remain intact. Suppression is 
considered to be relatively demanding of cognitive resources, which may lead to 
impaired executive processes. In general, research investigating the effects of 
emotion-regulation can be seen as supporting a model of limited resources (Gross, 
1998; Richards 2000). 
In terms of ageing, John and Gross (2004) proposed that older adults tend 
to make greater use of reappraisal and less use of suppression. This hypothesis 
was based upon two observations in the ageing literature. First, when compared to 
younger adults, older adults tend to report experiencing less negative emotion 
(Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 
2003). Second, older adults describe having greater emotional control than 
younger adults (Gross, et al., 1997).  
Research investigating the interaction between age, emotion regulation and 
executive function has shown that reappraisal has a far greater impact on memory 
for young adults compared with older adults (Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009). 
In their study, Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields, (2009) allocated both young and old 
participants into one of three conditions: control, down-regulation and 
maintenance control. All participants were shown a film designed to induce 
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feelings of disgust. The footage used depicted a woman eating horse rectum while 
describing her experience. Prior to viewing the film, participants completed a 
memory task and rated their emotions. Participants in the control condition were 
given no instructions regarding how to regulate their emotions. Participants in the 
down-regulation condition were told to change the negative emotions elicited by 
the film into positive ones as quickly as possible and, participants in the 
maintenance control condition were told to maintain any negative feelings 
experienced while viewing the film. After the film, participants again rated their 
emotions and completed another memory exercise. Results showed that 
instructions to down-regulate emotions differently affected working memory 
performance in young and older adults. Working memory performance was 
impaired after the mood induction for young adults, yet was unaffected in older 
adults. Furthermore, memory was unaffected in both young and old adults when 
they were given no explicit emotion regulation instruction, or when given 
instructions to maintain feelings of disgust. These findings are consistent with the 
literature insofar that regulating emotions is more costly for young adults 
compared to old (Baumeister at al., 2007; Richards, 2004). 
In summary, research on both the physical and cognitive costs of emotion 
regulation illustrate that different emotion regulation strategies can have diverse 
consequences. The costs of emotion regulation may be different depending upon 
the strategy used. Understanding how emotion regulation interacts in terms of 
facilitating or mediating cognitive costs could be important to recognising its role 
in decision-making. Many models of judgement and decision-making propose that 
good decisions require a number of exhaustive cognitive processes. Because ageing 
is associated with fewer cognitive resources, older adults may face an increased 
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disadvantage when making decisions following periods of emotion-regulation. 
However, literature on ageing and the positivity bias suggests that older adults 
simply have better strategies for dealing with emotionally demanding stimuli 
(Carstensen & Mikels, 2005). Alternatively, it may be that as with any practiced 
skill, the effectiveness of different emotion regulation strategies may change with 
age because cognitive resources required for practiced strategies are reduced.  
3.5  Experiment 3 
Many decisions are made while in a state of emotional arousal. For example, 
medical decision-making may entail significant consequences for an individual and 
therefore can be seen as carrying a considerable emotional burden. Making good 
decisions under these circumstances may be difficult for even the most able. 
However, even mundane, everyday decision-making can place a strain on the 
individual’s emotional and cognitive reserves. For example, an unexpected bill may 
cause worry or anxiety about financial repercussions. Complex discussions may 
lead to feelings of fatigue or pressure. Often an individual will control their 
emotions by engaging in a form of self-regulation. The toll of self-regulation on 
subsequent decision-making may be significant. How older adults balance declines 
in cognitive ability with advances in emotional control could have implications in 
terms of identifying ways to compensate for losses. 
It was observed that choosing to make a decision in the future has received 
very little attention in the decision literature. As outlined above, previous research 
has concentrated on the circumstances where participants defer making a 
decision. It was proposed that opting to defer a decision might be understood 
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differently compared to deciding to make a decision in the future. If this is true, it 
may be that allowing participants an option where they can decide in the future 
will reveal different findings compared to studies investigating the circumstances 
in which participants merely decide to defer. It is thought that the current study is 
unique in presenting both older and younger adults with the option to decide in 
the future. 
Experiment 3 tested a number of hypotheses. First, that participants who 
regulated emotions using a demanding strategy (suppression), while viewing a 
distressing film, would make decisions using strategies requiring comparatively 
few cognitive resources (e.g. to stick or decide in the future). The second 
hypothesis predicted that participants instructed to regulate their emotions using 
a less demanding strategy (reappraisal or none) would decide to switch more often 
and make more correct decisions as cognitive reserves remain intact.  
In terms of age differences, the ageing literature provides strong evidence 
in support of a developmental decline in cognitive abilities (such as fluid 
intelligence) and improvements in emotional control. Experiment 3 explored 
whether age-related advantages in emotion-regulation protected older adults from 
a state of ego-depletion or, whether ego-depletion was more prevalent in older 
adults due to age-related declines in cognitive resources. If age-related 
improvements in emotional control did protect older adults from the effects of 
ego-depletion, it was hypothesised that older adults placed in emotion-regulation 
conditions would make better (or equal) decisions compared to older adults in the 
control group.  However, it was also hypothesised that older adults may be more 
susceptible to the effects of ego-depletion due to declines in cognitive ability. If this 
was true, it was predicted that older adults in the emotion-regulation conditions 
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would make poorer decisions compared to those in the control group, and poorer 
decisions across all conditions compared to young adults.  
3.6  Method 
3.6.1  Participants 
A total of 120 participants took part in the study; 61 young adults (52 female) aged 
18 - 45 (M = 23.71, SD =7.82) and 59 older adults (40 female) aged 63 – 93 (M = 
73.61, SD = 8.21). Participants from each age group were divided into three 
conditions: reappraisal (20 young and 20 old), suppression (20 young and 20 old) 
and control (21 young and 19 old). Older adults volunteered their time to complete 
the experiment and were recruited from Plymouth and the surrounding area. 
Young participants were recruited from the University of Plymouth and received 
course credits for their participation. 
3.6.2  Materials 
Films 
 
In line with previous research (Scheibe et al., 2009; Schmeichel, 2007), 
footage designed to elicit disgust was presented to participants. A one-minute film 
depicting close-up footage of a fish hook being removed from a patient’s eyeball 
was used in the current study. To test the reliable effects of the film at eliciting 
disgust a pilot study was conducted. Thirteen participants were shown the film 
and asked to rate on a likert type scale the extent to which they felt each of 16 
emotional states. A rating of zero indicated that the film did not induce this 
emotion at all and a rating of ten denoted that the film elicited it very strongly. Of 
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the 16 emotional states presented to participants ‘disgust’ and ‘tension’ were rated 
as the most strongly perceived emotions (see Statistics Appendix 3.1). To restore 
participants’ resources at the end of the experiment, a short comedy clip of Charlie 
Chaplin was presented. Research suggests that positive affect can help improve 
self-regulation following a period of ego-depletion (Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli & 
Muraven, 2007).  
Manipulation check questionnaire 
A manipulation check in the form of a short questionnaire was presented to 
participants after having viewed the film. This was used to verify whether 
instructions given to the reappraisal and suppression condition (but not the 
control group) were effective. Participants were required to read through three 
statements and rate on a scale from 0-8 how much they agreed or disagreed with 
each (‘0’ denoted ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘8’ denoted ‘strongly agree’). This scale 
was used for the first three statements: “During the film, I did not feel anything at 
all”, “During the film, I felt emotions but tried to hide them” and, “During the film, I 
reacted completely spontaneously.” A fourth statement required participants to 
rate on a scale from 0-8 how difficult they found it to follow instructions given to 
them prior to watching the film. ‘0’ denoted ‘not at all difficult’ and ‘8’ denoted 
‘very difficult’. The fourth statement was not presented to participants in the 
control group as they were not given any instructions before viewing the film. The 
questions used in this manipulation check were borrowed directly from published 
research investigating the cognitive, physiological and social effects of emotion 
regulation (see Gross, 1998 and Richards and Gross, 2000). A copy of the questions 
presented to participants complete with response scales can be found in Appendix 
3B. 
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Decision Task 
To increase ecological validity, a new decision task was designed 
comprising choice options available to real consumers. This included the option to 
stick with a current option, switch to an alternative option or decide in the future. 
The decision task presented participants with hypothetical scenarios in which they 
were asked to make four choices in each of three consumer domains. In total, 
participants were required to make twelve decisions. The three consumer domains 
asked participants to make a choice regarding: a travel company (hotel, flight cost 
and how many stars the hotel had), hiring a car (hire, insurance and fuel economy), 
and a diving school (diving lessons, equipment cost and customer satisfaction). 
Information about eight companies labelled A-H was presented in a unique table 
for each of the twelve questions (see Table 3.1 and Appendix 3A for further 
details). An example scenario presented to participants is also depicted below. 
Participants were asked to imagine that they were making choices as they would in 
real life. 
 “Imagine that you are planning a holiday. You are thinking about using Travel 
Company A which costs £200 for the hotel and £100 for the flight. The hotel has a 
four-star rating. You are generally satisfied with this holiday package but you 
suspect another travel company may offer better value and so you wish to investigate 
further.”  
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Table 3.1 Table of Travel Companies Depicting the Price of Hotels and Flights and the 
Number of Stars Each Hotel was rated as Holding. 
 
In each table one company had been highlighted. Participants were told that 
this indicated the company they were thinking of selecting. Participants then had 
the option to ‘stick’ with the option already selected, ‘switch’ to an alternative 
company or ‘decide in the future.’ Prior to attempting each problem, participants 
were presented with a short vignette outlining what they were expected to do and 
highlighting the important information relevant to each decision. If the option to 
‘switch’ was chosen, participants were asked to indicate which company they 
would switch to by circling a letter from A-H.  
Each of the three sections contained four questions. The questions were 
individually designed to manipulate difficulty. Questions were considered ‘difficult’ 
if differences in attractiveness between options were small (see problem types I 
and II). Questions were considered ‘easy’ if differences in attractiveness between 
options were large (see problem types III and IV). Each of these four questions was 
constructed so that the decisions were counterbalanced: (I) All options (A-H) were 
very similar, however two equal optimum choices were presented, one of which 
had already been selected. The correct choice would be to ‘stick.’ (II) All options 
(A-H) were very similar, with two equal optimum choices were available. However, 
Travel Company Price of Hotel Hotel Stars Price of Flight 
A £200  £100 
B £173  £127 
C £144  £156 
D £122  £183 
E £133  £172 
F £172  £138 
G £114  £196 
H £107  £203 
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neither of these options had been selected. The correct choice would therefore be 
to ‘switch’. (III) Six of the eight options were very similar, though one company 
was markedly better than the others and one company was much worse. The best 
option had already been selected therefore the correct response would be to ‘stick’. 
(IV) Six of the eight options were very similar, however, one company was much 
better value than the rest and one was much worse. An inferior option had been 
selected for this question, therefore the participant should opt to ‘switch’ to get a 
superior alternative.  
Performance on the consumer decision task was scored in a number of 
ways. Participants could achieve a total score of 12 (100%) if they opted to stick on 
problems where the correct option had already been selected (as was the case for 
6 items) and switch on problems where an incorrect alternative had been selected. 
Because the present task included the option for participants to decide in the 
future, the total number of correct answers a participant could attain varied 
depending on the number of times they chose to decide in the future. Another 
score was therefore given for the total mean percentage of times the option to 
decide in the future was selected. 
After the number of times each participant selected the option to decide in 
the future had been subtracted, three additional scores were calculated. First, the 
mean percentage of correct stick and switch actions. Second, the mean percentage 
of complete correct switch decisions. This was done to attain a clearer picture of 
decision accuracy. In order that a decision to switch be recorded as completely 
correct, two steps were required: 1) to choose to switch and, 2) to switch to the 
correct alternative. Finally, the mean percentage of times participants correctly 
chose to stick and make complete correct switch decisions.  
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Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994) 
The PANAS-X was used as a control measure to check that the ego-depletion 
manipulation was not affecting subsequent decision making because it caused 
changes in affect. One possible interpretation of the results is that self-regulation 
by way of suppression or reappraisal might have affected subsequent decision-
making performance insofar that trying to regulate emotion may have been 
sufficiently averse that it increased negative affect. It is important to investigate 
this interpretation because negative affect has been shown to facilitate careful 
cognitive elaboration (e.g., Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992). With regards to the 
current experiment, if emotion-regulation were to increase negativity it should 
follow that performance on the consumer decision task should be improved.  
Furthermore, the strength model of ego-depletion proposes that exertion of 
resources will be followed by a period of diminished capacity, or fatigue which is 
evidenced by poorer performance on subsequent tasks (Muraven et al., 1998). 
Should emotion-regulation be affective in causing a state of ego-depletion, it would 
be evidenced by higher scores on the fatigue sub-scale of the PANAS-X.    
The PANAS-X yields separate scores of positive affect, negative affect and 
fatigue, and has been used in a number of similar studies (see Schmeichel, Vohs 
and Baumeister, 2003, Schmeichel and Vohs, 2009).  The positive, negative and 
fatigue sub-scales were administered to participants (see Appendix 3C). 
Participants were required to read through a total of 24 words describing positive, 
negative and fatigue and rate the extent to which they experienced that item at the 
present moment. Items were rated on a scale from 1-5 where: 1 = Very slightly or 
not at all, 2 = A little, 3 = Moderately, 4 = Quite a bit and 5 = Extremely. A mean 
score for each subscale was then calculated.  
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Demographic Questionnaire 
Participant’s age, gender, education and yearly household income was 
collected (See Appendix 3D). 
3.6.3  Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually and without a time limit. Prior to 
testing, participants were given a short introduction to familiarize themselves with 
the experimental tasks and order that they would be presented. The experiment 
consisted of two film clips (eye-surgery and Charlie Chaplin excerpt) and four 
tasks: Manipulation check questionnaire, Consumer Decision Task, PANAS-X and 
the Demographic Questionnaire. 
 All instructions used were taken from previous work conducted by Gross 
(1998) and Richards and Gross (2000). Before being presented with the eye-
surgery film, participants were told that the computer screen would be blank for 
one minute and that this time should be used to “clear your mind of all thoughts, 
feelings and memories”. After this one-minute baseline, participants received the 
following instructions; “we will now be showing you a short film clip. It is important 
to us that you watch the clip carefully, but if you find the clip too distressing, just say  
“stop”.  For the control participants (n = 40, 21 young and 19 old) no further 
instructions were given.  
 Reappraisal participants (n = 40, 20 young and 20 old) received the 
following instructions: “Try to adopt a detached and unemotional attitude as you 
watch the film. In other words, as you watch the film clip, try to think about what you 
are seeing objectively, in terms of the technical aspects of the events you observe. 
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Watch the film carefully, but please try to think about what you are seeing in such a 
way that you don’t feel anything at all.” 
 Participants in the suppression condition (n = 40, 20 young and 20 old) 
received the following instructions: “If you have any feeling as you watch the clip, 
please try your best not to let those feelings show. In other words, as you watch the 
film clip, try to behave in such a way that a person watching you would not know you 
were feeling anything. Watch the film clip carefully, but please try to behave so that 
someone watching you would not know that you are feeling anything at all.” 
 All participants then watched the eye-surgery film. This was followed by the 
manipulation check questionnaire. Participants then continued onto the decision 
task and were asked to work until they had completed all questions and then 
inform the experimenter once they had finished. There was no time limit imposed 
to complete this task, however the length of time it took each participant to finish 
these questions was recorded.  
Time was recorded using a stopwatch. All older participants were tested 
individually and younger participants were tested in small groups. Before 
beginning the decision-making task, participants were briefed in terms of how they 
should begin and end this part of the experiment. The question booklet containing 
the consumer problems was placed face-down in front of each participant. 
Participants were told that they could turn the booklet over and begin working 
when the experimenter said ‘start’. The experimenter explained that the length of 
time each participant took to complete this task was being logged, and that they 
should answer the questions at their own pace. Furthermore, young participants 
were told to raise their arm once they had completed the consumer problems and 
older adults were asked to simply inform the experimenter verbally. When the 
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experimenter said ‘start’, the timer was begun. When participants indicated that 
they had completed the task, a note of how long each individual had taken was 
recorded from the stopwatch. 
Participants were then instructed to work their way through the PANAS-X 
and demographic questionnaire. Instructions outlining how to complete each task 
were printed at the top of the corresponding pages. After participants had 
completed all aspects of the experimental procedure, they watched a short comedy 
film clip by Charlie Chaplin to restore their emotional standing.   
3.7  Results 
Performance on the Consumer Decision Task 
To assess whether instruction to regulate emotions differently affected 
older and younger adults’ performance on the consumer decision task, a number of 
performance measures were taken. Means and standard deviations for older and 
younger adults in each of these measures of the consumer decision task for all 
three conditions are presented in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2 Younger and Older Adults Performance in each Condition on the 
Consumer Decision Task. 
 Condition Young Old 
  M SD M SD 
 
Percentage of ‘Decide in the Future’ 
choices 
Suppression 8.33 14.05 11.25 22.5 
Reappraisal 2.92 5.59 7.08 15.60 
Control 1.98 4.49 16.23 29.46 
Percentage of correct stick and 
switch choices and actions minus 
decide in the future responses 
Suppression 88.1 12.54 68.92 20.58 
Reappraisal 79.63 13.29 79.04 17.31 
Control 82.49 13.43 56.02 26.37 
 
Percentage of correct stick decisions 
Suppression 82.5 21.27 60 26.16 
Reappraisal 80.83 14.58 75.83 25.06 
Control 79.37 14.82 55.26 28.89 
 
Percentage of correct switch 
decisions 
Suppression 80.83 18.16 59.17 30.34 
Reappraisal 73.33 19.79 74.17 23.86 
Control 81.74 16.59 48.25 32.34 
  
The means and standard deviations for the number of times old and young 
adults selected to decide in the future are presented in Table 3.2. A univariate 
analysis of variance (Age X Condition) was conducted to see if either of these 
factors were related to the number of times participants selected the option to 
decide in the future. Results showed that there was a significant main effect of age 
F (2, 114) = 4.99, p<.05, η² = .04 with older adults selecting this option more often 
than young adults. There was no significant main effect of condition (suppression 
vs. reappraisal vs. control) F (2, 114) = .88, p >.05, η² = .02. No significant 
interaction between age and condition was found, F (1, 114) = 1.27, p >.05, η² = .02. 
Post hoc analysis using the Fischer LSD test revealed no significant difference 
between the percentages of times the older or younger adults opted to decide in 
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the future in any condition. Please refer to Statistics Appendix 3 for all summary 
tables corresponding to Experiment 3. 
 To see whether condition affected the number of correct stick or switch 
decisions participants made, a mixed 3X2X2 analysis of variance (Condition X 
Correct choice X Age) was conducted. The results revealed no significant main 
effect of age, F (1, 114) = 1.45, p >.05, η ² = .1, and a marginally significant main 
effect of condition, F (1, 114) = 24.07, p =.09, η ² = .04 A significant interaction 
between age and condition was found, F (2, 114) = 4.97, p < .01, η ² = .08. However, 
no significant interactions were found between correct choice and age, F (1, 114) = 
.04, p >.05, η ² = 0; correct choice and condition, F (2, 114) = .19, p >.05, η ² = 0 or 
correct choice, age and condition, F (2, 114) = .98, p >.05, η ² = .02. 
 Additional t-tests were conducted to investigate further the interaction 
between correct choice, age and condition. Results revealed that for participants in 
the suppression condition, younger adults (M = 82.5, SD = 21.27) made 
significantly more correct stick choices than older adults (M = 60, SD = 26.16), t (1, 
38) 3, p < .01. Younger adults (M = 80.83, SD = 18.18) also made significantly more 
correct switch choices than older adults (M = 59.17, SD = 30.33), t (1, 38) 2.74, p < 
.01.  
Interestingly, for participants in the reappraisal condition, analysis revealed 
no significant difference in the number of correct stick choices made by young 
adults (M = 80.83, SD = 14.58) and old adults (M = 75.83, SD = 25.06), t (1, 38) .77, 
p > .05. Furthermore, no significant difference was revealed in the number of 
correct switch choices made by young adults (M = 73.33, SD = 19.79) and old 
adults (M = 74.17, SD = 23.86), t (1, 38) .77, p > .05. 
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For participants in the control condition, results showed that, younger 
adults (M = 79.37, SD = 14.81) made significantly more correct stick choices than 
older adults (M = 55.26, SD = 28.9), t (1, 38) 3.37, p < .01. Younger adults (M = 
81.75, SD = 16.59) also made significantly more correct switch choices than older 
adults (M = 48.24, SD = 32.34), t (1, 38) 4.18, p < .01. 
Problem Difficulty and Choice 
The percentage means and standard deviations for the number of times old 
and young adults chose to stick and decide in the future on difficult and easy 
problems are presented in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for the Number of Times Young and Old Adults 
Opted to ‘Stick’ or ‘Decide in the Future’ on Difficult and Easy Problems in Each 
Condition 
 Condition Young Old 
  M SD M SD 
 
Stick choices on 
difficult problems 
Suppression 45 18.02 44.5 18.01 
Reappraisal 54.16 20.14 46.33 17.37 
Control 50.79 17.06 46.32 23.67 
 
Stick choices easy 
problems 
Suppression 48.33 18.92 43.67 18.92 
Reappraisal 49.16 15.2 47.17 15.2 
Control 46.03 22.73 43.51 22.73 
 
Decide in the future 
difficult problems 
Suppression 11.67 18.81 12.17 22.72 
Reappraisal 3.33 8.72 8.83 16.38 
Control 3.33 8.98 19.3 30.05 
 
Decide in the future 
easy problems 
Suppression 5.83 12.42 11.17 24.71 
Reappraisal 2.5 8.16 5.83 18.16 
Control 0 0 13.16 30.21 
To examine whether the number of times participants chose to stick or 
decide in the future on difficult and easy problems varied as a function of 
condition, two multivariate 2X2X3 analyses of variance (Age X Problem difficulty X 
Condition) were conducted. In terms of the number of times young and old 
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participants chose to stick in each condition, no significant main effect was found 
for age, F (2,114) = 2.11, p >.05, η² = .02 or condition, F (2,114) = .8, p >.05, η² = .01. 
This suggests that neither age nor the condition participants were assigned 
affected how often they opted to stick. No significant main effect was found for 
problem difficulty, F (2,114) = .54, p >.05, η² = .01. This means that problem 
difficulty did not affect the rate at which participants chose to stick. No significant 
interaction was found between age and condition F (2,114) = .07, p >.05, η² = 0. 
This suggests that old and young adults chose to stick at a similar rate as each 
other across conditions. No significant interaction was found between age and 
problem difficulty suggesting that both young and old adults chose to stick at an 
equivalent rate as one another for both types of problems, F (1,114) = .08, p >.05, 
η² = 0. No significant interaction was revealed between problem difficulty and 
condition, F (2,114) = .5, p >.05, η² = 0. This implies condition did not affect the 
number of times participants chose to stick. Furthermore, no significant 
interaction was found between problem difficulty, age and condition, F (2,114) = 
.49, p >.05, η² = 0. This suggests that older and younger adults did not differ in 
terms of the number of times they selected the option to stick across conditions or 
problem types. 
In terms of the number of times participants selected the option to decide in 
the future, a significant main effect was found for age, F (2,114) = 4.92, p <.05, η² = 
.04, with older adults selecting the option more often than younger adults. No 
significant main effect was found for condition, F (2,114) = .91, p >.05, η² = .02. 
This suggests that the condition participants were assigned to did not affect how 
often they opted to decide in the future. However, a significant main effect of 
problem difficulty was revealed, F (2,114) = 10.8, p <.01, η² = .09 with participants 
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choosing to decide in the future more often when faced with difficult problems. No 
significant interaction was found between age and condition F (2,114) = 1.2, p >.05, 
η² = .02. This finding shows that old and young adults chose to decide in the future 
at a similar rate as each other across conditions. No significant interaction was 
found between age and problem difficulty suggesting that both young and old 
adults chose to decide in the future at an equivalent rate to one another for both 
types of problems, F (1,114) = .01, p >.05, η² = 0. No significant interaction was 
revealed between problem difficulty and condition, F (2,114) = .74, p >.05, η² = .01. 
This implies condition did not affect the number of times participants chose to 
decide in the future. Furthermore, no significant interaction was found between 
problem difficulty, age and condition, F (2,114) = 1.23, p >.05, η² = .02. This 
suggests that older and younger adults did not differ in terms of the number of 
times they selected the option to decide in the future across conditions or problem 
types.  
Post hoc analysis revealed that young adults in the suppression condition 
chose to decide in the future significantly more often than participants in the 
reappraisal condition (p < .05). A marginally significant finding was also found 
whereby young adults in the suppression condition also chose to decide in the 
future more often than participants in the control condition (p = .06). Post hoc 
analysis revealed no significant differences for the number of times older adults 
chose to decide in the future and the condition they were in.  
It is interesting to note that young adults chose to decide in the future 
significantly more when placed in the suppression condition compared to the 
other two groups. Once the option to decide in the future had been removed from 
the analysis, young adults performed best in the suppression condition. This may 
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suggest that some of the younger adults were affected differently by the 
suppression instructions. 
Manipulation Checks 
In order to ensure that participants understood the instructions they were 
presented, a number of manipulation checks were included in the design of the 
experiment. Participants were presented with four questions after having been 
assigned to a condition and watched the film (see Appendix 3B). Mean ratings for 
each of these questions are presented in Table 3.4. To analyse the manipulation 
checks a 2 X 3 univariate analysis of variance (Age X Condition) was conducted for 
each question.  
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Young and Old Adults Ratings for Each of the 
Manipulation Check Questions.  
Question Condition Young Old 
  M SD M SD 
 
Feelings while 
viewing film 
Suppression 3.3 2.59 5.1 2.57 
Reappraisal 4.8 2.14 5.45 2.46 
Control 2.38 2.48 5.4 2.79 
 
Hide emotions 
while viewing film 
Suppression 5.05 2.48 3.05 2.78 
Reappraisal 3.25 2.47 3.35 2.47 
Control 3.52 2.42 1.42 2.19 
Spontaneous 
reaction while 
viewing film 
Suppression 1.85 2.23 4.8 3.12 
Reappraisal 2.45 2.01 5.75 2.27 
Control 3.14 2.22 6.68 2.24 
Difficulty in 
performing 
instructions while 
viewing film 
Suppression 2.5 2.14 1.21 1.61 
Reappraisal 3.4 2.54 1.65 1.84 
In summary, the manipulation checks suggest instructions presented to 
participants in each condition were understood and adhered to correctly. Results 
for the question asking if participants had any feelings while watching the film 
showed that there was a significant main effect of age, F (1, 114) = 16.2, p <.01, η² = 
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.12 whereby older adults reported having less feelings in each of the three 
conditions compared to young adults. However, no significant main effect was 
found for condition (suppression vs. reappraisal vs. control) F (2, 114) = 2.49, p 
>.05, η² = .04. Finally, results indicated no significant interaction between age and 
condition F (2, 114) = 2.36, p>.05, η² = .04. Post-hoc analysis using Fischer’s LSD 
test showed that participants assigned to the reappraisal condition reported 
having less feelings than those in the control groups (p < .05). No significant 
differences were found in other conditions for ratings of feelings while watching 
the film and condition.  
 Results for the question asking participants if they hid their emotions while 
viewing the film showed that there was a significant main effect of age, F (1, 114) = 
8.38, p <.05, η² = .07 whereby young adults hid their emotions more than older 
adults, and a significant main effect of condition (suppression vs. reappraisal vs. 
control) F (2, 114) = 3.91, p <.05, η² = .06. However, there was no significant 
interaction between age and condition F (2, 114) = 2.43 p>.05, η² = .04. Post hoc 
analysis using Fischer’s LSD test showed participants were significantly more 
likely to hide their feelings if placed in the suppression condition than in the 
control group (p < .05). No significant differences were found between the other 
conditions and the amount participants reported hiding their feelings while 
watching the film. 
 Results for the question asking participants if they reacted spontaneously 
while watching the film showed that there was a highly significant main effect of 
age, F (1, 114) = 56.6, p <.01, η² = .33 whereby older adults rated themselves as 
reacting far more spontaneously than young adults across all conditions. Also a 
significant main effect of condition (suppression vs. reappraisal vs. control) F (2, 
107 
 
114) = 4.47 p <.05, η² = .07 was found. As expected, both younger and older adults 
reported reacting most spontaneously in the control condition and least 
spontaneously in the suppression group. No significant interaction was found 
between age and condition F (2, 114) = .16, p >.05, η² = 0. Post-hoc analysis using 
Fischer’s LSD test showed that participants assigned to the control condition 
reported reacting significantly more spontaneously than participants in the 
suppression group (p <.01). No significant differences were found between the 
other conditions and the amount participants reported reacting spontaneously 
while watching the film. 
 Results for the question asking how difficult participants found it to 
perform the self-regulation instructions showed a significant main effect of age F 
(1, 76) = 11.31, p <.01, η² = .13 whereby older adults reported that they found it 
easier than young adults to regulate their emotions. No significant effect of 
condition (suppression vs. reappraisal) F (1, 76) = 2.31, p >.05, η² = .03 and no 
significant interaction was found between age and condition F (1, 76) = .19, p >.05, 
η² = 0. Taken together, these findings suggest that the manipulation instructions 
were successful.  
Time taken to complete the Consumer Decision Task 
 The time spent completing the decision task was recorded for each 
participant. This was to ensure that any effects were not confounded by the length 
of time taken by individuals assigned to each condition. Means and standard 
deviations for the number of minutes taken by younger and older adults in each 
condition are presented in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for the Number of Minutes taken by Young and 
Old Adults in Each Condition to Complete the Consumer Decision Task. 
 
 Suppression Reappraisal Control 
M SD M SD M SD 
Young Adults 9.15 4.96 10.5 4.08 9.57 1.66 
Old Adults 15.6 6.1 15.5 4.83 17.8 13.46 
 
A 2 X 3 univariate analysis of variance (Age X Condition) was conducted to 
investigate whether condition had a significant effect on the time it took 
participants to complete the consumer task. Results revealed a significant main 
effect of age with older adults taking significantly longer on the consumer decision 
task than young adults, F (1, 111) = .29.68, p <.01, η² = .21. No significant main 
effect of condition was found, F (2, 111) = .41, p >.05, η² = .01 nor was there an 
interaction between age and condition, F (2, 111) = .61, p >.05, η² = .01.   
The effects of condition on affect 
 In order to test the hypothesis that there would be no differences in affect 
in each of the three conditions, a univariate analysis of variance (condition) was 
conducted for each of the three scales tested in the PANAS-X. The means and 
standard deviations for the number of times old and young adults rated 
themselves as positive, negative or fatigued in each condition are presented in 
Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6 Descriptive Statistics for Young and Older Adults Ratings for the 
Positive, Negative and Fatigue Sub-Scales of the PANAS-X 
Scale Condition Young Old 
  M SD M SD 
 
 
Positive 
Suppression 2.37 .82 2.88 .60 
Reappraisal 2.15 .84 3.35 .67 
Control 2.21 .66 3.3 .82 
 
 
Negative 
 
Suppression 1.27 .53 1.2 .43 
Reappraisal 1.36 .50 1.09 .18 
Control 1.34 .37 1.12 .19 
 
 
Fatigue 
Suppression 2.16 .91 1.74 .83 
Reappraisal 2.01 .99 1.53 .77 
Control 2.32 .99 1.53 .79 
 
 Results for the positive scale of the PANAS-X showed a significant main 
effect of age F (1, 113) = 47.16, p <.01, η² = .29 whereby young adults showed 
lower levels of positive affect across all conditions as compared to their older 
counterparts. These findings are consistent with previous literature suggesting 
that older adults tend to be more positive than young adults.  No significant main 
effects of condition on affect were found, F (2, 113) = .39, p>.05, η² = .01. No 
significant interaction between age and condition was found, F (2, 118) = 2.39, p 
>.05 η² = .04. 
 Results for the negative scale of the PANAS-X showed a significant main 
effect of age F (1, 113) = 6.59, p<.05, η² = .06 whereby younger adults reported 
more negative affect than older adults. There was no significant main effect found 
for condition (suppression vs. reappraisal vs. control) F (2, 113) = 0, p >.05, η² = 0. 
No significant interaction between age and condition was found, F (2, 118) = .62, p 
>.05, η² = .01. 
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 Interestingly, the fatigue scale showed younger adults as being significantly 
more tired than older participants F (1, 113) = 18.04, p <.01, η² = .1 and that 
participants in the suppression condition to be more tired than those in the 
reappraisal condition for both young and old adults however, these results were 
not significant, F (2, 113) = .45, p >.05, η² = .01. No significant interaction between 
age and condition was established, F (2, 113) = .5, p >.05, η² = .01. 
3.8  Discussion 
When making consumer decisions, individuals have a number of options 
available to them: to stick with a pre-selected option, switch to an alternative, or to 
postpone making a decision and decide in the future. Furthermore, consumer 
decisions are often made in the context of competing demands on resources. The 
current study investigated the types of decisions younger and adults made (given 
different age-related limitations in resources) when faced with problems varying 
in difficulty. In addition how emotion regulation (suppression and reappraisal) 
differently affected the resources available to older and younger adults was 
measured by examining the number of times participants selected to stick, switch 
or decide in the future.    
Results from Experiment 3 showed that older adults in the reappraisal 
condition performed significantly better across all measures on the consumer 
decision task than older adults in the control group. It is proposed that older adults 
performed best in this condition because regulating emotions using reappraisal 
matched strategies less demanding of cognitive effort (which older adults would 
normally adopt). Interestingly, suppressing emotions also seemed to preserve 
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older adults decision-making performance but not to the same extent as 
reappraisal. These findings support Gross and Richards (2000) who suggested that 
(for older adults at least) regulating emotions using reappraisal preserves 
resources necessary for decision-making. In other words, older adults in this 
condition had enough resources to engage in effortful processing and avoid simply 
sticking with an unfavourable option when a better alternative was available or 
opting to decide in the future. This data is also consistent with John and Gross’ 
(2004) hypothesis that as people reach older adulthood, they are better able to 
regulate their emotions and learn to make greater use of reappraisal and less use 
of suppression. Based on these findings, it seems that age-related advantages in 
emotion-regulation may have protected older adults from a state of ego-depletion. 
Young adults’ performance was counter to expectations. Once data relating 
to the number of times participants opted to decide in the future had been 
removed from the analysis, the results suggested that young participants in the 
suppression condition made significantly better consumer decisions than 
participants in the reappraisal and control conditions. These findings are in the 
opposite direction to those reported by Richards and Gross (2000) who proposed 
that suppressing emotions should be more costly than reappraising them and 
therefore lead to a decrease in performance on subsequent tasks. In an attempt to 
explain the current findings, it is suggested that different forms of emotion 
regulation incur different cognitive costs which vary as a function of age. It is 
proposed that younger adults find reappraisal more demanding in terms of 
resources than suppression and this pattern is reversed for older adults. Data from 
the current experiment supports research by Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields (2009), 
who found that older adults were more adept at emotion regulation and that the 
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cognitive consequences associated with reappraisal and suppression was less for 
older adults than young adults.  
The number of times older and younger adults chose to stick, switch or 
decide in the future in each condition was used as a measure of ego-depletion 
incurred by different emotion-regulation strategies. Interestingly, no significant 
differences were found for the number of times older and younger adults chose to 
decide in the future and the condition they were in. However, young adults 
assigned to the suppression condition chose to decide in the future significantly 
more often compared to young participants in the reappraisal condition and 
(although not significant) more than those in the control condition. These findings 
can be interpreted in the context of Baumeister’s strength model. It is proposed 
that suppression may have been particularly draining for younger adults; this 
resulted in a reduction in cognitive resources available which, in turn, lead them to 
select an option which required fewer resources (decide in the future). Taken 
together, it seems that older adults do not find suppressing emotions as cognitively 
demanding as young adults, and adds further evidence to the hypothesis that 
reappraisal and suppression are two different processes which, depending upon 
age, require different amount of effort to perform. 
It is noted that the data revealed by young adults is complex and may be 
due to additional factors other than age. It seems that young participants in the 
suppression condition chose to decide in the future most often. However, once 
data relating to the number of times participants chose to decide in the future had 
been removed, participants in the suppression condition made better decisions 
than those in the reappraisal and control groups. The current pattern of results 
suggests that young participants may be affected differently by instructions to self-
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regulate by way of suppression. Future research would seek to identify the 
individual factors responsible for these differences.   
 The second aim of Experiment 3 was to test the hypothesis that both young 
and old adults would choose strategies least demanding of resources (e.g. to stick 
or decide in the future) more often when problems were difficult. The data was 
consistent with this hypothesis: significantly more participants (in both age 
groups) chose to decide in the future when problems were difficult. This finding 
supports that of Dahr (1997a; 1998b) and Tversky and Shafir (1992) who 
proposed that consumers would choose to defer a decision when the choice 
environment becomes more complex. In other words, when given the option, 
participants avoided making a decision by postponing it or choosing to stick with a 
pre-selected option rather than switch, as this requires fewer resources. 
Furthermore, a significant main effect of age was found whereby older adults 
chose to decide in the future more often than young adults. This may reflect 
attempts to conserve resources due to age-related declines in cognitive abilities. 
It is thought that the current experiment represents one of the first of its 
kind to provide older and younger adults with the option to decide in the future 
rather than simply to defer (as has been observed in previous studies, see Dahr 
1997a; 1998b and Tversky & Shafir 1992). It was proposed that deciding in the 
future might be interpreted differently compared to choosing to defer which in 
turn have may incurred different cognitive costs. Differences in cognitive resources 
would have been observed by the number of times the option to decide in the 
future was selected compared to the stick or switch responses. The findings from 
Experiment 3 suggest that older and younger adults treat the option to decide in 
the future in the same manner observed in other studies where the option to defer 
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has been utilised. This provides support to Wessler et al., (2003) who proposed 
that individuals will attempt to conserve energy by avoiding making a decision, 
either by choosing to postpone it or deferring altogether.  
In order to check that the self-regulation instructions presented to 
participants did not cause differences in positive and negative affect or fatigue 
(which could explain subsequent performance differences between conditions), a 
manipulation check was carried out. The data revealed no significant differences in 
feelings of positivity, negativity or fatigue across the three conditions. However, a 
significant age difference was revealed whereby young adults reported feeling less 
positive, more negative and more fatigued than older adults. These findings are 
consistent with the literature which suggests that older adults tend to be more 
positive than young adults (Carstensen, et al., 2000; Charles, et al., 2003).  
 Further evidence showing age differences in emotional experience were 
revealed in the manipulation check questionnaire whereby older adults reported 
experiencing fewer emotions while watching the film and, found it easier to 
regulate their emotions using each strategy compared with young adults. 
Interestingly, no differences were found for the amount of feeling experienced and 
condition. These findings are consistent with Gross (2003) who found that 
subjective feelings were not affected by emotion regulation but were affected by 
age.  
The reason why suppression did not appear to cause the same ego-
depleting effects reported in other research (Richard & Gross, 2000) is unclear. It 
is proposed that (despite comparing the same regulatory processes), a key 
difference in paradigms may be responsible for the unexpected results in 
Experiment 3. Richards and Gross’s study used a dual task paradigm during which 
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participants were required to reappraise or suppress their emotions while 
watching a film clip. Their findings suggested that people in the suppression 
condition had worse memory for the clip than people in the reappraisal condition 
and thus concluded that suppression required more effort than reappraisal. 
However, Senesac (2010) proposed that these results may simply be a function of 
the way people paid attention to the film clip during the instruction conditions. For 
example, participants who were asked to suppress their expression of emotion 
may have paid more attention to controlling expressions in their face and body, 
therefore leaving fewer resources to process the film clip. Participants in the 
reappraisal condition may not have had to draw attention away from the film clip 
in order to successfully regulate their emotions in this manner. Consequently, the 
two groups would have different levels of memory for the content of the clip 
despite having spent the same amount of effort following instructions. In the 
present study, the demands of emotion-regulation on cognitive resources were 
measured according to responses in the consumer decision-making task. Because 
performance on the decision task was unrelated to memory of the film, 
participants’ decision-making ability should not have been affected by the aspects 
of the film they had attended to, but rather, how much effort they put into the 
consumer decision task. Based on this premise, it could be argued that the 
methodology used in Experiment 3 could overcome the limitations of that 
employed by Richards and Gross (2000). 
Data from the present study is also at odds with Baumeister et al., (2007) 
who found that suppression was associated with cognitive costs. The results from 
Experiment 3 may be explained by the idea that different emotions have different 
cognitive costs and that the costliness of reappraising or suppressing particular 
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emotions may vary by age. It should be noted that Experiment 3 required 
participants to regulate the feelings of disgust. Baumeister’s work mostly utilised 
films and other emotional stimuli that elicited sadness, anger or feelings of 
injustice (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 2008; Schmeichel, Vohs & 
Baumeister, 2003). In the current study, young and older adults may not have 
displayed the typical suppression effect found by Baumeister et al., (2008) because 
disgust might have been less difficult for them to suppress compared to emotions 
typically used in other research such as sadness and anger. In support of this 
argument, it was informally noted (through conversation with participants during 
the debrief), that many of the older adults expressed great interest as opposed to 
disgust while viewing the film clip, often remarking that either someone they knew 
(or even themselves) had had cataract surgery. As such, it may be that the film did 
not provoke the same emotional response in older adults compared with young 
adults, therefore older adults may not have expended as much energy regulating 
their emotions while watching the film. The present study piloted the footage on 
young adults only, future studies would need to test emotional potency of material 
on both young and old adults.  
Another explanation for the findings is based on research conducted by 
Hagger, Wood, Stiff and Chatzisarantis (2010). Hagger et al., (2010) performed a 
meta-analysis of 83 studies investigating self-regulation. Their results show that 
although the effect of ego-depletion was generally consistent across different tasks 
and subsequent measures of performance, the effect was significantly smaller for 
studies adopting dependent tasks involving cognition, choice and volition. They 
suggest that making choices may not place as many demands on depleted 
individuals’ self-control resources as other tasks used to measure ego-depletion. 
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Furthermore, Hagger et al., (2010) found that studies which relied upon depletion 
tasks requiring participants to control impulses and dependant tasks using 
cognition exhibited smaller ego-depletion effect sizes than other methodologies 
used in this field. Experiment 3 also relied upon a depletion task, which required 
participants to control impulses (i.e. in the suppression condition, participants had 
to behave in such a way that someone watching them would not know that they 
were feeling anything at all). Taken together, this may explain why the current 
data is inconsistent with that of other researchers who used different 
methodologies. 
In conclusion, the current research extends our knowledge in two 
important ways. First, findings are consistent with the literature in that both 
younger and older adults selected the option to decide in the future most often for 
difficult problems. Furthermore, older adults chose to decide in the future 
significantly more often than young adults. It is proposed that older adults selected 
the option associated with the fewest cognitive demands to conserve limited 
resources. Second, Experiment 3 shows that young and old adults appear to 
require different amounts of resources to regulate their emotions in accordance 
with different strategies. The underlying mechanisms as to why this might be are 
as yet unclear. It is proposed that older adults may be less susceptible to any ego-
depleting effects of emotion regulation due to age-related increases in emotional 
control. Further research is needed to assess the reliability of material at inducing 
states of ego-depletion. The next chapter aims to test alternative methods of 
causing ego-depletion and the subsequent effect on consumer decision-making.  
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 Chapter 4 
4.1  Introduction 
Many decisions are made in the context of emotional arousal. The 
consequences of controlling emotions prior, or while, making a choice may be 
significant. How the complex demands on peoples’ resources impact their ability to 
make good decisions is an important question. The data from Experiment 3 
suggested that regulating emotions using reappraisal and suppression differently 
affected decision making in younger and older adults. Specifically, older adults 
performed best under conditions of reappraisal. The finding that older adults were 
able to successfully regulate their emotions and, in turn, maintain performance on 
a subsequent decision making exercise was consistent with previous research 
(Schiebe & Blanchard Fields, 2009). However, younger adults revealed a different 
pattern of results whereby suppressing emotions seemed to maintain decision-
making performance and reappraisal diminished it. This finding was surprising 
given that Richards and Gross (2000) proposed that suppressing emotions should 
be more costly than reappraising them and therefore lead to a decrease in 
performance. The notion that ageing may provide some form of immunity to the 
depleting effects of emotion-regulation may provide an opportunity to harness this 
ability in order to minimise the effects of age-related declines in other cognitive 
abilities. 
Some data from Experiment 3 was consistent with previous research (e.g. 
Dahr, 1997; Tversky & Shafir, 1992) insofar that both younger and older adults 
chose to avoid making a decision and decide in the future more often when 
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problems were difficult compared to when they were easy. Furthermore, older 
adults chose to decide in the future more often than younger adults. These findings 
were in line with what may reasonably be expected given older adults’ declining 
cognitive abilities and the assumption that to decide in the future is the least 
demanding strategy in terms of cognitive effort. It was proposed that older adults 
may have tended to utilise this option more regularly in an attempt to conserve 
limited resources.  
4.2  Experiment 4  
 In view of these findings, two possible explanations were proposed: (i) 
emotion-regulation instructions were effective, however the consumer decision 
task was unusual and thus was affected in an unexpected way. Or (ii) the emotion-
regulation was not effective in the same way that typical tasks of this kind are. 
Based on these proposals, Chapter 4 presents two exploratory experiments using 
young participants only. 
 The first experiment utilised the same manipulation procedure and decision 
task used in Experiment 3, but included an additional dependent measure. The aim 
of this experiment was to test whether instructions to regulate emotions using 
reappraisal and suppression affected participants in the same way that has been 
observed in the literature (Gross, 2000). The second experiment introduced a new 
manipulation task, shown to be reliable in causing a state of ego-depletion. Both 
experiments sought to determine a method of ego-depletion that impacted upon 
the consumer decision task in a predictable way. 
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 The consumer decision task used in Experiment 3 presented participants 
with three choice options: to switch, the stick or to decide in the future. Results 
indicated that on difficult problems, participants tended to choose to decide in the 
future and older adults tended to decide in the future more than younger adults. In 
other words, participants displayed a tendency to decide in the future when 
cognitive demands were high rather than simply stick (the other least cognitively 
demanding option). It is proposed that including an option to decide in the future 
may have compromised the accuracy of analysis whereby the number of times 
participants chose to stick was influenced by the number of times participants 
chose to decide in the future. In an attempt to address this problem, the consumer 
decision task used in Experiment 4 presented participants with only two options: 
to stick or switch. It was assumed that removing the option to decide in the future 
would create conditions for a clearer evaluation of correct performance. It was 
anticipated that participants would tend to stick more often under conditions of 
self-regulatory load and when problems were more difficult.     
To address the disparity between the findings of Experiment 3, and those of 
other researchers (e.g. Richards & Gross 2000), it was proposed that differences in 
methodology could account for the apparent contradiction in findings. It was noted 
that in Richards and Gross (2000) study, memory for a film clip was the main 
subject of investigation, where participants had to regulate their emotions while 
viewing the footage. It was suggested that the amount of attention participants 
paid to the film clip may have varied as a function of the self-regulation group they 
were assigned to. In Chapter 3, it was argued that the decision-making exercise 
should not have been affected by aspects of the first task that participants were 
attending to because they were not directly linked. Rather, performance on the 
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decision-making exercise can be seen as measuring how much cognitive effort a 
participant made subsequent to regulating their emotions, not how much effort 
they made subsequent to regulating their attention. To test this argument, it was 
decided that the methodology employed in Experiment 3 should be assessed 
further.  
To examine whether differences on the consumer decision task could 
reliably be attributed to the differential ego-depleting effects of emotion-regulation 
styles, an additional intellectual task was used to measure subsequent 
performance. Schmeichel, Vohs and Baumeister (2003) conducted an experiment 
to test the idea that ego-depletion due to prior self-control would impair 
performance on intellectual tasks, requiring cognitive processes. Participants were 
required to watch a video of a woman being interviewed while at the bottom of the 
screen a series of words, irrelevant to the interview, were flashed. In the ego-
depletion condition, participants were instructed to direct their attention away 
from the words and focus exclusively on the woman. In the control condition, 
participants were given no instructions. Intellectual functioning was measured by 
performance on a section of the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), a standard 
test given to university students in the United States. The results from this study 
indicated that engaging in self-regulation impaired subsequent cognitive 
performance (as measured by the GRE). Participants in the ego-depletion 
condition provided significantly less correct answers. They also attempted fewer 
problems, which suggested that their speed of information processing was 
reduced. Finally, ego-depleted participants scored a lower proportion of correct 
answers among the problems they did attempt, indicating that their reasoning 
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abilities were less effective. Taken together ego depleted individuals were not only 
slower, but scored significantly worse.  
Based on the findings reported by Schmeichel, et al., (2003), it was decided 
that the GRE represented a reliable method of testing for the effects of ego-
depletion. To test whether performance on the decision-making exercise was due 
to the ego-depleting effects of different forms of emotion regulation, Experiment 4 
required participants to complete a subsection of problems taken from the GRE 
immediately after the task manipulation. If the instructions to reappraise or 
suppress emotions while viewing a disgust-eliciting film required differing 
amounts of cognitive effort to maintain, participants may have been subject to 
varying amounts of ego-depletion, which should be apparent by way of differences 
in aptitude on the GRE. For example, assuming that instructions to suppress 
emotions cause participants to regulate their emotions in this manner, and that 
this form of emotion regulation is indeed costly in terms of cognitive effort. It 
should follow that subsequent performance on the GRE is impaired together with 
that on the decision-making exercise (see Schmeichel, Vohs & Baumeister, 2003). 
In terms of performance on the consumer decision-making exercise, should 
suppression be more demanding in terms of resources, it is predicted that 
participants will attempt to conserve energy by opting to make more stick 
decisions compared to participants in the reappraisal condition.   
A secondary aim of Experiment 4 was to replicate some of the findings 
revealed in Experiment 3. Specifically, it was predicted that participants would 
choose to stick with a pre-selected option more often on difficult problems 
compared with easy problems.  
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It was predicted that participants would evidence which form of emotion-
regulation they found to be the most costly by how much time they spent 
completing the consumer decision task. It was anticipated that the emotion-
regulation strategy requiring most effort would result in participants spending less 
time completing the decision making task. This expectation is based on the work of 
Hagger, Wood, Stiff and Chatzisarantis, (2010) who found that ego-depleted 
individuals were more fatigued and tended to expend less effort.  
4.3  Method 
4.3.1  Participants 
It was decided that only young adult participants would be used in 
Experiments 4 and 5. This decision was based on two main factors. First, the two 
experiments outlined in the current chapter are exploratory in nature. The aim 
was to establish a reliable method of causing and measuring self-regulation in a 
way typical to that reported in the literature. It was anticipated that once a robust 
methodology had been established, it could then be utilised in a comparative study 
with older and younger adults. Second, using older adults as participants is 
reasonably resource-intensive in terms of recruitment, time and money.  It was 
therefore thought prudent to establish a reliable methodology for testing self-
regulation by using only young adults as participants (who are comparatively 
inexpensive and simple to recruit).   
A total of 61 participants took part in the study aged 18 – 45yrs (M = 
20.92, SD = 4.67). Participants were divided in to three conditions: reappraisal 
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(20), suppression (21) and control (20). Participants were recruited from the 
University of Plymouth and received course credits for their participation. 
4.3.2  Materials 
Film 
The film was designed to induce a state of ego-depletion and depicted close-
up footage of a fish hook being removed from a patient’s eyeball. This film ran for 1 
min.  
Manipulation check questionnaire 
The same manipulation check presented to participants in Experiment 3 
was given to participants after having viewed the film. A copy of the manipulation 
check questionnaire can be found in Appendix 3B. 
Graduate Record Examination Order Test (GRE) 
Cognitive functioning was assessed using items from the Order subset of 
the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). Thirteen problems were selected (see Appendix 
4A). It was assumed that presenting participants with the GRE soon after the ego-
depletion task would mean that any findings were indicative of the residual after 
effects of self-regulation incurred by emotional control. This hypothesis was tested 
on three different performance measures (as established by Schmeichel, 
Baumeister & Vohs, 2003): the number of items answered correctly, the number of 
items attempted (i.e. the number of items for which a participant recorded an 
answer), and the proportion of items answered correctly. Number correct 
represented a global measure of performance, number of items attempted 
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measured working speed and effort, and the proportion of correct answers 
assessed overall accuracy. Participants were asked to work on the GRE for 10 
minutes (timed by the experimenter) or until they had completed all the problems. 
Decision Task 
Participants were presented with the same consumer decision task 
developed for Experiment 3 (see Appendix 3A). In summary, participants faced a 
hypothetical consumer scenario in which they were asked to make a decision. 
Three scenarios were devised, each comprising four decision tasks. The three 
scenarios asked participants to make a choice regarding (a) a travel company, 
based on the price of the hotel, how much the flight cost and how many stars the 
hotel received, (b) a hire car with information about the price of hire, the price of 
insurance and fuel economy, and (c) a diving school, with details of the price of 
diving lessons, the cost to rent equipment and customer satisfaction.  
4.3.3  Procedure 
The procedure followed a similar pattern to that used in Experiment 3. 
Prior to watching the film participants were shown a blank screen for one minute. 
This time was used to allow participants a baseline period to clear their mind of all 
thoughts feelings and memories. After this one-minute baseline, participants were 
informed of their right to stop the study should they find the film clip too 
distressing. For the control participants (N = 20) no further instructions were 
given. Participants in the reappraisal (N = 20) and suppression (N = 21) condition 
received the same instructions outlined in Experiment 3. Those in the reappraisal 
condition were asked to think about what they were viewing in an objective 
manner and in such a way that they do not feel anything at all. Participants in the 
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suppression condition were asked to hide their feelings so that someone watching 
them would not know that they were feeling anything at all.  All participants then 
watched the eye-surgery film. This was followed by the manipulation check 
questionnaire.  
Participants then continued to complete the GRE. Next, participants were 
instructed to work on the stick or switch decision task and to inform the 
experimenter once they had finished. There was no time limit imposed to complete 
this task, however the length of time it took each participant to finish these 
questions was recorded. Time was recorded using a stopwatch in the same manner 
employed in Experiment 3. The question booklet containing the consumer 
problems was placed face-down in front of each participant. Participants were told 
that they could turn the booklet over and begin working when the experimenter 
said ‘start’. Because participants were tested in groups of between two and six, 
they were told to raise their arm once they had completed the consumer problems. 
When participants indicated that they had finished the task, a note of how long 
each individual had taken was recorded from the stopwatch. 
Participants were then instructed to work their way through the 
demographic questionnaire. Instructions outlining how to complete each task were 
printed at the top of the corresponding pages.  
4.4  Results 
First, performance on the consumer decision task was assessed. Measures 
of ability were evaluated using five measures of performance (as in Experiment 3). 
These included the percentage total of correct stick and switch actions achieved 
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when those who opted to switch selected the correct alternative, the percentage 
total of times participants chose to stick correctly, the percentage total of times 
participants chose to switch correctly and the percentage of times participants 
simply carried out the action to stick or switch. Means and standard deviations for 
performance on the decision task for participants in each condition are presented 
in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Participant’s Performance in  each Condition 
in the Consumer Decision Task. 
 
 
 
 
The data in Table 4.1 suggests that participants in the suppression 
condition performed best. Furthermore, this data suggests that participants tended 
to be more accurate when deciding to stick than switch.  
To see whether condition affected the number of correct stick or switch 
decisions participants made, a mixed 3X2 ANOVA (Condition X Correct choice) was 
conducted. The results revealed no significant main effect of correct choice, F (1, 
58) = 3.72, p >.05 η ² = .06, and a significant main effect of condition, F (2, 58) = 
7.06, p < .05, η ² = .2. No significant interaction between condition and correct 
choice was found, F (2, 58) = .04, p > .05, η ² = 0. Post-hoc analysis using Fischer’s 
LSD test revealed participants in the suppression condition made significantly 
more correct choices than participants in the reappraisal condition (p <.01) and 
the control condition (p <.05). No significant difference in performance was found 
 Suppression Reappraisal Control 
 M SD M SD M SD 
% correct stick and switch 92.86 6.61 77.91 17.76 84.17 11.75 
% correct stick 95.24 7.71 80 19.19 85.83 14.58 
% correct switch 90.48 11.27 75.83 20.17 82.5 14.78 
%  stick choices 52.38 7.04 52.31 8.92 51.67 8.8 
%  switch choices 47.62 7.04 47.69 8.92 48.33 8.8 
128 
 
between participants in the reappraisal and control conditions. Please refer to 
Statistics Appendix 4 for all summary tables corresponding to Experiment 4. 
To see if condition affected the number of times participants chose to stick 
or switch a mixed 3X2 ANOVA (Condition X Choice) was conducted. The results 
revealed a partially significant main effect of choice (stick or switch), F (2, 58) = 
4.9, p = .05, η ² = .06. Participants tended to choose to stick more often than switch. 
No significant main effect of condition was found, F (2, 58) = 0, p >.05, η ² = 0, and 
no significant interaction between condition and choice, F (2, 58) = .05, p >.05, η ² = 
0. Post-hoc analysis using Fischer’s LSD test revealed no significant differences in 
the number of times participants chose to stick or switch between any of the three 
conditions. 
To investigate the prediction that participants would opt to stick more on 
difficult problems compared to easy problems, a repeated measures three-way 
ANOVA (Condition X Problem difficulty) was conducted. Percentage means and 
standard deviations for the number of times stick was chosen for each problem 
type are presented in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Number of Times Participants Chose to 
Stick on Difficult and Easy Problems. 
 
  
  
  
 The data in Table 4.2 shows that participants opted to stick most on 
difficult problems. Analysis confirmed this finding as problem difficulty was 
revealed to be a main effect, F (1, 58) = 6.18, p <.05, η² = .1. These findings provide 
 Suppression Reappraisal Control 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Difficult Problems 55.56 13.26 57.5 15.74 52.5 15.56 
Easy Problems 49.21 6.4 46.67 11.6 50.83 10.48 
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further support to the status quo bias occurring as a function of problem 
complexity as found in Experiments 3. No main effect of condition was revealed, F 
(2, 58) = .04, p >.05, η² = 0, suggesting that emotion-regulation strategy did not 
cause participants to stick more often when problems were difficult. Furthermore, 
no interaction between condition and problem type was found, F (2, 58) = 1.08, p 
>.05, η² = .04.  
To assess the reliability of the emotion regulation procedure used in 
Experiment 3, performance on the GRE and consumer decision-making task were 
examined in young adults only. In analysing the data for the GRE, three different 
performance measures were tested: the number of items answered correctly, the 
number of items attempted and the proportion or items answered correctly. 
Means and standard deviations for each of these measures of the GRE across the 
three conditions are presented in Table 4.3 
Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics in Percentages for Performance on the GRE for 
Participants in Each Condition.  
 
For each measure, a univariate ANOVA (Condition) was used to compare 
performance in the suppression condition versus the reappraisal and control 
conditions. No significant difference for the total number of correct answers in 
each group was found F (2, 58) = 1.72, p > .05, η² = .06. No significant difference in 
the number of questions participants attempted in either condition was found F (2, 
58) = .56, P > .05, η² = .02. No significant difference was found between the three 
GRE Suppression Reappraisal Control 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Number of correct items 29.3 13.24 35.77 13.96 36.92 15.51 
Number of items attempted 51.28 18.89 57.69 21.97 52.69 20.01 
Proportion of items 
answered correctly 
65.83 37.78 66.29 23.3 71.53 19.43 
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conditions for the proportion of items answered correctly, F (2, 58) = .26, P > .05, 
η² = .01. The data suggests that instructions to self-regulate emotion did not affect 
overall performance, working speed, effort or overall accuracy on the GRE. This 
data implies that instructions to regulate emotion did not cause participants 
differential states of ego-depletion and is inconsistent with findings in the 
literature, (e.g. Schmeichel, et al., 2003). 
In order to ensure that participants understood the instructions they were 
presented with the same manipulation checks used in Experiment 3 were included 
in the design of the experiment (see Appendix 3B). Mean ratings for each of these 
questions are presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Mean Ratings for the Manipulation Check Questions. 
Question Suppression Reappraisal Control 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Feelings while viewing film 1.43 1.86 3.33 2.58 2.5 1.93 
Hide emotions while viewing film 6.33 1.24 4.6 2.41 4.3 2.2 
Spontaneous reaction while viewing 2.61 2.11 3.55 2.61 4.1 1.86 
Difficulty in performing instructions  4.9 2.36 3.75 2.61 3.2 2.82 
 
To analyse the manipulation checks, a number of univariate 3-way 
ANOVAs (condition) were conducted. Overall, the manipulation checks suggest 
instructions presented to participants in each condition were understood and 
conducted accordingly. Question 1 asked if participants had any feeling while 
viewing the film. Results indicated a highly significant difference between the three 
conditions, F (2, 58) = 3.94, p < .05, η ² = .12. Post hoc comparisons using a Fischer 
LSD test indicated that participants in the suppression condition reported having 
significantly more feelings than those in the reappraisal condition (p < .01). 
However, there was no significant difference between scores for participants in the 
reappraisal and control condition or, the control and suppression condition.  
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Question 2 investigated whether participants reported hiding their 
emotions while watching the film. Results indicated a highly significant effect 
between the three conditions F (2, 58) = 6.17, p < .01, η ² = .18. Post hoc analysis 
using a Fischer LSD test confirmed that as would be expected, participants in the 
suppression condition reported hiding their feelings significantly more than in the 
reappraisal condition (p < .01), and control condition (p < .01). There was no 
significant difference in scores for the reappraisal and control conditions.  
Question 3 asked participants how spontaneously they reacted during the 
film. Results showed no significant difference between conditions. Although the 
data showed that participants in the suppression condition did report behaving 
less spontaneously than participants in the reappraisal and control conditions, the 
difference was not significant F (2, 58) = 2.36, p > .05, η² = .08. Post hoc 
comparisons using a Fischer LSD test indicated that participants in the suppression 
condition reported behaving significantly less spontaneously than participants in 
the control condition (p < .05).  
Question 4 asked participants how difficult they found it to perform the 
instructions given to them before the film started. Again, no significant difference 
was found between conditions. F (1, 58) = 2.3, p > .05, η ² = .07. This suggests that 
participants in both conditions were able to perform their instructions while 
viewing the film equally well. However, post hoc comparisons using a Fischer LSD 
test indicated that participants in the suppression condition reported finding it 
significantly more difficult to perform the instructions than participants in the 
control condition (p < .05). 
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 The length of time participants in each condition spent completing the 
consumer decision task was recorded. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 
4.5. 
Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics for the Time (minutes) Participants in Each 
Condition Took to Complete the Consumer Decision Task. 
 
 Suppression Reappraisal Control 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Time (Minutes) 12.14 4.45 11.05 4.43 11.1 4.46 
 
 A univariate three-way ANOVA (condition) was conducted to see if 
differences in time taken could be reliably established to vary as a function of 
condition. The data revealed no significant difference in time taken to complete the 
task and condition, F (2, 58) = .39, p > .05, η ² = .01.  
4.5  Discussion 
Experiment 4 tested the ego-depleting effects of the emotion-regulation 
instructions by introducing a reliable measure of cognitive performance, which has 
been shown to be sensitive to ego-depletion manipulations (GRE). In addition, the 
status quo-bias revealed in Experiment 3 was tested further to see if the number of 
times participants chose to stick varied as a function of the emotion-regulation 
strategy used.  
Results for performance on the consumer decision-making task replicated 
those revealed for younger adults in Experiment 3, where young adults in the 
suppression condition made significantly better, and more accurate choices than 
participants in the control and reappraisal groups. However, (although not 
significant), participants in the reappraisal condition performed worse than those 
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in the control group. Participants in this condition opted to stick more often and 
this difference was significant for difficult problems. These findings again present a 
challenge Gross’s (2004) hypothesis that suppression is a more costly form of 
emotion-regulation in terms of resources. And, when considered in the context of 
Baumeister’s (1998) strength model, this data suggests that reappraisal is more 
demanding of cognitive reserves than suppression. Furthermore, no significant 
difference was found for the time taken by participants in each condition to 
complete the consumer decision task. Had participants been subject to a state of 
ego-depletion, this should have been evident in the time they took to complete the 
task (Hagger, Wood, Stiff & Chatzisarantis, 2010).  
 In an attempt to explain the findings reported in Experiment 3 and their 
replication in Experiment 4, the current study tested the hypothesis that the 
emotion-regulation procedure was not effective in the same way that typical tasks 
of this kind are.  To test these hypotheses, the GRE was used as an additional 
reliable measure of subsequent cognitive performance. 
Data from the GRE task showed no significant difference between 
conditions in measures for global performance, working speed, effort or overall 
accuracy. This suggests that instructing participants to regulate their emotions did 
not cause differential states of ego-depletion. Had the emotion-regulation 
instructions succeeded in depleting cognitive reserves, it was expected that this 
would be evidenced in subsequent differences in performance. For example, 
Schmeichel, et al., (2003) showed that controlling attention while viewing a film 
led to impaired subsequent performance on the GRE. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that differences in performance may not have been due to ego-
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depletion, but some other mechanism affected by the instruction to regulate 
emotion. 
In terms of finding a status-quo bias, the results from the current study are 
consistent with previous findings insofar that participants chose to stick 
significantly more often on difficult compared to easy problems. Interestingly, 
Experiment 4 revealed that when the option to decide in the future was removed, 
participants chose to stick more often (in place of where they may have originally 
selected to decide in the future). These findings provide further evidence in support 
of Tversky and Shafir (1992) who proposed that consumers would opt to defer a 
decision when the choice environment became more complex.  
It was expected that participants assigned to the suppression condition 
would opt to stick most when compared to participants in the other two 
conditions. This is based on the finding that suppression of emotional expression is 
particularly costly for young adults (Gross, 1998: Richards & Gross, 2000; 
Schmeichel, 2007). However, condition did not significantly affect the likelihood 
that participants would select to stick more often. This finding suggests that 
participants did not find suppressing emotions to be more costly in terms of 
cognitive resources than the control or reappraisal conditions. When considered 
along with the finding that condition did not significantly affect performance on 
the GRE, the data from Experiment 4 implies that attempts to obtain a state of ego-
depletion in young participants were unsuccessful. 
In summary, Experiment 4 suggests that the emotion-regulation 
instructions did not show typical effects in line with what would be expected had 
ego-depletion been evident (as demonstrated in the literature). Results from the 
manipulation questionnaire confirmed that participants understood the 
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instructions presented to them and behaved accordingly. Indeed, the data implies 
that instructing participants to regulate emotion using suppression and 
reappraisal had differential effects on overall performance on the consumer 
decision task. However, data from the GRE and analysis of the number of times 
participants in each condition chose to stick suggests that these effects cannot 
confidently be attributed to states of ego-depletion caused by emotion-regulation. 
Questions regarding the consequences of operating in a state of ego-
depletion remain unanswered. In conclusion, the data from Experiments 3 and 4 
suggest that emotion-regulation cannot reliably be used to generate ego-depletion. 
Consequently, Experiment 5 utilised a methodology shown to be reliable in causing 
ego-depletion and tested its subsequent effects on consumer decision-making.  
4.6  Experiment 5 
Experiments 3 and 4 showed using emotion-regulation to induce states of 
ego-depletion had unexpected effects. The question of how people make consumer 
decisions following a period of exertion is still unanswered. Because the data from 
the previous studies suggested that controlling emotion did not have clear ego-
depleting effects, another self-regulation strategy was examined.  
Hagger, Wood, Stiff and Chatzisarantis (2010) conducted a meta-analysis 
of 83 studies looking at the impact of ego-depletion on task performance. They 
found that ego-depletion tasks which involved crossing out letters had the largest 
effect size in comparison to other frequently used depleting tasks (e.g. video-
watching affect regulation, video watching attention control and the modified 
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Stroop task). In view of Hagger et al’s., (2010) findings, it was decided that a letter-
crossing task would be used to encourage an ego-depletion state.  
Fischer, Greitemeyer, and Frey (2007) investigated the hypothesis that ego-
depleted (compared to non-depleted) individuals would be less optimistic about 
their future expectations. In their study, participants were presented with a 
typewritten sheet of paper with meaningless text (a page from a statistics book). 
Two conditions were used. In the high ego-depletion condition, participants were 
presented with a difficult task, which required them to consider and follow 
multiple rules and control their decisions. They were told that they must follow the 
rule to only cross out an ‘e’ if it did not occur next to another vowel or one letter 
away from another vowel (for example, they could not cross out the ‘e’ in Peter). In 
addition, the photocopy of the stimulus page had been lightened, making it difficult 
to read and therefore requiring additional attention. Participants in the non-
depletion condition were given a high quality photocopy with good contrast and 
were told to cross out every ‘e’ with no further rules or restrictions. The depletion 
manipulation lasted about 10-15 minutes. Results indicated that participants in the 
high ego-depletion condition were less optimistic about their future than non-
depleted participants. The researchers proposed that optimistic illusions require 
large amounts of regulatory resources to preserve. Because ego-depleted 
participants had fewer resources available to them in order to control thoughts, 
emotions and behaviours, they were less able to maintain positive future 
expectations.  
Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, and Muraven (2007) induced ego-depletion in 
participants by first giving them a page of text and instructing them to cross out 
the letter “e” each time it appeared. They noted that most participants quickly 
learned to scan the page and mark every “e” so that the habit became established. 
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Participants were then given a second page and told to cross out every “e” except if 
it was adjacent to another vowel or one letter removed from another vowel. 
Therefore the second page required participants to override a learned habitual 
response of marking every “e”. Participants in the control group did not perform 
any crossing-out task. Results indicated that participants in the ego-depletion 
condition spent significantly less time than those in the control condition, 
persisting at a game designed to induce frustration.  
In a similar task, Baumeister, (2002) showed that self-regulation and 
making choices rely upon the same resource. In his study, participants were also 
made to regulate their behaviour by having to form and then break a similar habit 
as that used by Tice, et al., (2007). This procedure made people more likely to take 
the passive option in a decision task. These findings suggest that the energy 
resource is not limited to self-control, but is also linked to the self’s executive 
function generally.  
In light of the letter crossing tasks used by Tice, et al., (2007), Baumeister 
(2002) and Peter et al., (2007) it was decided that a combination of these 
methodologies would be employed in the present study. Three discrete conditions 
were devised. In Condition 1 (control) participants simply had to cross out all 
instances of the letter “e” on pages of clearly printed text. In Condition 2, 
participants were instructed to cross out all instances of the letter “e” in 
accordance with set rules presented to them on pages of poorly printed text. 
Participants in Condition 3 had to complete the procedures outlined in Condition 1 
and 2, in other words, participants formed a habit (crossing out all instances of the 
letter “e”) and then had to break it (crossing out selected instances of the letter 
“e”). To check whether the letter crossing manipulation worked in causing 
participants to feel depleted, the GRE was used again.  
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Although participants in Condition 3 spent twice as long to complete the 
manipulation procedure compared with participants in the other two groups, it 
was not expected to affect performance on the decision making task. The meta-
analysis conducted by Hagger, Wood, Stiff and Chatzisarantis (2010) revealed only 
a marginally significant relationship between the duration of the depleting task 
and ego-depletion in the hypothesised direction. They suggest task duration 
accounted for relatively little variance in the ego-depletion effect and, as such, task 
duration should only be a minor consideration when designing and evaluating ego-
depletion experiments. 
It was predicted that performance on the consumer decision task would 
differ as a function of condition. Specifically, participants in Condition 1 should 
perform best because they were subject to a task, which required moderately little 
in terms of resources. Participants in Conditions 2 and 3 would be more likely to 
select the option to “stick” and their overall performance on this task should be 
poorer than that of participants in Condition 1. 
In addition, we aimed to replicate the status-quo effect found in 
Experiments 3 and 4. Specifically, that participants would choose to stick more 
often when problems were difficult compared to when problems were easy. 
Finally, it was expected that participants assigned to condition 2 and 3 would take 
longer to complete the decision task. 
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4.7  Method 
4.7.1  Participants 
A total of 88 participants took part in the study aged 18-36 (M = 30.39, SD = 
3.22). Participants were recruited from the University of Plymouth and received 
course credits for their time. 
4.7.2  Materials 
Letter Crossing Task 
 
 Participants in Condition 1 were presented with eight pages of text 
describing how Vikings lived and worked (The Viking Achievement, P.G. Foote & 
D.M Wilson, 1974, p. 90-97). Following Fischer, Tobias, Greitemeyer and Frey 
(2007), participants in Condition 1 were given a high quality photocopy with good 
contrast participants and were instructed to read a text for ten minutes and cross 
out all instances of the letter ‘e’.  
Participants in Condition 2 were presented with the same eight pages of 
text however, the photocopy of the stimulus material had been deliberately 
lightened making it comparatively difficult to read. These participants were 
instructed to read a text for ten minutes and only cross out instances of the letter 
‘e’ in accordance with set rules.  
Participants in Condition 3 were presented with identical sets of stimulus 
material outlined in Condition 1 and 2 (see Appendix 4C) and instructed to read a 
text for ten minutes and cross out all instances of the letter ‘e’. This was then 
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followed by another task whereby participants had to read a text for ten minutes 
and only cross out the letter ‘e’ in accordance with set rules.  
Decision Task 
The decision task was exactly the same as that used in Experiment 4 (see 
Appendix 3A).  
Graduate Record Examination Order Test, (GRE) 
As in Experiment 4 cognitive functioning subsequent to the ego-depletion 
task was assessed using the same 13 items from the Order subset of the Graduate 
Record Exam (GRE) (see Appendix 4A). Three measures of performance were 
recorded: the number of items answered correctly, the number of items attempted 
and the proportion of items answered correctly.  
4.7.3  Procedure 
Participants were tested in small groups of between three and six 
individuals. Prior to testing participants were given a short introduction to 
familiarize themselves with the experimental tasks and order that they would be 
presented. 
Participants in Condition 1 (cross out all ‘e’s) were presented with the 
high quality stimulus material and instructed to “Cross off all instances of the letter 
“e””. The experimenter allowed participants to continue working on this task for 
precisely ten minutes. Participants in Condition 2 (cross out with rules) were 
presented with the poor quality stimulus material and told to  “Cross off all 
instances of the letter “e” according to the following: An “e” should only be crossed off 
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if it is not adjacent to another vowel or is only one letter away from another vowel.” 
Again, participants were allowed to work on this task for precisely ten minutes. 
Participants in Condition 3 (override learned response) were made to regulate 
their behaviour by having to form and then break a habit. This was done by 
presenting participants with the letter crossing task as outlined in Condition 1 
(crossing out all instances of the letter “e”) followed by the completion of the letter 
crossing task outline in Condition 2 (crossing out instances of the letter “e” in 
accordance with set rules).  
Half the participants then continued onto the GRE, whereby they worked 
until they had completed all the problems or until they reached the predetermined 
limit of ten minutes. The remaining participants were instructed to work on the 
stick or switch decision task and then inform the experimenter once they had 
finished. There was no time limit imposed to complete this task, however the 
length of time it took each participant to finish these questions was recorded in the 
same manner used in Experiments 3 and 4. Participants who completed the GRE 
first then went on to work on the stick or switch decision task. Participants who 
completed the stick or switch decision task first were then directed to the GRE. All 
participants were then instructed to work their way through demographic 
questionnaire. Instructions outlining how to complete each task were printed at 
the top of the corresponding pages.  
4.8  Results 
Next, performance on the consumer decision task was assessed. Measures 
of performance were evaluated using five indices (identical to those used in 
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Experiment 4). Complete means and standard deviations for performance for 
participants in each condition are presented in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics in Percentages on Five Measures of Performance 
Recorded by the Consumer Decision Task for All Participants.  
 
 The data in Table 4.6 suggests that participants in condition 3 performed 
better than participants in either of the other two conditions. To see if these 
findings were significant, a univariate three-way ANOVA (condition) was 
conducted to compare the effect of each condition on subsequent performance on 
the consumer decision task. A significant difference was found between the 
conditions for the total percentage of correct stick or switch responses, F (2, 85) = 
3.25, P < .05, η² =.07. Post hoc analysis using Fischer’s LSD test revealed that 
participants in condition 3 made significantly more correct stick and switch 
choices than participants in condition 1 (p < .01). No significant differences were 
found between overall number of correct decisions and participants in conditions 
1 and 2 and conditions 2 and 3. Please refer to Statistics Appendix 5 for all 
summary tables corresponding to Experiment 5. 
To see whether condition affected the number of correct stick or switch 
decisions that participants made, a mixed 3X2 ANOVA (Condition X Correct choice) 
was conducted. The results revealed a significant main effect of correct choice, F (1, 
85) = 4.79, p < .05, η ² = .05, with participants performing best when they chose to 
Total scores (N = 88) Condition 1 
Cross out all e’s 
Condition 2 
Cross out with 
rules 
Condition 3 
Override learned 
response 
 M SD M SD M SD 
% total of all correct decisions 80.17 12.87 84.44 9.47 87.64 11.05 
% total of stick choices 53.74 11.48 48.33 10.46 49.14 8.44 
% total of switch choices 49.14 9.8 51.67 10.36 50.86 8.44 
% total of correct stick choices 75.86 15.8 82.78 13.48 86.78 12.89 
% total of correct switch choices 84.48 17.21 86.11 14.57 88.51 14.84 
143 
 
switch. No significant interaction between condition and correct choice was found, 
F (2, 85) = .99, p > .05, η ² = .02.  
To see if condition affected the number of times participants chose to stick 
or switch a mixed 3X2 ANOVA (Condition X Choice) was conducted. The results 
revealed no significant main effect of choice (stick or switch), F (1, 85) = .01, p > 
.05, η ² = 0. No significant main effect of condition was found, F (2, 85) = 2.21, p 
>.05, η ² = .05, and no significant interaction between condition and choice, F (2, 
85) = 1.46, p >.05, η ² = .03.  
 To investigate the prediction that participants would opt to stick more on 
difficult problems compared to easy problems a repeated-measures three-way 
ANOVA (Condition X Problem difficulty) was conducted. Percentage means and 
standard deviations for each problem type are presented in Table 4.7.  
Table 4.7 Means and Standard Deviations in Percentages for Participants in 
Each Condition for Stick Choices on Difficult and Easy Problems. 
 
 Analysis revealed a significant main effect of problem difficulty whereby 
participants opted to stick more often on difficult problems, F (1, 85) = 8.85, p <.01, 
η² = .09. These findings provide further support to the status quo bias occurring as 
a function of problem complexity as found in Experiments 3 and 4. No main effect 
of condition was revealed, F (2, 85) = .54, p >.05, η² = .01 suggesting that the ego-
depletion task did not cause participants to stick more often when problems were 
 Condition 1 
Cross out all e’s 
Condition 2 
Cross out with 
rules 
Condition 3 
Override learned 
response 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Difficult Problems 51.72 15.65 53.89 16.77 51.72 14.33 
Easy Problems 50 8.91 42.78 11.32 46.55 12.1 
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difficult. Furthermore, no interaction between condition and problem type 
(easy/hard) was found, F (2, 85) = 1.86, p >.05, η² = .04.  
The primary function of the GRE was to measure cognitive functioning after 
the experimental manipulation. As in Experiment 4, three measures of 
performance were recorded. Means and standard deviations for each of these 
measures of the GRE across the three conditions are presented in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8 Descriptive Statistics in Percentages for the Three Measures of 
Performance Recorded by the GRE for Participants in Each of the Three 
Conditions.  
 
A three-way univariate ANOVA (Condition) was conducted on the number 
of correct items, the number of items attempted and, the proportion of items 
answered correctly. Results revealed a significant main effect of condition in terms 
of the percentage of correct answers attained by participants, F (2, 85) = 3.99, p < 
.05, η² = .09. A Fischer LSD test revealed that participants in condition 2 (cross out 
with rules) performed significantly better than participants in condition 1 (cross 
out all “e”s) (p < .01) and a marginally significantly better than participants in 
condition 3 (override learned response) (p = .06).  Post-hoc analysis revealed no 
significant difference between the percentage of correct items obtained by 
participants in conditions 1 and 3. 
GRE Condition 1 
Cross out all e’s 
Condition 2 
Cross out with 
rules 
Condition 3 
Override learned 
response 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Number of correct items 44.56 15.97 46.15 17.84 42.97 15.59 
Number of items attempted 25.2 12.14 35.64 17.2 28.38 13.81 
Proportion of items 
answered correctly 
60.97 27.87 74.81 18.77 67.31 15.06 
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 In terms of the number of questions attempted, a three-way univariate 
ANOVA (Condition) revealed no significant effect of condition, F (2, 85) = .37, p > 
.05 η² = .01.  
No significant effect of condition was found for the proportion of correct 
answers from those attempted, F (2, 85) = 2.4, p >.05, η² = .05. Post hoc analysis 
using a Fischer LSD test revealed a marginally significant difference between 
participants in condition 1 and condition 2 (p > .05) whereby participants in 
condition 2 attempted more problems. No significant difference was found for the 
proportion of correct answers from those attempted between participants in 
conditions 1 and 3 and conditions 2 and 3. 
 The length of time participants in each condition spent completing the 
consumer decision task was recorded. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 
4.9. 
Table 4.9 Descriptive Statistics for the Time (minutes) Participants in Each Condition 
Took to Complete the Consumer Decision Task. 
 
 Condition 1 
Cross out all e’s 
Condition 2 
Cross out with 
rules 
Condition 3 
Override learned 
response 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Time (Minutes) 11.13 2.12 13.1 7.2 11.46 3.6 
 
 A univariate three-way ANOVA (Condition) was conducted to see if 
differences in time taken could be reliably established to vary as a function of 
condition. The data revealed no significant difference in time taken to complete the 
task and condition, F (2, 85) = 1.42, p > .05, η² = .03. 
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4.9  Discussion 
Given that the emotion-regulation procedure used in Experiments 3 and 4 
were not effective in the same way that typical tasks of this kind are, Experiment 5 
aimed to test a methodology shown to be reliable in depleting cognitive resources. 
A review of the literature suggested that tasks involving letter crossing were most 
effective in causing participants to display signs consistent with being ego-
depleted. It was decided that a letter crossing task would be used whereby two 
conditions were designed to encourage ego-depletion in our participants. 
Results for performance on the consumer decision-making task revealed 
that participants in condition 3 (who had to override a learned response) made 
significantly more correct choices overall than participants in condition 1 (who 
simply had to cross out all cases of the letter ‘e’ on a good quality photocopy). 
Although these findings are contrary to those found by previous researchers, they 
replicate with those reported in Experiments 3 and 4 whereby young participants 
placed in conditions designed to maximise effort (and therefore drain resources) 
consistently performed best. In addition, participants in Condition 1 were more 
likely to stick than participants in Condition 2 (who were presented with a poor 
quality photocopy and instructed to cross out instances of the letter ‘e’ in 
accordance with set rules) and Condition 3. Again, this is contrary to what may be 
expected as participants in this condition should have been the least depleted in 
terms of cognitive resources. Pocheptsove et al., (2008) proposed that given the 
option, resource-depleted individuals often chose to defer their choice or stick 
with a pre-selected option because they lack the cognitive reserves necessary to 
engage in effortful trade-offs. The data from Experiment 5 did not show this. 
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Interestingly, participants in Condition 3 were most accurate in their choices to 
stick, which again differs to what would be predicted had the ego-depletion 
manipulation been effective.  
To test whether the letter-crossing task caused participants to behave in a 
way typical when in a state of ego-depletion, the GRE was again used as an 
additional reliable measure of subsequent cognitive performance. It seems the 
procedure used in Experiment 5 was unsuccessful in causing a state of ego-
depletion. Participants in Condition 2 (cross out with rules) actually performed 
better on the GRE in terms of the percentage of correct answers than participants 
in Condition 1 (cross out all “e”s). Participants in Condition 2 also performed best 
on a measure of overall accuracy whereby they scored more highly in the 
proportion of correct answers attained (however this effect was only marginally 
significant). In light of these findings, it seems that rather than leading to reduced 
performance, the ego-depletion manipulation resulted in equal or even better 
performance. In light of previous findings (e.g. Schmeichel, et al., 2003), the data 
from Experiment 5 is surprising. Had Conditions 2 (cross out with rules) and 3 
(override learned response) worked in causing participants to exhibit signs of ego-
depletion, this would be evidenced in reduced overall performance, accuracy and 
working speed.  
Half the participants received the GRE task prior to the consumer decision 
task, and half received the GRE after the consumer decision task. Only the 
combined analysis is presented in the main body of the thesis as the effects of 
order were minimal. The data shows that when data for participants who 
completed the GRE before and after the consumer decision task are taken together, 
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participants in Condition 2 scored significantly better in terms of the percentage 
total of correct answers than participants in Conditions 1 and 3.  
Based on the findings from Experiments 3 and 4, it was anticipated that 
participants would opt to stick with the status quo more often when problems 
were difficult compared to when they were easy. The data from the current 
experiment was consistent with this prediction and previous research in this area 
(e.g. Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Furthermore, it was expected that participants 
assigned to conditions designed to cause a state of ego-depletion would opt to stick 
more often than participants in the control group. However, no significant 
differences were revealed between conditions in terms of the number of times 
participants opted to stick on either type of problem. This adds further evidence to 
the argument that the letter crossing manipulation was unsuccessful in causing 
participants to behave in a manner consistent with being ego-depleted. 
Taken together, data from the GRE and consumer decision task suggests 
that the manipulation used to induce ego-depletion was unsuccessful and if 
anything, worked to facilitate decision-making. Despite the wealth of evidence 
providing support for the strength model of self-regulation, attempts to replicate 
these findings are not always successful. Murtagh and Todd (2004) conducted two 
experiments to try and reproduce studies that support the strength model. In their 
first study, participants completed a Stroop task, and then squeezed a handgrip for 
as long as they could. In their second experiment, participants were instructed not 
to think about a white bear while they wrote down their thoughts; depletion was 
then measured by time working on difficult anagrams. Neither of these studies 
provided evidence of ego-depletion.  
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In explaining their findings, Murtagh and Todd (2004) suggest the self-
regulatory failure may be due to difficulties in switching from a task in one domain 
to another. This may be particularly true for typical studies investigating ego-
depletion, which tend to cross domains (e.g. presenting a physical task and then an 
emotion control task). It is argued that behaviours associated with ego-depletion 
are presented because participants find it difficult to organise their responses, 
rather than a lack of resources due the costs associated with an initial task.  
An alternative explanation proposes that the manipulation used in each 
condition cued different processing mechanisms. Research has shown that 
instructing participants to reason intuitively or logically can have an effect on their 
reasoning performance, (e.g. Klaczynski, 2001). For example, Thompson and 
Hamilton (2004) showed that different modes of information processing were able 
to either enhance or undermine the effectiveness of advertising, depending upon 
the match between the format of the advert and the processing mode consumers 
used to encode the advert information. In their study, participants were divided 
into four groups and asked to rate messages in car advertisements on the basis of 
persuasiveness, strength of argument and importance of information. The advert 
given to participants was either comparative or non-comparative. Participants 
were presented with instructions regarding how they should process the advert 
information. In the analytical condition, participants were asked to focus on the 
attributes and benefits of the car and think about how these attributes would meet 
their needs. In the imagery condition, participants were asked to try and picture 
the car in their mind and imagine as vividly as possible this experience.  Results 
indicated that in the analytical condition, the message on the comparative advert 
was more persuasive than the message on the non-comparative ad but the reverse 
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was true in the imagery condition. It was concluded that matching advert format 
with processing instructions appeared to increase the message persuasiveness by 
improving the processability of information.  
In review of Experiments 3, 4 and 5 it is proposed that participants exposed 
to the ego-depletion manipulations may have been inadvertently cued to process 
information in a manner that matched that needed to make adaptive choices on 
subsequent cognitive tasks. It could be seen that the self-regulation tasks 
presented to participants in Experiments 3, 4 and 5 primed young participants to 
handle successive information in the decision-making tasks in a more adaptive 
manner, i.e. these participants were cued to match their mode of processing with 
the operations needed to make good choices on the GRE and consumer decision 
task. In other words, participants instructed to increase their attention to detail by 
consistently monitoring and controlling their actions (as required by the 
suppression condition in Experiments 3 and 4, and Conditions 2 and 3 in 
Experiment 5), may have continued to process information in subsequent decision 
tasks in an analytic manner therefore matching the process needed to perform 
well on these types of problems.  
In conclusion, the data from Experiments 3, 4 and 5 consistently suggests 
that manipulations designed to be demanding in terms of resources, has in fact 
caused younger adults to perform better on subsequent cognitive tasks. It is 
proposed that the instructions presented to young participants in the ego-
depletion conditions may have primed them to work harder to overcome the effort 
expended in adhering to the manipulation instructions. The effects of this priming 
led to better subsequent cognitive performance on successive tasks.  The following 
chapter presents research designed to examine the effect of instructions on 
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consumer decision-making in both young and old adults. These effects will be 
measured by way of overall performance and the number of times participants opt 
to stick with the status quo or switch to an alternative option. Age differences in 
status-quo bias are examined. Furthermore, predictive measures of cognitive 
performance are recorded in an attempt to replicate the findings presented in 
Chapter 2, which suggested that numeric and fluid abilities are intrinsic in the 
explanation of age-related differences in consumer decision-making.   
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 Chapter 5 
5.1  Introduction 
It is generally thought that good decision-making relies upon conscious, 
effortful and deliberative processes; however, the impact of age-related cognitive 
declines suggests negative consequences for older adults’ deliberative abilities and 
reductions in decision-making aptitude. Contexts that require exhaustive 
verifications might place older adults at a disadvantage given their limited 
cognitive resources.  
Previous research has shown that priming participants to process 
information in a specific manner can affect subsequent processing on unrelated 
tasks. For example, Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, and Sherman (2006) 
primed participants with inferential problems designed to facilitate heuristic 
processing. The inferential problems preceded the tasks presented to participants 
and shared the same basic structure. Results suggested that heuristic priming 
significantly increased heuristic processing. A further experiment conducted by the 
same research team tested whether the same effect could be attained in cueing 
individuals to engage in reason based processing. Participants were presented 
with formal problems as primes for subsequent target problems. Results indicated 
that rule-governed thinking involved in solving the priming problems led to an 
increase in reason based processing.  
Klaczynski (2001) investigated age-related differences in normatively 
correct responses and biased responses on a several judgement and decision- 
making tasks. Depending upon the condition participants were assigned to, they 
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were presented with ‘framing’ instructions which required them to respond to 
subsequent problems using either their “usual” mode of processing or, an 
“analytic” mode of processing. Results indicated that when given the instruction to 
process information in a more analytic manner, the use of automatically activated 
heuristics was reduced (Klazynski, 2001). 
In terms of the methodologies used to prime participants, both Ferreira et 
al., (2006) and Klaczynski (2001) employed the use of simple instructions. For 
example, in one experiment testing how people made choices on the basis of 
incomplete information, Ferreira et al., (2006) told participants that they were 
taking part in a study of human intuition. Participants in this condition were 
encouraged to base their answers on personal intuition and sensitivity. In the 
second condition, participants were told that they were taking part in an 
experiment on human rationality and that the study’s goal was to evaluate 
scientific reasoning ability. Participants in this condition were encouraged to 
behave like scientists and base their answers on rational and reflective thinking. 
Klaczynski (2001) induced analytic processing by asking participants to think 
about a given situation from the perspective of a perfectly logical person. In both 
these experiments, participants’ choices varied as a function of the instructions 
they were presented with. 
In light of the research outlined above, it is proposed that instructions 
presented to participants in Experiments 3, 4 and 5 may have primed participants 
to engage in discrete processing styles while completing the subsequent decision 
tasks. In Experiments 3 and 4 young adults in the suppression condition 
performed better than those in the reappraisal and control conditions. In both 
experiments, participants in the suppression condition were given the same 
154 
 
instructions. These instructions required that should participants experience any 
feelings while viewing a distressing video clip, they must do their best not to let 
these feelings show, and behave in a way that someone watching them would not 
know that they were feeling anything at all. It is possible that these instructions led 
participants to pay attention to both their emotional and physical responses (such 
as facial expressions) in order that they could be controlled. To maintain this level 
of self-control, it is thought that participants engaged in a deliberative process 
whereby their reactions were constantly monitored and corrected if necessary. To 
make optimal choices, participants were required to calculate all alternative 
options and then compare these against a preselected target. To do this, it is 
argued that a process of self-control must be employed so that the individual can 
engage in a resource-intense analysis of each option before making a choice. It is 
proposed that the deliberative mode of processing was induced by the suppression 
instructions, and continued to be employed while completing the stick or switch 
decision task.    
In Experiment 5, participants placed in Condition 3 were made to form a 
habit (cross off all instances of the letter ‘e’) and then break it (only cross off 
instances of the letter ‘e’ when in accordance with certain rules). It is possible that 
this procedure primed participants to override an established intuitive response 
(crossing out all “e”s) in order that a more analytic, reasoned processing 
mechanism be employed (cross out only certain “e”s). Again, this analytic, 
deliberative processing style may have been utilised in the subsequent consumer 
decision task. The decision task can be seen as requiring that rule-based 
calculation procedures are employed in order that optimum choices are made. 
Taken together, it is argued that the manipulation used in Condition 3 cued 
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participants to process information in a manner that matched the necessary 
operations needed for the subsequent consumer decision task. 
In view of the findings outlined by previous researchers (Ferreira et al., 
2006; Klaczynski, 2001) and those obtained in Experiments 3, 4 and 5, Experiment 
6 tested the effects of instruction manipulation (rational vs. intuitive) on a 
subsequent stick or switch decision task. The instructions were based on those 
used by Ferreira et al., (2006) and Klaczynski (2001). It was proposed that priming 
older adults to make choices in an intuitive manner may reduce the cognitive 
burden associated with decision-making. It is also hypothesised that priming 
young adults to utilise more deliberative processes will improve their decision- 
making. Performance on the decision-making task was measured by examining 
overall accuracy and the number of times participants opted to stick with the 
status quo or switch to an alternative option. Experiment 3 revealed that older 
adults tended to stick more often than younger adults. It was proposed that this 
was a strategy employed by older adults to conserve limited resources. It is 
anticipated that older adults would again reveal a general tendency to stick more 
than young adults. Furthermore, because processing information in a rational 
manner places additional demands on resources, it is thought that older adults in 
this condition may attempt to reduce the cost to their (limited) reserved by opting 
to stick even more often. 
In addition to examining the effects of processing style on decision- 
making, predictive measures of performance were used to examine individual 
differences. Data from Experiments 1 and 2 showed that numeric and fluid ability 
were important determinants of older adults’ performance on a consumer decision 
task. By including measures of fluid and crystallised intelligence, speed of 
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processing and numeric ability, it was anticipated that results from Experiments 1 
and 2 could be extended and replicated in a further consumer choice task. 
Finally, the data from Experiment 2 also suggested that domain specific 
knowledge could not fully explain older adults’ apparent aptitude at the consumer 
decision-making task. The data showed that even in a comparatively unfamiliar 
domain (e.g. mobile phone provider), older adults demonstrated maintained 
decision-making ability. Although it may be reasonable to assume that individuals 
make better choices in contexts in which they have experience, our findings 
showing no difference between domains are not unique. Kim and Hasher (2005) 
tested two possible hypotheses regarding the effects of age and experience on 
decision-making. The first hypothesis postulated a general expertise view that 
older adults are generally more skilled at making decisions than younger adults. 
The second tested whether older adults were simply more skilled in making 
decisions in domains where they have greater knowledge.  
Kim and Hasher (2005) presented older and younger participants with 
two choice tasks. Each task displayed information about price and quality for three 
brands. Brands A and B were competitive to each other because Brand A was 
weaker on the quality dimension and stronger on the price dimension, while the 
reverse was true for Brand B. A third option, Brand C was also presented, however 
this option was always irrelevant. The two choice tasks were presented within the 
context of grocery shopping or earning extra credit for a course. It was assumed 
that older adults would be more familiar with grocery shopping and younger 
adults would be more familiar with attaining course credits. Results indicated that 
older adults were consistent in their choices in both domains. Younger adults 
made inconsistent decisions when making choices in the grocery shopping 
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problem. However, they did not show this effect in the extra credit domain. These 
findings suggest that general expertise may explain performance in later years. In 
addition to this, and consistent with the predictions made in the current chapter, 
Kim and Hasher (2005) argue that the better performance shown by older adults 
may lie in their increased propensity to rely on heuristic or intuitive information 
processing while younger adults tend to rely on analytic, systematic information 
processing. Experiment 6 investigated this issue in four consumer domains: one 
familiar to both young and old adults, one unfamiliar to both young and old adults, 
one familiar to older adults only and one familiar to young adults only.  
5.2  Experiment 6 
Experiment 6 aimed to examine the effect of age and instruction 
manipulation on task performance. Firstly, it was predicted that young and old 
adults would perform best in the rational condition. Second, it was predicted that 
participants will select the option to stick with the status quo more often on 
difficult problems than easy problems and older adults would stick more often 
overall compared to younger adults. Third, that numeric and fluid abilities would 
independently predict performance on the consumer decision task for old adults. 
Finally, it was anticipated that domain specific experience would not affect 
decision aptitude across domains for old or young adults.  
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5.3  Method 
5.3.1  Participants 
123 participants took part in Experiment 6: sixty three young adults aged 
18-52 (M = 22.1, SD = 5.78), and sixty old adults aged 63-93 (M = 73.18, SD = 6.62).  
Participants in each age group were randomly divided into two separate 
conditions: intuitive and rational. A total of 31 younger adults participated in the 
intuitive condition (M = 22.29, SD = 5.34) and 32 participated in the rational 
condition (M = 21.91, SD = 6.31). Thirty older adults participated in the intuitive 
(M = 71.66, SD = 5.03) and rational (M = 74.81, SD = 7.75) conditions respectively. 
Old adults were paid £8 per hour for their time and young adults received 
course credits for their participation. Young participants were university students 
and old adults were recruited from the South West of the UK.  
5.3.2  Materials 
Manipulation Instructions 
 
Two sets of instructions were used. The instructions were adapted from 
those used by Ferreira et al., (2006) and Klaczynski (2001) and were designed to 
cue participants to either use an intuitive or rational mode of processing. All 
participants received the following instructions: 
“The present study’s goal is to evaluate how individuals make choices on the 
basis of some information. The following pages consist of scenarios where a choice 
has already been made. It is your job to decide whether you want to stick with this 
choice or switch to an alternative option.” 
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Participants in the Intuitive condition were then told: “Please answer on the basis of 
your intuition and personal sensitivity. Try to respond to the questions based upon 
gut instinct using your intuition as the guide for responding” 
Participants in the Rational condition were then told: “Please answer on the basis of 
your rational and reflective thinking. Try to think about the questions objectively 
in terms of the technical aspects of each problem. When answering these questions, 
try to take the perspective of a perfectly logical person” 
Stick or Switch Decision Making Task 
 The decision task replicated the format of that used in Experiments 3, 4 and 
5 whereby participants were presented with a number of hypothetical scenarios 
and asked to make a choice regarding whether they would like to stick with an 
option already selected for them, or switch to an alternative option. In total, 
participants were required to make sixteen decisions in four domains. The 
selection of the four domains was based upon their familiarity to both young and 
old adults. The findings from Experiment 2 suggested that young adults were very 
familiar with making choices about selecting mobile phone companies, and that 
older adults were very familiar with making choices about utility suppliers. Based 
on these findings, it was decided that four questions would be framed within the 
context of selecting a mobile phone company (familiar to young adults). Four 
questions would be framed within the context of selecting an energy supplier 
(familiar to older adults). In addition, two further contexts were introduced, one 
which would be familiar to both older and younger adults, i.e. choosing a 
supermarket, and one which would be relatively unfamiliar to both age groups 
such as selecting a pharmacological supplier. Details of all problems presented to 
participants can be found in Appendix 6A. 
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 Decisions about mobile phone companies were based upon the price of 100 
minutes call time, the price of 100 text messages, and how well rated the company 
was in terms of reception coverage (1-5, where 1 is bad and 5 is good). Decisions 
about energy companies were based upon the price of 100 kWhrs of gas, the price 
of 100 kWhrs of electricity and how well rated the company was in terms of 
customer service (1-5, where 1 is bad and 5 is good). Decisions about 
supermarkets were based upon the price of a loaf of bread and the price of a pint of 
milk as well as how well rated the supermarket was on scores of customer 
satisfaction (1-5, where 1 is bad and 5 is good). Finally, decisions about 
pharmacological suppliers were based upon purchasing an equal amount of two 
drugs: Polymyxin B and Dexamthasone as well as a score for delivery speed (1-5, 
where 1 is fast and 5 is slow). 
 The presentation of the problems matched that used in Experiments 3, 4 
and 5. Information about eight companies labelled A-H was presented in a unique 
table for each of the sixteen problems. As with the previous experiments using this 
task, in each table one company had been highlighted. Participants were told that 
this was the company they were thinking of selecting. Participants then had the 
option to ‘stick’ with the option already selected, or ‘switch’ to an alternative 
company. Prior to each problem, participants were presented with a short vignette 
outlining what they were expected to do and highlighting the important 
information relevant to each decision. If the option to ‘switch’ was chosen, 
participants were asked to indicate which company they would switch to by 
circling a letter from A-H. All participants were asked to make these decisions as 
though they were making them for themselves in real life. 
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 Furthermore, the questions were designed in a specific manner, meaning 
that some problems were harder to solve than others. As with problems presented 
in Experiments 3, 4 and 5, the questions were individually designed to manipulate 
difficulty, (see Appendix 6A). Questions were considered ‘difficult’ if differences in 
attractiveness between options were small (see problem types I and II). Questions 
were considered ‘easy’ if differences in attractiveness between options was large 
(see problem types III and IV). Each set of questions contained four problems. Each 
of these four problems was constructed carefully so that the decisions were 
counterbalanced: (I) All options (A-H) were very similar, however two equal 
optimum choices were presented, one of which had already been selected. The 
correct choice would be to ‘stick’. (II) All options (A-H) were very similar, with two 
equal optimum choices available however, neither of these options had been 
selected. The correct choice would therefore be to ‘switch’. (III) Six of the eight 
options were very similar, though one company was markedly better than the 
others and one company was much worse. The best option had already been 
selected; therefore the correct response would be for the participant to ‘stick’. (IV) 
Again, six of the eight options were very similar, however, one company was much 
better value than the rest and one was much worse. An inferior option had been 
selected for this question; therefore the participant should opt to ‘switch’ in order 
to correctly solve this problem. 
Standard Progressive Matrices 
All participants completed sections B, C and D of Raven’s Standard 
Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven & Court, 2003). This task was designed to 
measure two main components of general intelligence: the ability to think clearly 
162 
 
and make sense of complexity, as well as the capacity to store and reproduce 
information.  
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III Vocabulary Scale 
 This sub-test of the Wais-III assesses learning and memory (Alan, 2001; 
Alfredo 2007; Walter et al., 1975). All individuals were presented with a series of 
words both orally and visually. Participants were tasked with verbally defining 
each word as it was presented to them. 
Speed of Processing: 
 The digit comparison task (Finucane et al, 2005) was employed to evaluate 
speed of processing. Participants were asked to quickly determine whether or not 
two numerical figures were the same. Three, 45-second conditions were 
administered. 
Numeracy Scale 
 An 11-item numeracy scale (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) was used to 
evaluate numerical ability.  
Demographic Questionnaire 
 This asked for information about age, gender, and education.  To measure 
domain specific experience, participants were also asked questions about their 
interaction with energy suppliers, mobile phone companies, shopping habits and 
whether they had ever worked for a pharmacological supplier (see Appendix 6B). 
5.3.3  Procedure 
Older adult participants were tested individually and younger adults were 
tested in pairs. The experiment consisted of six tasks: The stick or switch decision 
task, demographic questionnaire, standard progressive matrices, Wais-III 
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vocabulary scale, digit comparison, and the numeracy scale. Prior to testing, 
participants were given a short introduction to familiarise themselves with the 
various tasks. It was made clear that calculators were not allowed to be used for 
the duration of the experiment, however scrap paper and pens were provided and 
the participants were informed that they could use these should they wish to make 
notes in order to aid them with their answers. 
All participants completed the stick or switch decision task first. 
Depending upon which condition they were allocated to they received either the 
intuitive or rational instructions. The instructions were read aloud to all 
participants and a printed copy was also provided for participants to refer to for 
the duration of the decision making task. All participants were informed that there 
was no time limit in which they had to complete the decision task, however the 
length of time it took them to accomplish the task would be noted. Participants’ 
timings were recorded using a stopwatch in exactly the same manner used in 
Experiments 3,4 and 5. To prevent order effects, the sequence that the questions in 
the decision task were presented was counterbalanced across age groups and 
conditions. 
Once the decision task had been completed, participants were then asked 
to answer the questions on the demographic questionnaire. All other procedures 
regarding the Ravens, Wais – III, speed of processing task and numeracy scale 
replicate those used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
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5.4  Results 
The impact of instructions to process information in an intuitive or rational 
manner was examined in older and younger adults. In order to ensure that 
participants assigned to each condition were equivalent, a multivariate analysis of 
variance (Age X Condition) for each predictive measure of performance was 
conducted. Means, standard deviations, F values and Eta squared are presented in 
Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics , F values and Eta Squared for Predictive 
Measures of Performance by Age and Condition.  
        *p < 0.05 
 
The data presented in Table 5.1 shows that older adults assigned to either 
condition showed no significant difference in terms of fluid intelligence, numeric 
ability or crystallised intelligence. However, older adult participants in the 
intuition condition evidenced significantly faster processing speed and completed 
the consumer decision task significantly more quickly than older adults in the 
rational condition.  
Table 5.1 shows that younger adults assigned to each condition did not 
differ significantly in terms of fluid intelligence, numeric ability, crystallised 
Predictive 
Measures 
Age 
Group 
 
Intuitive 
 
Rational 
 
F 
 
η² 
  M SD M SD   
RAVENS Young 85.57 7.22 86.37 9.13 .15 0 
Old 74.54 11 69.72 14.25 2.15 .04 
Digit 
Comparison 
Young 77.23 10.44 74.97 13.87 .53 .01 
Old 60.9 11.96 53.4 10.69 6.56* .1 
Numeracy Young 83.28 9.99 82.67 15.38 .04 0 
Old 72.12 15.1 69.7 20.16 .28 .01 
Vocabulary Young 58.06 8.12 54.31 12.54 2 .03 
Old 65.25 14.42 65.25 11.81 0 0 
Time 
(Minutes) 
Young 10.81 3.57 12.94 2.96 6.66* .1 
Old 16.9 11.11 22 7.24 4.38* .07 
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intelligence or speed of processing. And, as with the older adults, young 
participants in the rational condition took significantly longer to complete the 
decision-making exercise than those in the intuition condition. 
 Next, an independent measures t-test was conducted to test for differences 
in performance in predictive measures of ability between participants in each age 
group. Descriptive statistics, t values and significance are presented in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics in Percentages on Predictive Measures of 
Performance for all Younger and Older adults  
 
  
    
  
              **p < 0.01   
Table 5.2 shows that younger adults performed significantly better than 
older adults on measures of fluid intelligence, numeric ability and speed of 
processing. Older adults scored significantly higher on a measure of crystallised 
intelligence (vocabulary) than younger adults. These findings are consistent with 
the literature on cognitive ageing (and data from Experiments 1 and 2), suggesting 
our sample is representative.  
Next, the effects of age and condition on decision-making ability on the 
consumer decision task were investigated. Means and standard deviations for old 
and young adult’s performance on the consumer decision task for both conditions 
are presented in Table 5.3.     
 
 
 
 
Predictive Measures Young Old t 
 M SD M SD  
Ravens 85.98 8.2 72.13 12.84 7.09** 
Digit Comparison 76.08 12.26 57.15 11.87 -8.7** 
Numeracy 82.97 12.91 70.91 17.7 4.33** 
Vocabulary 56.16 10.68 65.25 13.07 4.24** 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics in Percentages for Performance of Younger and 
Older Adults by Condition on the Consumer Decision Task.  
  Intuitive Rational 
  M SD M SD 
 
Total Stick and Switch Correct 
Young 77.41 10.91 81.84 10.76 
Old 70 16.85 75 10.76 
 
Total Correct Stick Choices 
Young 94.47 7.97 94.64 9.43 
Old 85.71 21 92.7 8.34 
 
Total Correct Switch Choices 
Young 64.87 15.48 70.14 14.23 
Old 58.44 20.32 61.56 16.55 
 
Total Times Stick was Chosen 
Young 50.81 7.7 47.23 6.53 
Old 46.46 15.8 50.21 9.21 
 
Total Times Switch was Chosen 
Young 49.2 7.69 52.73 6.53 
Old 53.54 15.8 49.17 8.95 
 
To see whether condition affected the number of correct stick or switch 
decisions participants made, a mixed 2X2X2 analysis of variance (Condition X 
Correct choice X Age) was conducted. The results revealed a significant main effect 
of correct choice, F (1, 119) = 268.91, p < .01, η ² = .69, a significant main effect of 
age, F (1, 119) = 9.64, p < .05, η ² = .08, and a marginally significant main effect of 
condition, F (1, 119) = 3.52, p = .06, η² = .03.  These results indicate that young 
adults performed better than old adults in both conditions. Choices were correct 
most often when participants opted to stick and when participants were placed in 
the rational condition. No significant interaction between age and condition was 
found, F (1,119) = .32, p > .05, η ² = 0. No significant interaction was found between 
correct choice and age, F (1, 119) = .4, p > .05, η² = 0. No significant interaction was 
found between correct choice and condition, F (1, 119) = .03, p > .05, η ² = 0. 
Furthermore, no significant interaction was found between correct choice, age and 
condition, F (1, 119) = 1.71, p > .05, η² = .01. Please refer to Statistics Appendix 6 
for all summary tables corresponding to Experiment 6. 
Next the prediction that participants would opt to stick more on difficult 
problems compared to easy problems was tested. Means and standard deviations 
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for old and young adults in the intuition and rational conditions are presented in 
Table 5.4 
Table 5.4 Means and Standard Deviations for Old and Young Adults in the 
Intuition and Rational Conditions on Difficult and Easy Problems. 
  
A 2X2X2 analysis of variance (Age X Condition X Problem difficulty) was 
conducted. Results indicated no significant main effect of age, F (1, 119) = .01, p > 
.05, η² = 0, and no significant main effect of condition, F (1, 119) = .04, p > .05, η² = 
0. However, a significant main effect of problem type was found, F (1, 119) = 477.8, 
p < .01, η² = .8 where all participants chose to stick more often on difficult 
problems. Furthermore, a significant interaction between age and condition was 
revealed F (1, 119) = 4.9, p < .05, η² = .04 where both young and old adults chose to 
stick more when placed in the rational condition. No significant interactions were 
found between age and problem type F (1, 119) = 2.35, p > .05, η² = .08, problem 
type and condition, F (1, 119) = 2.18, p > .05, η² = .02, or problem type, age and 
condition, F (1, 119) = 1.02 p > .05, η² = .01. These findings suggest that both 
younger and older adults tended to stick more often on problems that were 
difficult compared to problems which were easy. Furthermore, the data indicates 
that the number of times younger and older adults chose to stick was equivocal 
across conditions. Finally, younger and older adults did not differ significantly 
from one another in terms of the number of stick choices made for difficult and 
easy problems. 
 Young Old 
Stick  Intuition Rational Intuition Rational 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Difficult Problems 69.75 10.59 65.23 9.91 61.25 22.11 69.17 14.21 
Easy Problems 37.1 13.88 31.25 10.04 35.83 16.33 36.67 14.28 
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Next, a series of Pearson correlations were conducted to investigate any 
relationships between predicative measures of ability and performance on the 
consumer decision task. Pearson correlation values and significance for 
participants in each condition and combined condition are presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 Pearson Correlation Matrix Among Predictive Measures of Ability for 
Overall Decision Performance for Young and Old Adults in the Intuitive and Rational 
and Conditions Combined.  
  Predictors 
Age Group Numeracy Digit 
Comparison 
Ravens Vocabulary Time 
 
Young 
Intuitive -.56** -.21 .0 -.04 .44** 
Rational -.12 .16 .21 -.13 -.03 
Combined -.29* -.03 .12 -.12 .29* 
 
Old 
Intuitive .34° .05 .56** .12 -.1 
Rational .35° .33 .31 .17 -.03 
Combined .31* .08 .37** .13 -.03 
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01, ° p< .1 
Table 5.5 reveals that numeracy and time were related to decision-making 
ability for young adults in the intuitive condition. Interestingly, the correlation for 
numeracy and ability at the stick or switch task was negative, suggesting that good 
numeric ability led to poorer overall performance. Surprisingly, no correlations 
were found between ability to select adaptively and predictive measures in the 
rational condition. In terms of older adults, the data presented in Table 5.5 shows 
that a significant relationship occurred between numeric ability and fluid 
intelligence in the intuitive and combined group analysis. Numeric ability was also 
marginally significant in both the intuitive and rational conditions. When data from 
participants in the rational and intuitive group were combined, numeric ability and 
fluid intelligence were significantly correlated with performance. 
The next analysis examined the extent to which numeracy, fluid and 
crystallised intelligence and speed of processing predicted performance. A number 
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of multiple regression analyses were performed with numeracy, fluid intelligence, 
crystallised intelligence and digit comparison entered as predictive variables. A 
total of three independent analyses were run for each age group. Performance on 
the consumer decision task was the dependent variable for participants in both the 
rational and intuitive conditions and, data for participants in both conditions 
combined.  
Table 5.6 Multiple Regression Analysis for Younger Adults Decision Making Ability 
and Predictive Measures of Performance 
Question Predictors β t Sig R² Adjusted R² 
 
Rational 
Numeracy -.28 -1.25 .22  
.16 
 
.04 Fluid Intelligence .37 1.76 .09º 
Vocabulary -.17 -.84 .41 
Speed of Processing .19 .97 .34 
 
Intuitive 
Numeracy -.55 -3.4 0**  
.35 
 
.25 Fluid Intelligence -.02 -.08 .93 
Vocabulary -.03 -.2 .85 
Speed of Processing -.23 -1.2 .24 
 
Combined 
Numeracy -.39 -2.74 .01*  
.16 
 
.1 Fluid Intelligence .29 2.17 .03* 
Vocabulary -.08 -.62 .54 
Speed of Processing .07 .59 .56 
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01, ° p< .1 
Table 5.6 shows that none of the measures of intelligence could predict 
young adults’ decision-making performance when placed in the rational condition, 
although fluid ability was marginally significant. Numeric ability was found to be a 
highly significant predictor of performance for young participants in the intuitive 
condition. Furthermore, numeric and fluid ability were found to be significant 
predictors of performance when the scores for participants in the rational and 
intuitive conditions were combined. 
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Table 5.7 Multiple Regression Analysis for Older Adults Decision Making Ability and 
Predictive Measures of Performance 
Question Predictors β t Sig R² Adjusted R² 
 
Rational 
Numeracy .29 1.41 .17  
.22 
 
.09 Fluid Intelligence .03 .11 .91 
Vocabulary .09 .51 .62 
Speed of Processing .28 1.39 .18 
 
Intuitive 
Numeracy .06 .28 .78  
.32 
 
.21 Fluid Intelligence .54 2.67 .01* 
Vocabulary -.01 -.08 .94 
Speed of Processing -.06 -.33 .75 
 
Combined 
Numeracy .16 1.08 .29  
.16 
 
.1 Fluid Intelligence .3 1.94 .06º 
Vocabulary .04 .31 .76 
Speed of Processing -.04 -.32 .75 
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01, ° p< .1 
Table 5.7 shows that decision-making performance for older adults in the 
rational condition could not be predicted by any of the variables measured. 
However, fluid intelligence was found to be a significant predictor of consumer 
decision making for participants in the intuition condition. When the data from 
older participants in both the rational and intuition conditions were combined, 
fluid intelligence was found to be a marginally significant predictor of decision 
performance. 
To examine whether experience can account for performance, a number of 
Pearson Chi-Square analyses were performed. Experience with the four topic areas 
was assessed by asking participants about their interactions specific to each 
domain. Data from one question corresponding to each topic was used in the 
analysis. Questions can be found in Appendix 6B. In summary, results revealed no 
significant associations between experience and decision making in each domain 
for either age group.  
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5.5  Discussion 
The work presented in this chapter explores age differences in consumer 
decision-making. Experiment 6 tested the idea that older and younger adults 
would vary in performance on the decision-making task depending upon the 
processing instructions they received. It was thought that asking participants to 
manage information in a rational manner would encourage them to process 
information in a deliberative way. In contrast, asking participants to manage 
information in an intuitive manner would encourage them to process information 
in an instinctive, less resource demanding way.  
The first prediction assumed that young and old adults would perform 
best in the rational condition. Results from Experiment 6 revealed that both young 
and old in the rational condition performed better than participants in the intuitive 
group. These findings supported the predictions. The current data implies that 
both older and younger adults must engage in deliberative and effortful processing 
to attain good decisions. In terms of Experiment 3, the mechanisms underlying the 
performance of older adults in the reappraisal condition remain unclear. In light of 
this, it seems that reappraisal may not simply have been less cognitively 
demanding than other strategies, but that some other process incurred by the 
reappraisal instructions caused older adults to handle information in a more 
beneficial way.  
Further analysis revealed that young and old adults were significantly 
more likely to stick when placed in the intuition condition and switch more when 
assigned to the rational condition. This finding implies that participants expended 
less energy when placed in the intuition condition as deciding to stick requires 
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fewer cognitive resources than choosing to switch (Dahr, 1997). In view of the 
manipulation instructions, this data suggests that directions to process 
information in an intuitive or rational manner were successful.  
Finally, young adults were significantly more accurate in their choices 
than older adults. This finding was consistent with the literature on ageing 
whereby older adults tend to make worse consumer decisions than young adults 
(e.g. Peters et al., 2007; Reyna et al., 2009).  
An additional prediction was that all participants would opt to stick with 
the status quo more often on difficult problems. The data from the current study is 
consistent with this prediction and previous research (including data from 
Experiments 3, 4 & 5). Taken together, the findings from the research presented in 
this thesis provide robust support for Dahr (1997) and Tversky and Shafir (1992) 
who proposed that consumers would choose to defer a decision when the choice 
environment becomes more complex. Furthermore, the present findings 
demonstrate differential effects of instructions for older and younger adults in 
terms of the decisions they make in complex and simple choice environments.   
 Despite the mixed pattern of results for younger and older adults’ 
performance on the decision-making exercise, it was assumed that the instruction 
manipulations were effective. This belief is based on older and younger adults’ 
performance on other measures of ability. For example, both older and younger 
adults in the rational condition spent significantly more time completing the stick 
or switch decision task. This implies that those in the rational condition were 
indeed engaging in a more effortful form of processing. Furthermore, on the digit 
comparison task, both older and younger participants in the rational condition 
were found to compare fewer digits than those in the intuitive condition. This 
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suggests that participants in the rational condition were responding in a 
deliberative and more effortful manner, the consequence of which was a reduction 
in processing speed.  
An additional explanation for these findings is that old and young adults 
may have had different definitions regarding which alternative they considered to 
be the best. In Experiment 6, the best alternative was deemed to have the most 
positive (and fewest negative) attributes; this definition is consistent with that 
used by Dijksterhuis (2006). However, Calvillo and Panaloza (2009) propose the 
following example to illustrate a problem with this definition: “suppose one is 
deciding between two cars, each with three known attributes. Car A has cup-
holders and a sunroof, but gets poor gas mileage, while Car B has no cup-holders or 
sunroof, but gets good gas mileage. Car A has two positive and one negative 
attribute while Car B has one positive and two negative attributes” (Calvillo & 
Panaloza, 2009, p. 510). According to the definition used in the present study, one 
should choose car A. However, a person who weighs gas mileage more than the 
sum of weights for cup-holders and sunroofs should select Car B. Because the 
weighting of attributes is subjective, when positive and negative attributes vary 
between alternatives, it can be seen as difficult to know which alternative to select. 
Older adults may have weighted attributes in each problem differently to young 
adults, for example problems presented to participants in the context of selecting a 
holiday provided information on the price of the hotel, the price of the flight and 
the number of stars assigned to each hotel. Older adults may have been prepared 
to pay additional money to stay at a hotel with extra stars because they weighted 
this attribute more highly than the costs of the hotel and flight. 
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It was proposed that numeric and fluid abilities would predict 
performance on the consumer decision task for both young and old adults. To test 
this hypothesis, cognitive predictors of performance (i.e. numeracy, speed of 
processing, crystallised intelligence and fluid intelligence) were examined. Results 
suggested that numeracy was the strongest predictor of performance for younger 
adults when instructed to work on problems in an intuitive manner, although this 
relationship was negative. This implies that the higher the numeric aptitude of the 
individual, the poorer their performance when asked to answer problems on the 
stick or switch decision task in an intuitive manner. Despite the unexpected nature 
of these findings, they are consistent with those found in Experiment 1 whereby a 
negative relationship between numeracy and performance on factual questions 
was found to be close to significant.   
It is proposed that more numerate participants engaged in a more 
complex calculation procedure, which conversely led to poorer performance. It can 
be seen that the problems presented in the stick or switch task are relatively 
simple. The most efficient strategy in solving these items involves two stages. The 
first step would be to eliminate all options that scored below the pre-selected 
choice based on the visual depiction of ratings for customer satisfaction, speed of 
delivery, customer service or mobile phone reception. The second step requires 
that participants then complete a simple calculation process to achieve an overall 
cost relating the remaining alternative options. In light of this, making good 
choices on the stick or switch decision task can be viewed as being dependent 
upon information search, and relatively less reliant on numeric ability.  
One possibility is that more numerate individuals may attempt to compare 
options by combining all of the information presented in the tables. This may have 
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included assigning a value to each of the visual depictions for ratings of customer 
satisfaction. By engaging in this form of ratio-based processing participants would 
not achieve a correct response. In support of this explanation, research conducted 
by Reber, Brun, and Mitterndorfer (2008) suggested that when people do not have 
enough time to analyse a problem, they may engage in heuristic cues in order to 
assess the correctness of a proposed solution. They argue that it is this mechanism 
that underlies intuitive judgements in simple mathematical tasks. It is proposed 
that participants with better numeric skills may have developed more accurate 
heuristic cues able to efficiently process complex numeric problems. If this were 
so, participants with better numeric skills may have indeed tried to combine all the 
information presented in the tables by assigning a value to the visual depictions of 
product attributes. These forms of calculation may lead to an incorrect response.  
It is interesting to note that a similar negative relationship was established 
for young participants in the factual condition in Experiment 1. Again, it could be 
argued that highly numerate individuals tried to engage complex calculation 
processes unnecessary for the task. By attempting to evaluate information in a 
complex manner, these participants performed worse than those who were less 
numerate. Interestingly, no measures of cognitive performance were found to 
significantly predict aptitude on the consumer decision task for young adults in the 
rational conditions. However, when data for young participants in both conditions 
was combined, numeracy and fluid intelligence presented the best model for 
predicting performance on the consumer decision task. 
With regards to older adults, fluid intelligence and numeric ability were 
found to be significantly correlated with performance on the consumer decision 
task; Fluid intelligence also presented the best model for predicting performance 
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when data for older participants in both conditions were combined. These findings 
are consistent with the literature whereby it is thought that, compared to young 
adults, older adults may rely on a more effortful processing mechanism (as 
measured by fluid intelligence) to manage exhaustive verification strategies used 
to calculate the most beneficial option on the decision task. No measures of 
cognitive performance predicted aptitude on the consumer decision task for old 
adults in the rational condition. 
Results revealed that experience in each of the four domains could not 
significantly account for performance on the consumer decision-making task. 
Experiment 6 adds further support to the notion that domain specific knowledge 
cannot fully explain performance on the decision making task. 
In summary, this experiment provides some interesting findings. Namely 
that priming young and old adults to process information in a rational manner 
leads to better decision-making compared with cueing intuitive processing. 
Furthermore, additional evidence for age-related differences in processing 
mechanisms when making consumer choices was provided. It seems that older 
adults rely most on fluid intelligence, whereas numeric ability seems key to 
predicting young adult’s competence at making good decisions. Interestingly, the 
converse relationship between numeric ability and decision competence found in 
Experiment 1 is replicated, whereby better numeric ability lead to worse decision- 
making. Additional support is also afforded to Dahr (1998, 1997), Tversky and 
Shafir (1992) who proposed that consumers would choose to stick more often 
when the choice environment becomes more complex. However, age-differences in 
the status-quo effect were not revealed suggesting that older adults do not rely on 
this strategy more often than young adults as a way of conserving resources. 
177 
 
Finally, the current study found that experience did not impact performance on the 
decision task; this finding is in line with that of previous experiments in this thesis 
and other researchers (e.g. Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). 
In conclusion, Experiment 6 provides further evidence regarding the 
impact of instruction on subsequent decision-making and, in addition the key role 
of numeracy and fluid intelligence as independent predictors of ability for young 
and old adults when making consumer choices.  
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 Chapter 6 
6.1  Experimental Review 
Experiments 1, 2 and 6 examined differences in younger and older adults’ 
consumer decision-making. It was predicted that older adults would make 
comparatively worse decisions than young adults and both younger and older 
adults would perform worse on complex consumer problems compared to simple 
ones. In addition, it was anticipated that differences in decision-making ability 
could be explained by differences in cognitive abilities. See Table 6.1 (p181) for a 
summary of significant findings across all studies.  
Data from Experiment 1 showed no difference in decision performance on 
simple or complex problems for older and younger adults. This finding was 
interesting given that age was associated with lower scores on fluid intelligence 
tasks, processing speed and numeracy. It was suggested that older adults might 
have relied on improved crystallised intelligence to compensate for declines in 
fluid abilities. This explanation is consistent with ideas proposed by Stanovich and 
West (2008) insofar that age-related increases in crystallised intelligence can 
provide some protection against deficits in other cognitive abilities. Additional 
support for this argument was revealed when crystallised intelligence was added 
as a covariate and a significant main effect of age emerged. Furthermore, when 
fluid intelligence was added as a covariate alongside crystallised intelligence, the 
effect of age disappeared. Taken together, Experiment 1 suggests that age 
differences in decision performance are the result of cognitive decline, and 
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provides evidence consistent with the idea that crystallised intelligence can 
protect against some age-related deficits in cognitive ability.    
Contrary to Experiment 1, Experiments 2 and 6 revealed a significant main 
effect of age where young adults made better decisions than old adults. These 
results are consistent with previous research given age-related differences in 
independent measures of cognitive ability. Interestingly, when fluid intelligence 
was added as a covariate, the main effect of age disappeared. This finding was 
reliably shown across Experiments 1, 2 and 6 and suggests that age differences in 
decision-making are partially influenced by fluid intelligence.  
With regard to numeric ability, Experiments 1 and 2 revealed this to be a 
significant independent predictor of older adults’ decision aptitude. Furthermore, 
numeracy was significantly correlated with older adults’ performance in 
Experiment 6. This finding is consistent with previous research conducted by 
Peters et al., (2006), Tanius et al., (2009) and Wood et al., (2011) and highlights the 
important independent role of numeric ability in decision-making. These findings 
imply that for older adults, consumer decision-making performance is highly 
dependent upon both numeric and fluid ability. One possible interpretation of 
these findings is that older adults might rely on more effortful processing 
mechanisms to manage the verification strategies used to calculate the best option. 
In terms of younger adults, numeric ability was found to predict 
performance on the consumer decision task in Experiment 2 and for participants 
in the intuition condition in Experiment 6. The results however, revealed that 
younger adults high in numeric ability seemed to perform worse on the consumer 
task. One possible explanation is that more numerate participants engaged in a 
complex form of ratio based calculation process, which lead to incorrect responses. 
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Reber et al., (2008) showed that when people do not have enough time to fully 
analyse a problem, they engage in heuristic cues to assess whether a proposed 
solution is correct. Because participants in the intuition condition were told to 
make decisions based upon their ‘gut instinct,’ it was proposed that participants 
with better numeric ability (and more accurate numeric heuristic cues) may have 
attempted to combine all the information presented in the tables by assigning a 
value to the visual depictions of product attributes. This form of calculation may 
have led to an incorrect response. As will be discussed later, the wider implications 
presented by these results suggest that individuals with poor numeric ability may 
be at increased risk of making bad consumer choices with potentially serious 
consequences. 
In summary, the findings from Experiments 1, 2 and 6 consistently show 
that older adults’ consumer decision making can be independently predicted by 
fluid and numeric abilities. However, the mechanisms young adults rely on when 
making consumer decisions remain unclear. In attempting to explain young adults’ 
performance a number of alternatives are considered. First, it is possible that 
younger adults simply had sufficient cognitive capacity to engage in the types of 
calculations needed to process the information effectively without predominantly 
relying on any one predictive measure. Second, it may be some other mechanism 
not included in this study can predict performance. A growing body of literature 
suggests that decision-making may be affected by many factors aside from 
cognitive ability.  Klaczynski (2001; 2009) demonstrated that social, motivational, 
affect and prior beliefs can impact the way people make choices. Furthermore, 
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) found that participants with a higher need for cognition 
were more likely to think harder about problems. Finally, Blais, Thompson and 
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Baranski (2005) demonstrated that need for cognition was related to decision 
accuracy on comparative judgement tasks.  
The idea that an alternative variable, not included in the current research, 
can predict young adult performance is substantiated by Stanovich and West 
(1997). As will be discussed later, Stanovich and West (1997) showed that 
decision-making can be independently predicted by both cognitive ability and by 
thinking dispositions. Taken together, it seems that decision-making can be 
affected by both cognitive and dispositional factors. Experiments 1, 2 and 6 
concentrated on measuring cognitive abilities. As such, future research could 
extend the scope of the present work by adding additional measures of disposition. 
It is predicted that a clearer picture of the factors responsible for young adults’ 
consumer performance would be established. 
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 Table 6.1. Summary of significant findings across all studies 
Study Young Adults Old Adults 
One Performed best on factual questions 
compared to inferential questions.  
 
Performed best on factual questions compared 
to inferential questions. 
A significant main effect of age emerged when 
crystallised intelligence was added as a 
covariate. 
When fluid intelligence was added alongside 
crystallised intelligence, the main effect of age 
disappeared. 
Numeric ability and fluid intelligence were 
found to independently predict decision 
making performance on the consumer task. 
 
Two Performed best on factual questions 
compared to inferential questions.  
Young adults performed significantly better 
than old adults on the consumer decision task. 
Numeric ability independently predicted 
decision performance on the consumer task. 
Performed best on factual questions compared 
to inferential questions.  
When fluid intelligence was added as a 
covariate, the main effect of age disappeared. 
Numeric ability and fluid intelligence were 
found to independently predict decision 
making performance on the consumer task. 
 
Three Participants chose to make a decision in the 
future significantly more often on difficult 
problems. 
Participants in the control and suppression 
conditions made more correct choices than 
older adults. 
Participants performed best in the 
suppression condition. 
Participants chose to ‘make a decision in the 
future’ most significantly more often on 
difficult problems. 
Older adults found it easier to regulate their 
emotions compared to young adults. 
Older adults reported feeing more positive and 
less negative than young adults. 
Participants performed best in the reappraisal 
condition 
Four Participants in the suppression condition 
made more correct decisions than those in the 
reappraisal condition. 
Participants in all conditions decided to stick 
more often than switch. 
Participants decided to stick most often on 
difficult problems. 
  
 
Five Participants in Condition 3 (high ego-
depletion) made more correct decisions than 
participants in Condition 1 (low ego-
depletion). 
Participants in Condition 2 (moderate ego-
depletion) attempted most questions on the 
GRE. 
Participants decided to stick most often on 
difficult problems. 
 
 
Six Young adults performed better than older 
adults on the consumer decision task in both 
the rational and intuitive condition. 
Young adults decided to stick most often in the 
rational condition. 
Numeric ability was negatively correlated 
with decision performance on the consumer 
task. 
Numeric ability and fluid intelligence 
predicted decision performance on the 
consumer task. 
Older adults decided to stick most in the 
intuitive condition. 
When fluid intelligence was added as a 
covariate, the main effect of age disappeared. 
Numeric ability and fluid intelligence were 
correlated with overall performance on the 
consumer decision task. 
Fluid intelligence independently predicted 
performance on the consumer decision task.  
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6.2  Choosing to Stick, Switch or Decide in the Future 
When making a decision, consumers have a number of decision strategies 
available to them including: to stick with a current option, select an alternative 
option or decide in the future. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, making a 
consumer choice often demands that the individual considers a large number of 
alternative options (companies, tariffs and payment preferences) and engage in an 
extensive and/or complicated calculation processes to attain the best option. The 
associated cost to individual resources such as memory is high. It is important to 
identify decision environments where people may be vulnerable in terms of 
choosing to stick with a company that does not offer them the most beneficial 
option.  Ascertaining how age and decision environment impact choice is an 
important step to developing methods to help people in making better consumer 
decisions. 
Dahr (1997) proposed that the choice to stick, switch or defer vary in terms 
of the cognitive resources needed to implement them. Furthermore, Wesseler et 
al., (2003) suggested that people may avoid making a choice when they perceive 
the cognitive effort required to compare competing alternatives as too costly. In 
other words, individuals may choose to stick or defer in an attempt to conserve 
effort or resources.  
To date, research has provided data consistent with the theories presented 
by Dahr (1997) and Wesseler et al., (2003). For example, Shafir and Tversky 
(1992) showed that difficult choices lead people to defer more often than when 
choices were easy. The choice to stick or decide in the future can be viewed as 
arising from similar decision conditions as the choice to defer. Furthermore, the 
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likelihood of the status quo effect occurring has been shown to significantly 
increase if an option has been predetermined (Hartman et al., 1991; Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988).  
Based on previous studies outlined in the decision literature (e.g. Dahr, 
1997; Tversky et al., 1992) and preceding experiments described in this thesis, two 
predictions were made: First, older adults would choose to stick and decide in the 
future more often than young adults. This was based on the findings of previous 
studies: Experiments 1 and 2 revealed fluid intelligence to be a key predictor of 
consumer decision-making performance for older adults. Furthermore, older 
adults were found to score significantly lower on a measure of fluid intelligence 
than young adults. These findings are consistent with a wealth of evidence 
documenting age-related declines in many processes key to good decision-making. 
Older adults and younger adults seem to rely heavily on cognitive capacity to solve 
consumer problems. Because older adults’ ability to engage in complex processing 
is more limited than younger adults, it was proposed that they may be more likely 
to attempt to conserve cognitive resources by choosing options less demanding of 
their cognitive reserves. 
The second prediction stated that both older and younger adults would 
choose to stick more often on difficult problems compared to easy problems. 
Consumer problems in the current research were defined as difficult when 
attractiveness between options was small. In order to make the best decision, 
participants had to engage in an exhaustive verification process, adding together 
costs for multiple companies before making a selection. For easy problems, 
differences in attractiveness were large. The best and worst options were clearly 
identifiable from the alternatives. To test the two predictions, an original decision 
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task was designed to mimic real consumer decision by comprising authentic choice 
options available to consumers. Experiment 3 measured age differences in the 
number of times individuals opted to stick, switch or decide in the future and 
Experiment 6 measured age differences in the number of times older and younger 
adults chose to stick or switch. 
 The data from Experiments 3 and 6 provided some interesting findings on 
both accounts. Both Experiments 3 and 6 revealed no significant difference in the 
number of times older and younger adults chose to stick. This is surprising given 
age-related cognitive declines in processing ability and resources. Furthermore, 
participants chose to stick most when young and old participants were faced with 
difficult problems (this was also shown in Experiments 4 and 5 with young adult 
participants). Interestingly, when the option to decide in the future was removed 
(as in Experiments 4, 5 and 6), participants chose to stick significantly more often, 
in place of where they may have originally selected to decide in the future. These 
findings are consistent with the work of Dahr (1997), Tversky et al., (1992) and 
Wesseler et al., (2003) in providing further evidence for the idea that consumers 
tend try and avoid making decisions when the choice environment becomes 
complex. In terms of the current research, it is suggested that participants simply 
found the cognitive costs of engaging in a comprehensive calculation process (as 
required by difficult problems) comparatively costly and therefore selected an 
option less demanding of resources. 
Another explanation sympathetic to proposals made by Dahr (1997), 
Tversky et al., (1992) and Wesseler et al., (2003)  sees the decision to stick or 
decide in the future as a ‘passive-option’ (Brockner, Shaw & Rubin, 1979). 
Brockner et al., (1979) measured persistence in a futile endeavour under two 
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constraining situations. In one, the person had to make a positive move to 
continue, but the procedure would stop automatically if he or she did nothing (i.e. 
continuing was active and quitting was passive). The other situation was the 
reverse, in which a positive move was required to terminate whereas continuing 
was automatic unless the person signalled to quit. Data revealed a ‘passive-option 
effect’ whereby participants showed greater persistence when persistence was 
passive than when it was active. It is argued that the passive option effect reflects a 
similar process to the status quo bias. Both can be defined by the fact that in any 
choice situation, the likelihood of any option being chosen is increased if choosing 
involves a passive rather than an active response. In terms of limited resources, 
both the passive-option effect and status quo bias are possible consequence of the 
individual preserving energy, where active responding requires the self to expend 
some of its resources and passive responses do not. 
These findings also replicate studies conducted in field environments. For 
example, Hartman, Doane and Woo (1991) demonstrated a significant tendency 
for electricity customers to stick with a pre-selected option regardless of whether a 
service was rated as reliable or unreliable. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) 
demonstrated that over extended periods of time, individuals tend to retain 
unchanging financial amounts of insurance cover (for cars, buildings and life) from 
the same provider. And today, charities can be seen to utilise status quo effects in 
their efforts to maximise donations as individuals are signed up to make standard 
monthly contributions.    
The findings presented in Experiments 3 to 6 confirm expectations and 
accurately reflect real consumer decisions made in the real world: In 2011, the 
Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) found that four out of five 
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customers fail to shop around for gas and electricity. The present findings suggest 
both young and old adults are susceptible to avoiding decisions by sticking or 
opting to decide in the future when decisions are difficult. It is important to note 
that the decision tasks used in the current research were simplified versions of the 
marketing information presented to customers. Therefore, the tendency to stick or 
decide in the future may be even more pronounced when making real consumer 
decisions. The implications of these results are discussed later in the current 
chapter.  
6.3  Ageing, Decision Making and Emotion Regulation 
People frequently find themselves making everyday decisions in a state of 
emotional arousal. Often an individual will control their emotions by engaging in a 
form of self-regulation. As discussed in Chapter 1, it has been noted that emotions 
play an important role in decision-making and in particular, amongst older adults. 
Research provides convergent evidence that self-regulation of emotional 
functioning is spared from age-related decline (Charles & Carstensen, 2004), and 
can even improve with age (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005). The ageing research 
provides strong evidence in support of preserved emotional functioning despite 
declines in effortful cognitive processing. Experiment 3 investigated how age-
related developmental changes affect decisions that draw on both emotional and 
cognitive processes.  By identifying areas of preserved functioning along with 
areas of decline researchers could help develop methods to compensate for age-
related losses. 
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Two strategies of emotion regulation were investigated, suppression and 
reappraisal, and evaluated in the context of Baumeister et al., (1998) strength 
model. Gross, (1998) proposed that suppression requires the individual to 
consciously manage and modify the behavioural aspects of their emotional 
responses and is therefore seen as costly in terms of resources. Reappraisal is 
thought to entail comparatively less cognitive effort than suppression as this 
process requires the individual to redefine the meaning of a situation before 
emotions are determined.   
Based on the literature, it was proposed that differential changes in emotion 
regulation would have different implications for younger and older adults’ decision 
making. The consequences of regulating emotion using either strategy would be 
apparent in the choice (to stick, switch or decide in the future) most favoured by 
participants in each condition.  
As previously outlined, decisions to stick, switch or decide in the future are 
thought to differ in terms of cognitive costs. One way that individuals may try to 
reduce the cognitive burden of making a decision is to select an option that 
requires fewer resources. A central assumption of Baumeister et al., (1998) 
strength model is that that exertion of resources will be followed by a period of 
diminished capacity (a process called ego-depletion). Research suggests that 
regulating emotions and cognitively effortful processing involved in making 
choices draw from the same limited resource required for executive control. For 
example, Pochepstove et al., (2008) found that resource depletion inhibited the 
executive processes required to make effortful trade-offs between difficult choices.  
It was predicted that ego-depleted participants would tend to select to stick 
or decide in the future more often than non ego-depleted participants. The results 
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from Experiment 3 revealed that young and old adults did require different 
amounts of resources to regulate their emotions. Specifically, older adults in the 
reappraisal condition made better decisions compared to older adults in the 
control and suppression condition. Two explanations were proposed. First, older 
adults may be less susceptible to any ego-depleting effects of emotion regulation 
due to age-related increases in emotional control. Second, regulating emotion 
using reappraisal matched the type of strategy older adults would normally adopt 
because it is less demanding of cognitive effort. Taken together, these findings 
provide support for Richards and Gross (2000) theory insofar that using 
reappraisal to regulate emotion is less costly in terms of cognitive resources and 
thus reserves are preserved and can be used for decision-making. 
Interestingly, younger adults presented a different pattern of results 
whereby once the option to decide in the future had been removed, those in the 
suppression condition performed best compared to those in the control and 
reappraisal condition. On this basis, it was proposed that younger adults found 
reappraisal more demanding in terms of resources than suppression. These 
findings are consistent with data presented by Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields 
(2009) who found that older adults were more adept at emotion-regulation and 
that emotion-regulation of negative emotions to be less costly in older age. 
Taken together, this research suggested that young and old adults appeared 
to require different amounts of resources to regulate their emotions in accordance 
with different strategies. It could be argued that long-term practice, or experience 
in regulating emotions can decrease the amount of resources necessary to 
maintain or regain emotional wellbeing while performing well at other tasks. On 
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this basis one may speculate that growing older has the adaptive potential to 
reduce the cognitive costs of emotion regulation. 
Although the data from Experiment 3 confirmed and extended our 
knowledge in interesting ways, not all findings were consistent with those 
presented by previous researchers. Notably, suppression did not appear to cause 
the same ego-depleting effects reported in the literature (e.g. Richard & Gross, 
2000). It was proposed that a difference in research methodology may explain the 
disparity in results. Richard and Gross (2000) required participants to reappraise 
or suppress emotions while watching a film clip. They concluded that using 
suppression to regulate emotions required more effort because participants in the 
suppression condition had worse memory for the film clip than those in the 
reappraisal group. However, it is argued that participants in the suppression 
condition may simply not have paid as much attention to the film because they 
were preoccupied with controlling the behavioural aspects of their emotions (e.g. 
facial expressions). Because performance on the decision task presented to 
participants in Experiment 3 was unrelated to memory of a previous task, 
performance should not have been affected by aspects of the previous task they 
attended to, but rather, how much effort they put into the consumer decision task.  
The methodology used in Experiment 3 may provide an alternative 
explanation for the findings. Hagger et al., (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of 
studies investigating self-regulation. Results showed smaller effect sizes for studies 
that required participants to control impulses (or emotions) to deplete ego and 
measured the effects using cognitive tasks. Based on the work of Hagger et al., 
(2010), it is possible that the results of Experiment 3 were influenced by two 
methodological factors: (i) the emotion-regulation instructions were effective, but 
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the consumer decision task was not sensitive enough to pick up these effects. And, 
(ii) the emotion regulation procedure did not produce the predicted effect. These 
two explanations were tested in two additional studies (Experiments 4 and 5) on 
young adults only.   
Experiments 4 tested the ego-depleting effects of emotion-regulation 
instructions by introducing a measure of subsequent cognitive performance, which 
has been utilised often in this area of research (the GRE). Consistent with 
Experiment 3, participants’ decision performance did not match earlier studies. 
Young adults in the suppression condition made significantly better and more 
accurate choices than participants in the reappraisal and control groups. 
Furthermore, data from the GRE revealed no difference in performance between 
participants assigned to each condition. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
differences in decision-making may not have been due to ego-depletion, but some 
other mechanism. 
Experiment 5 tested a methodology shown to be reliable in depleting 
cognitive reserves: a letter crossing task. Again, findings showed that participants 
assigned to the high ego-depletion condition made better consumer decisions than 
participants assigned to control or low ego-depletion condition. Furthermore, 
measures of the GRE revealed that the ego-depletion manipulation resulted in 
equal or better performance.  
In summary, attempts to verify a reliable method of ego-depletion were 
unsuccessful. However, consistent results emerged whereby participants assigned 
to conditions assumed to cause ego-depletion performed better compared to those 
assigned to other groups. Based on these findings, an alternative explanation was 
proposed. It was suggested that instructions used in Experiments 3, 4 and 5 might 
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have primed participants to engage in discrete processing styles while completing 
the subsequent decision task. Specifically, it was hypothesised that instructions to 
self-regulate encouraged participants to process information in a deliberative 
manner that matched the necessary operations needed for the consumer decision 
task.  
Experiment 6 tested the effects of deliberate instruction on age and 
decision-making. Previous research has shown that priming participants to 
process information in a specific manner can affect subsequent performance on 
unrelated tasks (Ferreira et al., 2006; Klaczynski, 2001). It was predicted that older 
and younger adults would vary in performance on the decision-making task 
depending upon the processing instructions they received. Two manipulations 
were used where participants were instructed to make decisions in either a 
rational or intuitive manner. It was hypothesised that asking participants to 
manage information in a rational manner would encourage them to process 
information in a deliberative way, and asking participants to manage information 
in an intuitive manner, would encourage them to process information in an 
instinctive, less resource demanding way.  
Results revealed that both young and old participants in the rational 
condition made better decisions than participants assigned to the intuitive 
condition. An interesting pattern of data emerged whereby young adults opted to 
stick most often in the intuition condition and older adults chose to stick most 
often in the rational condition. It was proposed that the decision behaviour 
displayed by young adults showed that directions to process information in an 
intuitive or rational manner were successful. In other words, choosing to stick 
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reflected a trend to expend fewer cognitive resources when evaluating information 
(Brockner et al., 1979; Dahr, 1997).  
In terms of older adults, it is important to note that processing information 
in a rational manner is generally considered to be comparatively demanding of 
cognitive resources. It was argued that when rational processing was combined 
with age-related declines in cognitive ability, older adults would seek to preserve 
limited resources by selecting an option with fewer cognitive costs (e.g. stick). 
Again, this data demonstrates how differential limitations in cognitive 
reserves may affect consumer decision-making in older and younger adults. 
However, despite differences in resources, it seems that both older and younger 
adults must engage in deliberative and effortful processing to make good decisions.  
6.4  Practical Implications  
The findings presented in this thesis have important practical implications. 
Two applications have been identified as possible ways to improve the likelihood 
that younger and older adults make good consumer decisions: numeric 
malleability and managing status quo bias. 
6.4.1  Financial Education 
Aside from selecting utility companies, older adults must deal with many 
other complex financial decisions, for example, investment of retirement savings 
and accumulated wealth and intergenerational transfers of wealth, all while living 
off accumulated savings (James, Boyle, Bennett & Bennett, 2012). A commonality 
shared by most consumer decisions of this type is that they require the individual 
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to process numeric information. The data from Experiments 1, 2 and 6 consistently 
showed that older adults’ consumer decision making performance was 
independently predicted by numeric ability. These results are consistent with 
research by Peters et al., (2006), Tanus et al., (2009) and Wood et al., (2011). 
However, as outlined in the literature and in Experiments 2 and 6, older adults 
tend to make poorer choices compared to young adults (e.g. Hibbard et al., 2002; 
Schaie &Willis, 1993). This is particularly worrying when the Financial Services 
Authority (2009) presented findings stating that 35 per cent of people in the UK 
targeted by fraud were over the age of 65. It is expected that research into the 
modifiable determinants of poor decision-making in older adults may provide 
avenues for development and better decision-making. If numeric ability is 
malleable, the potential exists for older adults to improve their numeracy skills and 
thus, their consumer decisions.  
Research presented by James et al., (2012) suggested that health and 
financial literacy may be modifiable determinants of decision-making in older 
adults. Furthermore, their research showed that particular groups of older adults 
may benefit most from better health literacy, namely those with lower levels of 
cognitive function who were poorer and older. James at al., (2012) proposed that 
targeted improvements in these high risk groups may have particularly beneficial 
effects.  
In 2009, Help the Aged commissioned a report by the National Research 
and Development Centre for Adult Literacy and Numeracy (NRDC) to assess older 
adults’ money management.  Recommendations from this report included the need 
for financial education to be a priority along with adult literacy and numeracy. 
Furthermore, the need for increased provision and awareness of formal financial 
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education opportunities were highlighted. These findings support previous 
research conducted by the National Institute of Adult Continuing Education (2007) 
who found that 58% of people aged 65-plus in the UK think that adult education 
should cover the topic of financial advice.  
Despite these recommendations, today formal financial and numeric 
education for older adults in the UK is limited.  Age UK (the UK’s largest charity for 
older people) currently provides a service where free factsheets and information 
guides can be obtained which supply advice on a wide range of financial and 
consumer issues faced by the elderly, i.e. tax, benefits, pensions, managing money, 
insurance and fuel bills (www.ageuk.org.uk). However, there is no national 
programme of education for older adults where basic skills (such as numeracy and 
literacy) are taught.    
In light of the findings presented in the current thesis and those offered by 
the literature in this area, it is proposed that a programme of formal education of 
numeracy skills for people post-65 should be made available. It is anticipated that 
this would improve consumer decision-making in older adults and potentially their 
quality of life as better financial and health choices are made. Furthermore, it 
should be acknowledged that the positive effects of education reach beyond the 
practical skills learned in the classroom; older adult learners self-report significant 
benefits for life enjoyment, self-confidence, and ability to cope (Dench & Regan, 
2000).  
6.4.2  Managing status quo bias 
Another method of facilitating consumers’ decision-making may be to 
ensure that pre-selected options are consistent with the individual’s needs or 
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financial constraints. As has been outlined, data from the current research and 
previous studies clearly indicate a status quo bias. Rather than attempting to fight 
this phenomenon, it is suggested that it be used to an advantage. Examples 
currently exist where this methodology has already been implemented. A recent 
debate in the UK considered whether organ donation should be assumed 
permitted unless the individual has formally stated otherwise. In many countries, 
(i.e. Denmark, Finland, France, Italy and Singapore) people are presumed to 
consent to allow organ donation; however, they are allowed to opt out of this. 
Currently, the UK operates on an explicit consent system and requires that 
individuals authorise organ removal after death by carrying a donor card or 
joining a national registry. 
 A number of studies both inside and outside of the lab have found marked 
increases in the number of organ donation rates following the introduction of 
presumed consent legislation. For example, Johnson and Goldstein (2003) asked 
participants whether they would be donors on the basis of one of three questions 
with varying defaults. In the opt-in condition, participants were told to assume that 
they had just moved to a new state where the default was not to be an organ donor, 
and they were given a choice to confirm or change that status. The opt-out 
condition was identical, except the default was to be a donor. The third, neutral 
condition, simply required participants to choose with no prior default. Results 
revealed that participants were nearly two times more likely to donate when 
opting-out compared with opting-in. The neutral condition did not differ 
significantly from the opt-out condition. These findings have also been replicated 
in a number of real-world contexts: In Australia the 4.6 donors per million 
population per year before legislation increased to 10.1 per million in the four 
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years after the introduction of presumed consent, and 27 per million in the five 
years after. In Belgium, kidney donation increased from 18.9 to 41.3 per million 
population per year over a three year period (Rithalia, McDaid, Suekarran, Myers 
&Sowden, 2008).  
In terms of utilising the status-quo bias to help people make better 
consumer decisions, it is proposed that older adults are routinely placed onto the 
cheapest options available from any given company. For example, a utility supplier 
would automatically place older adults onto tariffs that incurred the lowest 
possible costs for gas and electricity. Indeed, this idea has recently gained credence 
as a serious method of addressing fuel poverty in the UK elderly population. In 
June 2012, the opposition party (Labour) proposed that energy firms could cut 
bills for 4 million pensioners by automatically putting all people over the age of 75 
on the lowest tariff. It was predicted that this could save pensioner households 
£200 per year (www.ageuk.org.uk).   
Furthermore, the effect of status-quo bias may be observed in a realistic 
setting as recent government reforms to pensions begin. Starting from October 
2012, millions of workers will be automatically enrolled into a work-place pension. 
Workers will be able to opt out of this pension scheme at any time, however if they 
chose to do so, they will lose out on the employer contribution and tax relief from 
government (Department for Work and Pensions, 2011). Utilising the finding that 
people tend to stick with a pre-determined choice is already significantly shaping 
policy reforms. Extending this to other areas of obligatory financial commitments 
such as household or car insurance and essential commodities such as water 
supply and sewerage costs, or a bank account with the highest interest payment 
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may help in insuring that the individual manages their money in the most 
beneficial way.  
6.5  Limitations and Future Directions 
The studies presented in this thesis investigated how ageing affects 
applied decision-making. Original tasks were developed to examine decision-
making in the context of everyday choices, and existing choice architecture was 
utilised. Taken together, the current research can be seen as a novel and valid 
contribution to the decision literature. Despite this, it is important to note that the 
experiments presented are still subject to limitations, which may limit their 
robustness and generalisability. While methodological issues have been 
considered within each chapter, a number of additional issues are discussed here, 
along with suggestions for future directions.  
6.5.1  Further research on Emotion Regulation and Deciding in the 
Future  
Experiment 3 revealed a number of interesting findings. First, that suppression 
and reappraisal seem to require different amounts of cognitive resources, which vary as 
a function of age. An additional study to reaffirm these findings using a larger cohort 
would have provided important information regarding the reliability of this data. 
Furthermore, if using reappraisal to regulate emotions had again been shown to benefit 
older adults’ consumer decision-making, it could be recommended that older adults 
engage in this form of emotion-regulation before making important consumer decisions.    
Second, this study is unique in that it presented participants with the option to 
decide in the future alongside the options to stick or switch to a different alternative. 
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The literature states that people are most likely to defer making a decision when the 
decision environment is complex, i.e. when the difference between two variables is as 
small (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). The decision to defer or ‘decide in the future’ can be 
seen as similar and the findings in Experiment 3 seem to support the hypothesis 
presented by Tversky and Shafir (1992). Future research would seek to examine the 
cognitive mechanisms and individual differences that affect opting to decide in the 
future and how this decision might differ from simply deciding to defer. Finding out 
circumstances where individuals are most likely to choose these options might inform 
the development of decision aids and the design of decision environment structures. 
Opting to defer or decide in the future might (in some circumstances) have negative 
consequences for the individual. For example, in terms of consumer decision-making, 
opting to defer or decide in the future might mean missing out on a good financial 
opportunity when products are on offer for a limited time. 
6.5.2  Alternative Areas and Measures of Consumer Decision Making 
 The experiments presented in the current thesis focussed on a limited 
number of every-decisions ranging from selecting a utility supplier, choosing a 
mobile phone provider, to deciding where to shop for groceries. Extending 
research into other areas of applied decision-making, relevant to the types of 
choices faced by elderly consumers would add to the literature in two important 
ways. First, it would shed light onto how older adults fare when making these 
important decisions and second, it would extend the present findings concerning 
specific cognitive abilities and decision aptitude. 
Future studies could present older adults with decision tasks specific to the 
types of choices made by individuals over the age of 65. This might include making 
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decisions about a savings plan, bank account or retirement home. The decision 
architecture of these types of choices is similar insofar that the individual is 
required to make complex calculations based on many alternatives. In addition, 
discrete measures of cognition and ability could be assessed. As with the current 
studies, fluid and crystallised intelligence and numeric ability would be examined. 
An additional measure of financial literacy (e.g. Lusardi & Mitchell, 2006) could be 
introduced to investigate any relationship between numeric aptitude, financial 
literacy and decision competency. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) showed that 
financial knowledge and planning were interrelated: those who displayed financial 
knowledge were more likely to plan and succeed in their planning. By influencing 
planning patterns, financial literacy may influence household saving outcomes.  
Many studies suggest a positive association between financial knowledge 
and household financial decision-making. For instance, Stango and Zinman (2008) 
showed that those unable to correctly calculate interest rates given a stream of 
payments ended up borrowing more and accumulating less wealth. Others show 
that the less financially literate were unlikely to invest in stocks (van Rooij, 
Lusardi, and Alessie, 2007; Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula, 2008) and tended to 
select mutual funds with higher fees (Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton, 2008). Lusardi 
and Tufano (2008) found that those who severely underestimate the power of 
interest compounding were more likely to experience difficulty with debt. Taken 
together, these studies show that financial literacy is an important mediator of 
consumer decision-making. If numeric ability and financial aptitude are found to 
be independent predictors of decision ability, the potential may exist for targeted 
educational interventions to be tailored for older adults.  
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6.5.3  Age Differences in Neurology and Decision-Making 
This thesis considers age-related differences in decision making from a 
predominantly cognitive perspective. It is proposed that the explanations 
presented in this body of work can be significantly refined using neuroscientific 
methodologies. Advances in brain imaging methods have allowed unprecedented 
insights into the neural correlates of healthy ageing. It is proposed that these 
techniques be utilised in expanding our knowledge of ageing, individual 
differences and consumer decision-making. The following section will outline two 
avenues for future studies in this area. It is acknowledged that extensive research 
exists investigating neuroscientific explanations of ageing, however, as this is not 
the focus of the work presented in this thesis, only a few accounts are considered. 
There is growing evidence linking the integrity of the prefrontal cortex to 
frequently studied consumer behaviours, such as comprehension, information 
search, and decision-making (e.g. Fellows, 2006). One of the most widely accepted 
theories of neuroscientific ageing is the frontal lobe hypothesis (West, 1996). The 
frontal lobe hypothesis of cognitive ageing broadly states that some older adults 
have disproportionate age-related change of prefrontal brain structures and 
consequently, of associated cognitive functions. This hypothesis is supported by 
multiple sources of evidence which are steadily mounting, involving 
neuropsychological (West, Murphy, Armilio et al., 2002), neuroanatomic, (Raz, 
Gunning-Dixon & Acker, 1998; Resnick et al., 2003), and functional neuroimaging 
(Gur et al., 1987) studies. This hypothesis is not without its critics (e.g. Greenwood, 
2000) but it can be seen to provide a plausible and testable account of at least 
some age-related neurocognitive phenomena.  
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Denburg, Cole, Hernandez, Yamada, Tranel, Bechara et al., (2007) used a 
cross-sectional sample of community dwelling participants to show that a sizeable 
subset of older adults (approximately 35-40%) performed poorly on a decision-
making task designed to mimic everyday choices. Participants who performed 
poorly on this task were found to display defective autonomic responses 
equivalent to those displayed by patients with acquired prefrontal lesions.  
Furthermore, participants shown to have defective autonomic responses were 
significantly less likely to comprehend information presented to them in an 
advertisement, and were more likely to make poor consumer choices based on 
information from advertisements. Taken together, this research adds weight to the 
frontal lobe hypothesis of cognitive ageing, and highlights the need for future 
research into the behavioural and neuroscientific correlates of defective consumer 
decision-making among healthy older adults. It may be that little can be done to 
halt age-related degeneration of the frontal lobe, however identifying otherwise 
healthy older adults and making them aware that they might be particularly 
susceptible to misleading advertising and poor consumer choices could be a first 
step in preventing detrimental decisions.  
The second area of future neuroscientific research addresses numeric 
ability. At the neuronal level, studies have shown that difficulties or expertise with 
numbers are associated with functional and anatomical anomalies of the right 
parietal lobe (Aydin, Ucar, Oguz, Okur, Agayev, Unal et al., 2007). Recent research 
has provided some interesting findings suggesting that non-invasive brain 
stimulation to the right parietal lobe can enhance numerical abilities with 
remarkable longevity. Kadosh, Soskic, Iuculano, Kanai and Walsh (2010) combined 
transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS), a non-invasive brain stimulation 
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technique, with a learning paradigm involving artificial digits. TDCS involves 
applying a weak current constantly over time to enhance, or reduce the excitation 
of neural populations, with maximal effect on the stimulated area beneath the 
electrodes. Results revealed that participants who received TDCS to the right 
parietal lobe showed enhanced and consistent performance on subsequent 
numeracy tasks. Furthermore, the improvements were still present six months 
after the training.  
Kadosh et al., (2010) findings are important because they establish TDCS 
as a tool for intervention in cases of poor numerical development or loss of 
numeric abilities due to other factors such as degenerative illness or age. Future 
research would investigate the potential for utilising TDCS in improving numeracy 
skills in older adults, which in turn may lead to better consumer decision-making.  
In summary, an important area for future neurobiological and consumer 
research is to identify the extent to which bad decision-makers can recruit or be 
trained to use compensatory processing to improve accuracy of judgements. 
Adopting a neuroscientific perspective may lead to a better understanding of age 
differences in consumer decision-making at a more fundamental (neural) level, 
and reveal potential interventions tailored to improve decision making in older 
adults.      
6.5.4  Dispositional Explanations 
Experiment 1, 2 and 6 successfully identified cognitive predictors of 
consumer decision performance. A clear pattern of results was established for 
older adults however, the factors accounting for younger adults’ ability were not as 
evident. Based on research by Stanovich and West (2008), it was proposed that 
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cognitive abilities alone were not enough in explaining the processes young adults 
utilise when making consumer choices. In their study, participants thinking 
dispositions were measured using a number of scales. From these scales, a 
composite Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT) score was achieved by summing 
up scores on measures of flexible thinking, openness–ideas and openness–values 
and subtracting the sum of the absolution, dogmatism and categorical thinking. 
Results revealed that the ability to evaluate objective argument quality was linked 
to individual differences in both cognitive ability and actively open-minded 
thinking dispositions. Furthermore, individual dispositions were found to directly 
predict decision performance independently of cognitive ability. These findings 
corroborate previous research demonstrating the important role of thinking 
dispositions in decision making (e.g. Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Schommer, 1990). 
It is suggested that preferred dispositions (such as open-minded thinking) 
may account for their decision performance. Future research would consider age 
differences in thinking dispositions in an attempt to establish a more thorough 
understanding of the factors that predict decision performance across the life-
span. 
Another individual difference that might account for differences in consumer 
decision-making is motivation. The data from Experiments 3, 4 and 5 suggested that 
young participants made better decisions when placed in conditions designed to be 
resource demanding. In explaining these findings, it was proposed that the instructions 
used to encourage participants to self-regulate may have inadvertently primed them to 
work harder and therefore make better decisions. In other words, these participants were 
more motivated. Should this hypothesis be true, it raises interesting questions in terms 
of the role of motivation in explaining differences in decision-making. Experiment 6 
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provided some evidence in support of this argument. Younger and older adults 
performed best when asked to make decisions on the basis of ‘rational and reflective 
thinking’. Making decisions in a rational, logical manner is assumed to require a lot of 
cognitive effort (Fishburn, 1991). Therefore it may be argued that these participants 
were more motivated to try hard when making decisions than participants in the 
intuitive condition. 
Previous research has shown that priming can influence many variables, for 
example: problem-solving techniques (Higgins & Chaires 1980), judgment about a 
product (Herr 1989) and product choice (Bettman & Sujan 1987; Mandel & Johnson 
2002). Therefore, it is reasonable to propose that participant motivation may have been 
affected by instructions presented to them prior to completing the consumer decision 
task. Decision performance was improved in younger adults in conditions that primed 
them to work harder (i.e. using suppression to control emotions in Experiments 3 and 4, 
completing a difficult letter crossing task in Experiment 5, and thinking about decisions 
in a rational manner in Experiment 6). Decision-making was also best for older adult 
participants in the rational condition in Experiment 6. It may simply be that asking 
participants to work harder improves decision-making ability. Future research would 
seek to investigate further the effects of priming on motivation and subsequent decision- 
making performance in younger and older adults. 
6.5.5  Participants and Experience 
It should be acknowledged that because age was not a variable that could be 
manipulated, random assignment of participants to the different age groups was 
impossible. Therefore, Experiments 1, 2 and 6 are cross-sectional in design and it could 
be argued that the findings revealed in these studies were (in part) due to cohort effects. 
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All the older adults recruited for the present research lived in or around Plymouth; it 
was informally observed that many had grown up and worked in the local area their 
whole lives. In terms of cohort effects, it should be noted that Plymouth was subject to 
very specific circumstances during the lifetime of many of the older adults who took 
part in this research. Namely, that many of these participants had their education 
disrupted during the Second World War. This may have affected the older adults used in 
the current body of work differently from other generations in terms of education and 
opportunities. 
Data from the present studies show that younger adults have completed 
significantly more years of formal education than older adults. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given the social circumstances faced by many the older participants while 
they were growing up. Furthermore, the sample of young participants used in the 
current research was drawn from university students, the nature of whom required the 
attainment of set academic achievements usually accomplished in at least 13 years of 
schooling. Despite this, the data in terms of education is representative of most research 
on age differences. For example, Rentz and Reynolds (1981) point out that at any point 
in time, older adults report having completed fewer years of formal education, on 
average, than young people. 
Taken together, it should be acknowledged that the findings revealed in 
Experiments 1, 2 and 6 may have been affected by the cohort membership of the groups 
studied together with the developmental changes associated with the ageing process. 
Ideally developmental changes in cognitive and emotional ability, and their relationship 
with decision aptitude across the lifespan would be measured. It is proposed that a 
programme of research utilising a longitudinal approach and combining a broad set of 
cognitive capability measures, including multiple measures of fluid and crystallised 
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intelligence, with an even broader set of decision-making tasks (across different 
domains) would both address many of the methodological implications encountered in 
this thesis and shed further light on how cognitive, emotional, dispositional and 
motivational factors affect decision making across the lifespan. However, it is 
recognised that this type of methodology is often limited due to expense and time. 
6.5.6  Challenges with Ego-Depletion   
The aim of Experiments 3, 4 and 5 was to extend the work of ego-
depletion into older adults. The materials used in these experiments were 
designed to replicate those observed in previous studies in this area (e.g. 
Baumeister et al., 1998; Schmeichel et al., 2003). Experiment 3 assessed the ego-
depleting effects of emotion-regulation on subsequent decision-making. As the 
data differed from the predictions, two additional exploratory studies were 
conducted. Experiments 4 and 5 tested the methodology used in Experiment 3 and 
sought to establish a reliable manipulation and measure of ego-depletion.   
However, despite utilising well-established manipulations in producing ego-
depleted states, the studies presented did not replicate previous findings. In 
evaluating why this might be, a number of explanations were considered. 
First, it was proposed that different emotions carry different cognitive costs 
and that the costliness of regulating a particular emotion varies by age. Experiment 
3 required participants to regulate feelings of disgust. It may be that young and old 
adults did not display behaviour typical of being ego-depleted following the film 
because disgust might have been less difficult for them to suppress compared to 
other emotions such as sadness or anger (Baumeister et al., 2008; Schmeichel et 
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al., 2003). Future research might utilise different footage eliciting emotions shown 
to produce ego-depletion across age-groups.   
As outlined earlier, the consumer decision task may not have been 
sensitive to the effects of ego-depletion and therefore was affected in an 
unpredictable way. Experiments 4 and 5 were designed to address this issue by 
including an additional measure of performance (the GRE); however data was not 
reliable in indicating ego-depletion in participants. Hagger et al., (2010) observed 
that the effects of ego-depletion are often significantly smaller for studies adopting 
dependent tasks involving cognition, choice and volition compared to dependent 
tasks measuring physical effects (e.g. squeezing a handgrip) or modified Stroop 
tasks. As the consumer decision task involved measuring performance by way of 
decision competence, it may be less surprising to find that the results obtained did 
not match those most often reported in the literature.  
Finally, attempts to replicate findings in support of the strength model are 
not always successful. Many of the manipulations and measures used throughout 
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 were taken directly from previous research (Baumeister, 
2002; Gross, 2000; Schmeichel et al., 2003; Tice et al., 2007). Yet, other researchers 
have also failed to produce an ego-depleted state and the negative consequences 
associated with it (Murtagh & Todd, 2004). It may be reasonable to assume that 
failure to reproduce findings consistent with much of the published literature on 
the strength model occur more frequently than has been reported. The 
implications of this suggestion may be that behaviours associated with ego-
depletion are the result of some other cause. A meta-analysis of both published and 
unpublished studies in this area (including attempts to replicate ego-depletion 
which have been unsuccessful) may establish a more realistic rate of success.  
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6.6   Conclusions 
 This thesis offers an expanded view of the cognitive and affective abilities 
older and younger consumers rely on when making decisions. I present a unique 
theoretical contribution and highlight many practical implications in terms of how 
older adults might be supported in making better consumer decisions. A key factor 
that distinguished the current body of work from other research in this area is that 
original tasks representative of real consumer decisions were developed. This 
means that the data obtained is likely to more accurately reflect how consumers 
make decisions in the real world. It is believed that this work represents some of 
the first of its kind to begin to identify, from an individual-differences perspective, 
the factors that affect applied decision-making in older and younger adults.  
One of the primary findings highlighted the notion that ageing is associated 
with many positive gains in terms of self-regulation and emotional control 
alongside declines in other cognitive abilities. It is well established that 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities do exist, however it is clear that several strengths 
do as well. Overall, the research presented suggests that older adults process 
information differently from young adults. Declines in deliberative capacity imply 
that older adults will make worse decisions than young adults in some situations. 
However, the current work provides compelling evidence to counter the notion 
that age-differences in consumer decision-making are simply due to deliberative 
decline. First, it seems that crystallised intelligence can compensate in part for age-
related losses. Second, the independent role of numeric ability and fluid 
intelligence are highlighted as important factors in older adults’ decision making 
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and third, decision-making ability seems to be preserved if older adults regulate 
emotions using reappraisal.  
Today older adults are faced with an increasing number of decisions about 
vital financial, health and other personal issues. At the same time, their proportion 
of the population is growing. Understanding the underlying processes involved 
with older adults’ decision-making may help in developing methods to increase 
their likelihood of making the best consumer choice for them. The research 
presented in this thesis has enriched and uniquely contributed to this area of 
psychology; furthermore it provides a strong foundation for future work in an area 
rapidly increasing in political and social importance.  
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MATERIALS APPENDICES 
 
All appendices are numbered in line with the experiment to which their contents 
refer. 
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Experiment 1 
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APPENDIX 1A: REAL INFORMATION PRESENTED TO CUSTOMERS 
REGARDING TARIFFS FOR BOTH GAS AND ELECTRICITY. 
 
Figure 1.1 Gas tariffs presented by British Gas – August 2011  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Electricity tariffs presented by British Gas – August 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Explanation or Tier 1 and Tier 2 Tariffs presented by British Gas – 
August 2011 
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APPENDIX 1B: FACTUAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO PARTICIPANTS IN 
THE ENERGY SUPPLIER DECISION TASK  
 
1) Looking at the table, please indicate which Energy Supplier you think 
charges the most for Electricity in Band One. 
 
2) Looking at the table, please indicate how much Energy Supplier B charges 
for Gas in band Two. 
 
3) Looking at the table, please indicate which Energy Supplier you think 
charges the most for both Gas and Electricity in Band Two. 
 
APPENDIX 1C: INFERENTIAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO PARTICIPANTS 
IN THE ENERGY SUPPLIER DECISION TASK 
4) Sue uses 10,000 kWh of Gas each year. Looking at the table, which Energy 
Supplier is best value for Sue? 
 
5) Robin and Louise live together. Between them, they use 21,000 kWh of Gas 
each year. Looking at the table, which Energy Supplier do you think is best 
value for Robin and Louise? 
 
6) Richard uses 4,000 kWh of electricity each year. Looking at the table, which 
Energy supplier do you think is best value for Richard? 
 
7) Tom is very environmentally aware. He only uses 2000 kWh of Electricity 
each year. Looking at the table, which Energy Supplier do you think is best 
value for Tom?       
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APPENDIX 1D: SAMPLE OF PROBLEMS PRESENTED TO PARTICIPANTS 
FROM RAVENS STANDARD PROGRESSIVE MATRICES (SUB SECTIONS B, C 
AND D). 
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APPENDIX 1E: WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE-III – 
VOCABULARY SUBSET 
 
 
 
  
 
Bed 
 
Designate 
 
Ship 
 
Reluctant 
 
Penny 
 
Colony 
 
Winter 
 
Generate 
 
Breakfast 
 
Ballad 
 
Repair 
 
Pout 
 
Assemble 
 
Plagiarize 
 
Yesterday 
 
Diverse 
 
Terminate 
 
Evolve 
 
Consume 
 
Tangible 
 
Sentence 
 
Fortitude 
 
Confide 
 
Epic 
 
Remorse 
 
Audacious 
 
Ponder 
 
Ominous 
 
Compassion 
 
Encumber 
 
Tranquil 
 
Tirade 
 
Sanctuary 
 
219 
 
APPENDIX 1F: SAMPLE FROM EACH SUBSECTION OF THE DIGIT 
COMPARISON TASK 
 
Three Digit Comparisons 
 
 SAME DIFF    SAME DIFF  
265 (  ) (  ) 265  251 (  ) (  ) 231 
         
632 (  ) (  ) 632  712 (  ) (  ) 712 
         
735 (  ) (  ) 735  694 (  ) (  ) 894 
         
183 (  ) (  ) 184  786 (  ) (  ) 286 
         
325 (  ) (  ) 325  096 (  ) (  ) 096 
         
308 (  ) (  ) 308  395 (  ) (  ) 395 
         
923 (  ) (  ) 973  436 (  ) (  ) 436 
         
536 (  ) (  ) 506  846 (  ) (  ) 846 
         
612 (  ) (  ) 612  573 (  ) (  ) 973 
         
524 (  ) (  ) 924  645 (  ) (  ) 845 
         
206 (  ) (  ) 205  492 (  ) (  ) 496 
         
238 (  ) (  ) 238  730 (  ) (  ) 738 
         
867 (  ) (  ) 863  542 (  ) (  ) 542 
         
734 (  ) (  ) 732  879 (  ) (  ) 879 
         
793 (  ) (  ) 794  961 (  ) (  ) 261 
         
176 (  ) (  ) 176  439 (  ) (  ) 439 
 SAME DIFF    SAME DIFF  
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Six Digit Comparisons 
 
 
 SAME DIFF    SAME DIFF  
374957 (  ) (  ) 374957  018382 (  ) (  ) 918382 
         
157034 (  ) (  ) 147034  327498 (  ) (  ) 327498 
         
832765 (  ) (  ) 832765  267635 (  ) (  ) 267635 
         
264540 (  ) (  ) 264640  838650 (  ) (  ) 838650 
         
608079 (  ) (  ) 628079  306837 (  ) (  ) 806837 
         
747821 (  ) (  ) 797821  835456 (  ) (  ) 835756 
         
010642 (  ) (  ) 010642  038072 (  ) (  ) 028072 
         
715283 (  ) (  ) 715283  894309 (  ) (  ) 894308 
         
239613 (  ) (  ) 239614  648206 (  ) (  ) 648206 
         
839240 (  ) (  ) 839240  702408 (  ) (  ) 702408 
         
039860 (  ) (  ) 039860  231541 (  ) (  ) 931541 
         
013209 (  ) (  ) 613209  307065 (  ) (  ) 302065 
         
289651 (  ) (  ) 281651  702925 (  ) (  ) 702925 
         
703454 (  ) (  ) 703434  738942 (  ) (  ) 738942 
         
527803 (  ) (  ) 527803  456152 (  ) (  ) 456152 
         
434965 (  ) (  ) 434965  047134 (  ) (  ) 040134 
 SAME DIFF    SAME DIFF  
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Nine Digit Comparisons 
 
  
 SAME DIFF    SAME DIFF  
910317407 (  ) (  ) 910217407  915783147 (  ) (  ) 915783147 
         
017459304 (  ) (  ) 017459304  350725614 (  ) (  ) 350725614 
         
687219109 (  ) (  ) 687219709  526287694 (  ) (  ) 523287694 
         
638461049 (  ) (  ) 638461049  723956590 (  ) (  ) 723956590 
         
783436760 (  ) (  ) 783416760  321524187 (  ) (  ) 321524787 
         
581302359 (  ) (  ) 586302359  132048604 (  ) (  ) 132047604 
         
792404397 (  ) (  ) 592404397  724094315 (  ) (  ) 724094315 
         
241263608 (  ) (  ) 241263678  980242174 (  ) (  ) 980242174 
         
832125307 (  ) (  ) 832125307  789619302 (  ) (  ) 789619302 
         
189573912 (  ) (  ) 149573912  340747521 (  ) (  ) 340747521 
         
652910257 (  ) (  ) 652910257  837532021 (  ) (  ) 837532021 
         
818306702 (  ) (  ) 818308702  390206594 (  ) (  ) 390206594 
         
573681916 (  ) (  ) 573681216  621693104 (  ) (  ) 621693194 
         
710809629 (  ) (  ) 710809629  979352158 (  ) (  ) 978352158 
         
389274184 (  ) (  ) 389274186  316450527 (  ) (  ) 316450527 
         
571836123 (  ) (  ) 571836423  986905671 (  ) (  ) 986905671 
 SAME DIFF    SAME DIFF  
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APPENDIX 1G: NUMERACY SCALE (LIPKUS, SAMSA & RIMER, 2001) 
 
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times.  Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times 
do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?   
Number of times: _______________________ 
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10 prize are 1%.  What is your 
best guess about how many people would win a $10 prize if 1,000 people each buy a 
single ticket from BIG BUCKS. 
Number of people: _______________________ 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000.  
What per cent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?  
Per cent of tickets: _______________________ 
4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
____ (1)  1 in 100          ____ (2)  1 in 1,000       ____ (3)  1 in 10 
5. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
____ (1)  1%                    ____ (2)  10%                  ____ (3)  5% 
6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B’s risk is double that 
of A’s, what is B’s risk?  
Person B’s risk: _______________________ 
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B’s risk is 
double that of A, what is B’s risk?  
Person B’s risk: _______________________ 
8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the 
disease out of 100? 
Number of people: _______________________ 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the 
disease out of 1000? 
Number of people: _______________________ 
10. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a  
________% chance of getting the disease. 
11. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005.  Out of 10,000 people, about how many 
of them are expected to get infected? 
Number of people: _______________________ 
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APPENDIX 1H: DEMOGRAPHIC AND EXPERIENCE QUESTIONNAIR 
 
1. Please indicate your sex                             Male                                 Female 
 
2. Please state how old you are.................................................................................. 
 
3. What is your yearly household income? 
Less than £10,000                                           Between £30,000 - £40,000 
Between £10,000 - £20,000                          Higher than £40,000 
Between £20,000 - £30,000 
 
4. Please indicate what your highest level of education is 
GCSE or O Level                                               Professional Qualification 
A Level                                                              Post Graduate Qualification 
Diploma/Certificate                                        Other (Please Specify) 
University or College Degree 
 
5. Are you responsible for paying the Energy Bills in your household?   
 
Yes                                          No 
 
6.  Have you changed Energy Supplier in the last year? 
               Yes                 No   
 
7. Have you ever contacted your current Energy Supplier regarding billing errors? 
             Yes                                                                          No 
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Experiment 2 
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APPENDIX 2A: FACTUAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO PARTICIPANTS IN 
THE MOBILE PHONE COMPANY DECISION TASK.  
 
1) Looking at the table, please indicate which Mobile Phone Company you 
think charges the Least for Text Messages in Band One. 
2) Looking at the table, please indicate which Mobile Phone Company you 
think charges the Most Per Minute in Band One. 
3) Looking at the table, please indicate which Mobile Phone Company you 
think charges the Most for Text Messages in Band One and Band Two, 
assuming that usage is equal in each band. 
4) Looking at the table, please indicate which Mobile Phone Company you 
think charges the Most Per Minute and for Text Messages in Band One, 
assuming equal usage of minutes and texts. 
 
 
APPENDIX 2B: INFERENTIAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO PARTICIPANTS 
IN THE MOBILE PHONE COMPANY DECISION TASK. 
5) Grace uses 320 Minutes on the phone each month and sends 50 Text 
Messages. Which Mobile Phone Company do you think is best value for 
Grace? 
6) Peter uses 200 Minutes and sends 400 Text Messages. Which Mobile 
Phone Company do you think is the best value for Peter? 
7) Polly uses 60 Minutes of call time each month and sends 20 Text 
Messages. Which mobile phone provider do you think is best value for 
Polly? 
8) Graham uses 90 Minutes of calls and sends 100 Text Messages. Which 
Mobile Phone Company do you think is best value for Graham? 
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APPENDIX 2C: NEED FOR COGNITION SCALE 
1.    I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
2.   I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
3.   Thinking is not my idea of fun.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
4.   I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
5.   I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely chance that I will have to 
think in depth about something.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
6.   I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
7.   I only think as hard as I have to.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
8.   I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
9.   I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
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10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
16.  I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 
mental effort.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
17.  It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it 
works.  
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
18.  I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally. 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Not at all like me) (Not very much 
like me) 
(Don’t know) (A bit like me) (Very much like me) 
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APPENDIX 2D: DEMOGRAPHIC AND EXPERIENCE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. Please indicate your sex                             Male                                 Female 
2. Please state how old you are.................................................................................. 
3. What is your yearly household income? 
Less than £10,000                                           Between £30,000 - £40,000 
Between £10,000 - £20,000                          Higher than £40,000 
Between £20,000 - £30,000 
 
4. Please indicate what your highest level of education is 
GCSE or O Level                                              Professional Qualification 
A Level                                                              Post Graduate Qualification 
Diploma/Certificate                                      Other (Please Specify) 
University or College Degree 
 
5. Do you own a mobile phone?              Yes                 No 
 
6. Are you responsible for paying your mobile phone bill?                   
                                                                          Yes                   No 
7. Have you changed you mobile phone contract in the last year?               
                    Yes      No 
8. Are you responsible for paying the Energy Bills in your household?                 
                                                                           Yes                 No 
9.  Have you changed Energy Supplier in the last year?       
                                                                          Yes                  No 
10. Have you ever contacted your current Energy Supplier regarding billing errors? 
                                                                           Yes                 No 
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Experiment 3  
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APPENDIX 3A: CONSUMER PROBLEMS PRESENTED TO PARTICIPANTS  
 
Imagine that you are planning a holiday. You are thinking about using Travel Company 
A which costs £200 for the hotel and £100 for the flight. The hotel has a Four star 
rating. You are generally satisfied with this holiday package but you suspect another 
travel company may offer better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Travel Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the 
ones available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Travel Company Price of Hotel Hotel Stars Price of Flight 
A £200  £100 
B £173  £127 
C £144  £156 
D £122  £183 
E £133  £172 
F £172  £138 
G £114  £196 
H £107  £203 
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Imagine that you are planning a holiday. You are thinking about using Travel Company 
G which costs £248 for the hotel and £162 for the flight. The hotel has a Three star 
rating. You are generally satisfied with this holiday package but you suspect another 
travel company may offer better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
 
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Travel Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the 
ones available here and Decide in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Travel Company Price of Hotel Hotel Stars Price of Flight 
A £189  £211 
B £243  £157 
C £310  £90 
D £276  £129 
E £304  £101 
F £172  £233 
G £248  £162 
H £129  £281 
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Imagine that you are planning a holiday. You are thinking about using Travel Company 
H which costs £123 for the hotel and £177for the flight. The hotel has a Five star 
rating. You are generally satisfied with this holiday package but you suspect another 
travel company may offer better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Travel Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the 
ones available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
  
Travel Company Price of Hotel Hotel Stars Price of Flight 
A £267  £233 
B £195  £235 
C £258  £172 
D £199  £221 
E £249  £171 
F £283  £127 
G £176  £234 
H 
£123 
 
£177 
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Imagine that you are planning a holiday. You are thinking about using Travel Company 
F which costs £198 for the hotel and £112 for the flight. The hotel has a Five star 
rating. You are generally satisfied with this holiday package but you suspect another 
travel company may offer better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Travel Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the 
ones available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
 
  
Travel Company Price of Hotel Hotel Stars Price of Flight 
A £160  £240 
B £162  £138 
C £189  £111 
D £203  £107 
E £167  £143 
F £198  £112 
G £135  £185 
H £96  £104 
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Imagine that you want to hire a car. You are thinking about using Car Company G 
which costs £203 for the car hire and £142 for the insurance. The car scores Five for 
fuel economy. You are generally satisfied with this car hire package but you suspect 
another car company may offer better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Car Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the ones 
available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
 
  
Car Price of Hire Fuel Economy Insurance 
A 
£174  £176 
B £216  £134 
C £139  £211 
D £91  £264 
E £166  £189 
F £200  £155 
G £203  £142 
H £99  £246 
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Imagine that you want to hire a car. You are thinking about using Car Company E which 
costs £155 for the car hire and £125 for the insurance. The car scores Four for fuel 
economy. You are generally satisfied with this car hire package but you suspect 
another car company may offer better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Car Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the ones 
available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
 
  
Car Price of Hire Fuel Economy Insurance 
A 
£162  £113 
B £130  £145 
C £97  £178 
D £141  £139 
E £155  £125 
F £123  £162 
G £162  £123 
H £113  £172 
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Imagine that you want to hire a car. You are thinking about using Car Company H 
which costs £33 for the car hire and £67 for the insurance. The car scores Five for fuel 
economy. You are generally satisfied with this car hire package but you suspect 
another car company may offer better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Car Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the ones 
available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
 
  
Car Price of Hire Fuel Economy Insurance 
A £173  £127 
B 
£102  £98 
C £75  £125 
D 
£98  £97 
E £116  £79 
F £82  £123 
G 
£106  £99 
H 
£33  £67 
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Imagine that you want to hire a car. You are thinking about using Car Company B which 
costs £130 for the car hire and £270 for the insurance. The car scores Four for fuel 
economy. You are generally satisfied with this car hire package but you suspect 
another car company may offer better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Car Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the ones 
available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
 
  
Car Price of Hire Fuel Economy Insurance 
A £211  £189 
B £130  £270 
C £153  £147 
D £202  £203 
E £206  £199 
F £208  £187 
G £230  £165 
H £211  £289 
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Imagine that you want learn how to dive. You are thinking about using Diving School F 
which charges £117 for the lessons and £128 for renting the equipment. The diving 
school scores Five for customer satisfaction. You are generally satisfied with this diving 
school but you suspect another diving school may offer better value and so you wish to 
investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Diving Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the 
ones available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
 
  
Diving School Price of Lessons Customer 
Satisfaction 
Equipment Rent 
A £73  £177 
B £90  £160 
C £94  £156 
D £111  £144 
E £72  £183 
F £117  £128 
G £108  £137 
H £118  £127 
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Imagine that you want learn how to dive. You are thinking about using Diving School D 
which charges £94 for the lessons and £221 for renting the equipment. The diving 
school scores Four for customer satisfaction. You are generally satisfied with this 
diving school but you suspect another diving school may offer better value and so you 
wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Diving Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the 
ones available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
 
  
Diving School Price of Lessons Customer 
Satisfaction 
Equipment Rent 
A 
£164  £156 
B £172  £148 
C £128  £192 
D £94  £221 
E £80  £235 
F £145  £170 
G £134  £176 
H £101  £209 
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Imagine that you want learn how to dive. You are thinking about using Diving School H 
which charges £203 for the lessons and £187 for renting the equipment. The diving 
school scores Five for customer satisfaction. You are generally satisfied with this diving 
school but you suspect another diving school may offer better value and so you wish to 
investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Diving Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the 
ones available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
 
  
Diving School Price of Lessons Customer 
Satisfaction 
Equipment Rent 
A 
£252  £238 
B £145  £145 
C £201  £189 
D £188  £207 
E £219  £176 
F £190  £210 
G £205  £195 
H £203  £187 
241 
 
Imagine that you want learn how to dive. You are thinking about using Diving School A 
which charges £240 for the lessons and £210 for renting the equipment. The diving 
school scores Five for customer satisfaction. You are generally satisfied with this diving 
school but you suspect another diving school may offer better value and so you wish to 
investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Diving Company, Switch to an alternative option, or seek out other packages to the 
ones available here and Decide in the future. 
 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
          Stick                                                    Switch                                  Decide in the future 
 
 
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
  
Diving School Price of Lessons Customer 
Satisfaction 
Equipment Rent 
A £240  £210 
B £226  £224 
C £192  £108 
D £203  £297 
E £239  £206 
F £232  £213 
G £167  £278 
H £208  £242 
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APPENDIX 3B: MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please read through the statements below and circle the number 
which most closely matches how you feel. 
 
1. During the film, I did not feel anything at all. 
0        1            2            3            4            5            6            7           8              
Strongly Disagree                                                                                      Strongly Agree 
 
2. During the film, I felt emotions but tried to hide them.  
0        1            2            3            4            5            6            7           8              
Strongly Disagree                                                                                      Strongly Agree 
 
3. During the film, I reacted completely spontaneously.  
0        1            2            3            4            5            6            7           8              
Strongly Disagree                                                                                      Strongly Agree 
 
4. During the film, how difficult did you find it to perform the 
instructions given to you before it started?  
0        1            2            3            4            5            6            7           8              
Not at all Difficult                                                                                           Very Difficult 
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APPENDIX 3C: PANAS-X 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different 
feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate 
answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you have felt 
this way right now, that is, at the present moment. 
 
Use the following scale to record your answers: 
          1                        2                     3                         4                      5 
Very slightly          A little        Moderately        Quite a bit      Extremely                          
or not at all 
 
______ active                   ______ guilty                   ______ enthusiastic            
______ attentive               ______ afraid                   ______ tired                     
______ nervous                ______ sluggish               ______ distressed           
______ sleepy                  ______ excited                 ______ determined 
______ strong                  ______ hostile                  ______ proud                      
______ alert                     ______ jittery                   ______ interested           
______ irritable               ______ upset                    ______ ashamed            
______ inspired               ______ scared                  ______ drowsy           
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APPENDIX 3D: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNIARE 
 
Age............................................................................................................................................ 
Gender:    Male             Female 
Years of education............................................................................................................. 
Highest Qualification………………………………………………………………………… 
 
What is your yearly household income? 
  
Less than £10,000                        Between £30,000-40,000 
 
Between £10,000-£20,000                Higher than £40,000 
 
Between £20,000-£30,000 
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Experiment 4 
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APPENDIX 4A: ORDER PROBLEMS 
Directions: Each set of questions is based on a passage and set of conditions. In 
answering some of the questions, it may be useful to draw a rough diagram. For each 
question, select the best answer choice given. 
 
Set 1 
A veterinarian is doing an informal study of the 
growth of exactly seven poodles – Fido, Monet, 
Pal, Quixote, Rover, Spot and Tache – all six-
month-old puppies from the same litter. The 
veterinarian’s assistant collected the following 
comparative data concerning the poodles’ 
heights: 
 Rover is taller than Tache. 
 Quixote is taller than Spot. 
 Fido is taller than Tache. 
 Pal is taller than Monet, but Tache is 
taller than Pal. 
 None of the seven poodles is exactly 
the same height as any other poodle 
from the litter. 
 
1. Which of the following could be the correct 
ordering of the poodles from tallest to 
shortest? 
(A) Fido, Rover, Tache, Monet, Quixote, 
Pal, Spot 
(B) Quixote, Spot, Fido, Tache, Pal, Rover, 
Monet 
(C) Rover, Fido, Tache, Pal, Quixote, 
Monet, Spot 
(D) Rover, Tache, Quixote, Pal, Spot, Fido, 
Monet 
(E) Spot, Rover, Fido, Tache, Pal, Quixote, 
Monet 
 
2.  Which of the following must be true? 
(A) Fido is taller than Pal. 
(B) Fido is taller than Rover. 
(C) Quixote is taller than Pal. 
(D) Spot is taller than Monet. 
(E) Tache is taller than Spot. 
 
3. If Spot is taller than Tache, which of the 
following must be true? 
(A) Quixote is taller than Fido. 
(B) Quixote is taller than Pal. 
(C) Quixote is taller than Rover. 
(D) Rover is taller than Fido. 
(E) Tache is taller than Quixote. 
 
 
4. If Tache is taller than Quixote, any of the 
following can be true EXCEPT: 
(A) Monet is taller than Quixote. 
(B) Quixote is taller than Pal. 
(C) Quixote is taller than Rover. 
(D) Spot is taller than Monet. 
(E) Spot is taller than Pal. 
 
Set 2 
1. A particular auto race involved eight 
cars – S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, and Z. At the end 
of every lap, an accurate record was made 
of the position of the cars from first 
(position 1) to last (position 8). For each of 
the records the following statements are 
true: 
 No two cars occupy the same 
position. 
 S is in some position ahead of Z. 
 There is exactly one car between T 
and X, regardless of whether T or 
X is ahead of the other. 
 U is in the position immediately 
ahead of Y. 
 Both V and Y are in position ahead 
of S. 
 W is in first position. 
 
1. Which of the following could be noted on 
one of the records as the positions of the cars 
from position 1 through position 8? 
(A) W, U, S, Y, V, T, Z, X 
(B) W, U, Y, S, T, V, Z, X 
(C) W, U, Y, V, S, T, Z, X, 
(D) W, U, Y, Z, V, T, S, X 
(E) W, V, S, U, Y, T, Z, X 
 
2.  If on one of the records Y and X are in 
positions 4 and 5, respectively, which of the 
following must be true of that record? 
(A) S is in position 2. 
(B) S is in position 7. 
(C) T is in position 3. 
(D) V is in position 3. 
(E) Z is in position 8. 
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3. If on one of the records V is in some position 
behind T, which car must be in position 7 on 
that record? 
(A) S     
(B) T     
(C) V     
(D) X      
(E) Z 
 
Set 3 
In a game, exactly six inverted cups stand side 
by side in a straight line, and each has exactly 
one ball hidden under it. The cups are 
numbered consecutively 1 through 6. Each of 
the balls is painted in a single solid colour. The 
colours of the balls are green, magenta, orange, 
purple, red and yellow. The balls have been 
hidden under the cups in a manner that 
conforms to the following conditions: 
 The purple ball must be hidden under a 
lower-numbered cup than the orange 
ball. 
 The red ball must be hidden under a 
cup immediately adjacent to the cup 
under which the magenta ball is 
hidden. 
 The green ball must  
 .be hidden under cup 5. 
 
1.  Which of the following could be the colours 
of the balls under the cups, in order from 1 
through 6? 
(A) Green, yellow, magenta, red, purple, 
orange 
(B) Magenta, green, purple, red, orange, 
yellow 
(C) Magenta, red, purple, yellow, green, 
orange 
(D) Orange, yellow, red, magenta, green, 
purple 
(E) Red, purple, magenta, yellow, green, 
orange 
 
2. If the magenta ball is under cup 4, the red ball 
must be under cup 
(A) 1 
(B) 2 
(C) 3 
(D) 5 
(E) 6 
 
 
3. A ball of which of the following colours could 
be under cup 6? 
(A) Green 
(B) Magenta 
(C) Purple 
(D) Red 
(E) Yellow 
 
4. If the purple ball is under cup 4, the orange 
ball must be under cup 
(A) 1 
(B) 2 
(C) 3 
(D) 5 
(E) 6 
 
5. Which of the following must be true? 
(A) The green ball is under a lower-
numbered cup than the yellow ball. 
(B) The orange ball is under a lower-
numbered cup than the green ball. 
(C) The purple ball is under a lower-
numbered cup than the green ball. 
(D) The purple ball is under a lower-
numbered cup than the red ball. 
(E) The red ball is under a lower-numbered 
cup than the yellow ball. 
 
6. If the orange ball is under cup 2, balls of 
which of the following colours could be under 
the cups immediately adjacent to each other? 
(A) Green and magenta 
(B) Green and purple 
(C) Orange and yellow 
(D) Purple and red 
(E) Red and yellow 
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APPENDIX 6A: CONSUMER PROBLEMS PRESENTED TO 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Imagine that you are buying a mobile phone contract. You will use 100 minutes and 
100 text messages per month. You are thinking about using Mobile Phone Company G 
which costs £3.50 per 100 minutes and £9.50 per 100 Text Messages. The Mobile 
Phone Company has a reception coverage score of 5. You are generally satisfied with 
this mobile phone contract but you suspect another mobile phone company may offer 
better value and so you wish to investigate further.   
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Mobile Phone Company or Switch to an alternative option. 
Please mark your decision in the appropriate box below.  
 
 
 
                                           Stick                                                Switch                                   
  
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are buying a mobile phone contract. You will use 100 minutes and 
100 text messages per month. You are thinking about using Mobile Phone Company E 
which costs £15.50 per 100 minutes and £12.50 per 100 Text Messages. The Mobile 
Phone Company has a reception coverage score of 4. You are generally satisfied with 
this mobile phone contract but you suspect another mobile phone company may offer 
better value and so you wish to investigate further.   
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Mobile Phone Company or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
Stick                                      Switch                                   
 B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are buying a mobile phone contract. You will use 100 minutes and 
100 text messages per month. You are thinking about using Mobile Phone Company H 
which costs £3.50 per 100 minutes and £6.50 per 100 Text Messages. The Mobile 
Phone Company has a reception coverage score of 5. You are generally satisfied with 
this mobile phone contract but you suspect another mobile phone company may offer 
better value and so you wish to investigate further.   
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of Mobile 
Phone Company or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
    
 
  Stick                                                  Switch                                   
  
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are buying a mobile phone contract. You will use 100 minutes and 
100 text messages per month. You are thinking about using Mobile Phone Company B 
which costs £13.00 per 100 minutes and £27.00 per 100 Text Messages. The Mobile 
Phone Company has a reception coverage score of 4. You are generally satisfied with 
this mobile phone contract but you suspect another mobile phone company may offer 
better value and so you wish to investigate further.   
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Mobile Phone Company or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
  
 
    Stick                                                  Switch                                   
  
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are changing Energy Company. You will use an equal amount of gas 
and electricity each month. You are thinking about using Energy Company F which 
costs £12.50 per 100 kWhs for Gas and £11.00 per 100 kWhs for Electricity. The Energy 
Company has a Customer Service score of 5. You are generally satisfied with this 
Energy Company but you suspect another  Energy Company may offer better value and 
so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of Energy 
Company or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
     
 Stick                                                  Switch                                   
  
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are changing Energy Company. You will use an equal amount of gas 
and electricity each month. You are thinking about using Energy Company D which 
costs £10.50 per 100 kWhs for Gas and £21.00 per 100 kWhs for Electricity. The Energy 
Company has a Customer Service score of 4. You are generally satisfied with this 
Energy Company but you suspect another Energy Company may offer better value and 
so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Energy Company or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 Stick                                                  Switch                           
         
 B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are changing Energy Company. You will use an equal amount of gas 
and electricity each month. You are thinking about using Energy Company H which 
costs £20.50 per 100 kWhs for Gas and £18.50 per 100 kWhs for Electricity. The Energy 
Company has a Customer Service score of 5. You are generally satisfied with this 
Energy Company but you suspect another Energy Company may offer better value and 
so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Energy Company or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
 
 
     Stick                                               Switch                           
         
 B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are changing Energy Company. You will use an equal amount of gas 
and electricity each month. You are thinking about using Energy Company A which 
costs £24.00 per 100 kWhs for Gas and £21.00 per 100 kWhs for Electricity. The Energy 
Company has a Customer Service score of 5. You are generally satisfied with this 
Energy Company but you suspect another Energy Company may offer better value and 
so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Energy Company or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
                                   
   Stick                                                    Switch                                   
  
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are very price conscious and want to go shopping. You need 
to buy one loaf of bread and one pint of milk.  You are thinking about using 
Super Market A which charges £1.20 for a loaf of bread and £1.00 for a pint of 
milk. The Super Market has a Customer Satisfaction Score of 4. You are 
generally satisfied with this Super Market but you suspect another Super 
Market may offer better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
 
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your 
choice of Super Market or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stick                                                      Switch                                   
  
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are very price conscious and want to go shopping. You need to buy 
one loaf of bread and one pint of milk. You are thinking about using Super Market G 
which charges £2.25 for a loaf of bread and £1.40 for a pint of milk. The Super Market 
has a Customer Satisfaction Score of 3. You are generally satisfied with this Super 
Market but you suspect another Super Market may offer better value and so you wish 
to investigate further.  
 
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Super Market or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
 
Stick                                                      Switch                                   
  
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are very price conscious and want to go shopping. You need to buy 
one loaf of bread and one pint of milk. You are thinking about using Super Market A 
which charges £2.50 for a loaf of bread and £1.50 for a pint of milk. The Super Market 
has a Customer Satisfaction Score of 2. You are generally satisfied with this Super 
Market but you suspect another Super Market may offer better value and so you wish 
to investigate further.  
 
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Super Market or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
 
Stick                                                      Switch                                   
  
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you are very price conscious and want to go shopping. You need to buy one loaf of 
bread and one pint of milk. You are thinking about using Super Market F which charges £1.20 for a 
loaf of bread and £1.90 for a pint of milk. The Super Market has a Customer Satisfaction Score of 
5. You are generally satisfied with this Super Market but you suspect another Super Market may 
offer better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of Super 
Market or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
Stick                                                      Switch                                   
  
B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you work for a drug company. It is your job to buy the stock 
needed for the production of a new antibiotic.  The antibiotic requires that you 
buy an equal amount of Dexamthasone and Polymixin B. You are thinking about 
using Pharmacological Supplier D which charges £27.00 for 100g of 
Dexamthasone and £40.50 for 100g of Polymyxin B. The Pharmacological 
Supplier has a delivery speed score of 5. You are generally satisfied with this 
Pharmacological Supplier but you suspect another Pharmacological may offer 
better value and so you wish to investigate further.  
 
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your 
choice of Pharmacological Supplier or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stick                                                      Switch                                   
 B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you work for a drug company. It is your job to buy the stock needed for 
the production of a new antibiotic.  The antibiotic requires that you buy an equal 
amount of Dexamthasone and Polymixin B. You are thinking about using 
Pharmacological Supplier D which charges £30.00 for 100g of Dexamthasone and 
£65.00 for 100g of Polymyxin B. The Pharmacological Supplier has a delivery speed 
score of 4. You are generally satisfied with this Pharmacological Supplier but you 
suspect another Pharmacological may offer better value and so you wish to investigate 
further.  
 
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Pharmacological Supplier or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stick                                                    Switch                                   
 B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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 Imagine that you work for a drug company. It is your job to buy the stock needed for the 
production of a new antibiotic.  The antibiotic requires that you buy an equal amount of 
Dexamthasone and Polymixin B. You are thinking about using Pharmacological Supplier H which 
charges £38.00 for 100g of Dexamthasone and £37.00 for 100g of Polymyxin B. The 
Pharmacological Supplier has a delivery speed score of 5. You are generally satisfied with this 
Pharmacological Supplier but you suspect another Pharmacological may offer better value and so 
you wish to investigate further.  
 
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Pharmacological Supplier or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
 
Stick                                                      Switch                                   
 B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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Imagine that you work for a drug company. It is your job to buy the stock needed for 
the production of a new antibiotic. The antibiotic requires that you buy an equal 
amount of Dexamthasone and Polymixin B.  You are thinking about using 
Pharmacological Supplier D which charges £25.50 for 100g of Dexamthasone and 
£17.50 for 100g of Polymyxin B. The Pharmacological Supplier has a delivery speed 
score of 5. You are generally satisfied with this Pharmacological Supplier but you 
suspect another Pharmacological may offer better value and so you wish to investigate 
further.  
 
A) Look at the table below carefully. You have the option to Stick with your choice of 
Pharmacological Supplier or Switch to an alternative option. 
 
 
 
 
Stick                                                      Switch                                   
 B) If you decided to switch, please circle the letter of the Travel Agent you chose. 
 
A B C D E F G H 
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APPENDIX 6B: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please indicate your sex                             Male                                 Female 
Please state how old you are.......................................................................... 
What is your yearly household income? (Home) 
Less than £10,000                                    Between £30,000-£40,000 
Between £10,001 - £20,000                  Higher than £40,001 
Between £20,001- £30,000 
Please indicate what your highest level of education is 
GCSE or O Level                                         Professional Qualification 
A Level                                                          Post Graduate Qualification 
Diploma/Certificate                                  Other (Please Specify) 
University or College Degree 
 
Do you own a mobile phone?                  Yes               No 
If so, for how many years have you owned a mobile phone?  ..................... 
How regularly would you say you use your mobile phone? 
Every day             couple times a week             Rarely             Never 
Are you responsible for paying your mobile phone bill?                       
            Yes             No 
Have you changed you mobile phone contract in the last year?                    
  Yes              No 
How often do you usually consider changing your mobile phone 
contract? 
          Every 6 Months             Every year              Every 18 Months                 Every 2yrs 
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Are you responsible for paying the Energy Bills in your household?              
Yes                      No 
 Have you changed Energy Supplier in the last year?   Yes               No 
 
How often do you go to the supermarket to buy food? 
            Never             Once a week             Twice a week             3 times a week or more 
How important is PRICE to you when selecting which supermarket to 
shop at?  
1                          2                             3                              4                              5   
 
Very Important                                                                   Not important at all 
How important to you is customer satisfaction when selecting a 
supermarket to shop at? 
1                           2                           3                              4                               5   
    
Very Important                                                                   Not important at all 
Have you ever been responsible for sourcing the chemicals used in 
pharmacological drugs? 
               Yes                       No 
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STATISTICS APPENDICES 
 
All appendices are numbered in line with the experiment to which their contents 
refer. 
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Experiment 1  
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TABLE 1.1S: 2X2 ANOVA (AGE X QUESTION TYPE) 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Question Type 44.97 .00 .39 
Age 2.67 .12 .04 
Age*Question Type .19 .67 .00 
 
TABLE 1.2S: 2X2 ANOVA (AGE X QUESTION TYPE) WITH VOCABULARY AS 
A COVARIATE 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Question Type 3.02 .09 .04 
Age 7.81 .01 .11 
Vocabulary .23 .63 .00 
Age*Question Type .16 .69 .00 
Age*Vocabulary 16.15 .00 .19 
TABLE1.3S: 2X2 ANOVA (AGE X QUESTION TYPE) WITH VOCABULARY 
AND FLUID INTELLIGENCE AS COVARIATES 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Question Type 9.99 .00 .13 
Age .79 .38 .01 
Vocabulary 7.88 .01 .11 
Fluid Intelligence 7.6 .01 .11 
Age*Question Type .31 .58 .01 
Age*Vocabulary 6.86 .01 .1 
Age*Fluid Intelligence 3.27 .08 .05 
 
TABLE 1.4S: 2X2 ANOVA (AGE X QUESTION TYPE) WITH VOCABULARY, 
FLUID INTELLIGENCE AND NUMERACY AS COVARIATES 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Question Type 9.84 .00 .13 
Age .06 .8 .00 
Vocabulary 5.77 .02 .08 
Fluid Intelligence 4.53 .04 .67 
Numeracy 3.92 .05 .06 
Age*Question Type 4.65 .04 .07 
Age*Vocabulary .69 .41 .01 
Age*Fluid Intelligence 4.53 .04 .07 
Age*Numeracy 1.89 .17 .03 
TABLE 1.5S: ANOVA (AGE X RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAYMENT OF BILLS X 
TOTAL NUMBER OF CORRECT FACTUAL AND INFERENTIAL PROBLEMS) 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 3.94 .05 .06 
Responsibility for bills 1.78 .19 .03 
Age*Responsibility .49 .49 .01 
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  Experiment 2 
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TABLE 2.1S: 2X2X2 ANOVA (AGE X QUESTION TYPE X TOPIC) 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 18.97 .00 .96 
Question Type 231.38 .00 .65 
Topic .48 .49 .00 
Age*Question Type .18 .67 .00 
Age*Topic 1.78 .18 .01 
Question Type*Topic 39.31 .00 .24 
Age*Question Type*Topic .51 .48 .00 
 
TABLE 2.2S: 2X2X2 ANOVA (AGE X QUESTION TYPE X TOPIC) WITH 
VOCABULARY ADDED AS A COVARIATE  
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 17.42 .00 .13 
Question Type 10.1 .00 .08 
Topic .54 .47 .00 
Vocabulary 1.92 .17 .02 
Age*Question Type .06 .8 .00 
Age*Topic 1.39 .24 .01 
Question Type*Topic 3.21 .08 .03 
Topic*Vocabulary .44 .51 .00 
Question Type*Vocabulary .02 .89 .00 
Age*Question Type*Topic .22 .64 .00 
Question Type*Vocabulary*Topic .32 .57 .00 
 
TABLE 2.3S: 2X2X2 ANOVA (AGE X QUESTION TYPE X TOPIC) WITH 
VOCABULARY AND FLUID INTELLIGENCE ADDED AS COVARIATES  
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age .39 .54 .00 
Question Type .6 .44 .01 
Topic .53 .47 .00 
Vocabulary .41 .52 .00 
Fluid Intelligence 52.3 00 .31 
Age*Question Type .58 .45 .01 
Age*Topic .00 .99 .00 
Question Type*Topic 6.5 .01 .05 
Topic*Vocabulary .86 .36 .01 
Question Type*Vocabulary .18 .68 .00 
Question Type*Fluid Intelligence 1.98 .16 .02 
Topic*Fluid Intelligence 1.91 .17 .02 
Age*Question Type*Topic 2.29 .13 .02 
Question Type*Vocabulary*Topic .01 .91 .00 
Question Type Fluid Int*Topic 3.64 .06 .03 
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TABLE 2.4S: 2X2X2 ANOVA (AGE X QUESTION TYPE X TOPIC) WITH 
VOCABULARY, FLUID INTELLIGENCE AND NUMERACY ADDED AS 
COVARIATES  
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 1.63 .2 .01 
Question Type 1.41 .24 .01 
Topic .41 .53 .00 
Vocabulary .86 .6 .01 
Fluid Intelligence 26.99 .00 .19 
Numeracy 13.64 .00 .11 
Age*Question Type .11 .75 .00 
Age*Topic .01 .94 .00 
Question Type*Topic 6.81 .01 .06 
Topic*Vocabulary .79 .38 .01 
Topic*Numeracy .22 .4 .00 
Question Type*Vocabulary .06 .8 .00 
Question Type*Numeracy 6.58 .01 .05 
Topic*Fluid Intelligence 2.09 .15 .02 
Question Type*Fluid Intelligence 5.89 .02 .05 
Age*Question Type*Topic 2.55 .11 .02 
Question Type*Vocabulary*Topic .02 .88 .00 
Question Type Fluid Int*Topic 2.04 .16 .02 
Question Type*Numeracy*Topic .4 .53 .00 
 
TABLE 2.5S: ANOVA DATA FOR THE MAIN EFFECTS OF AGE AND 
EXPERIENCE ON DECISION MAKING PERFORMANCE FOR PROBLEMS IN 
TWO CONSUMER DOMAINS (SELECTING AN ENERGY COMPANY AND, 
MOBILE PHONE SUPPLIER). 
  Main Effects 
  age performance 
Topic Question F η² F η² 
 
Energy 
Responsibility for paying utility bills 6.02** .05 .11 0 
Changed utility supplier in the last year 7.5** .06 .23 .05 
Contacted utility supplier in the last year 6.61** .05 .06 0 
 
 
Mobile 
Own a Mobile 16.24** .12 .37 0 
Number of years of mobile owned 16.39** .13 .04 0 
Responsibility for paying mobile phone bills 14.53** .12 .07 0 
Changed mobile provider in the last year 10.48** .09 1.3 .01 
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Experiment 3 
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3.1S: PILOT DATA 
Figure 3.1. Mean rating for each of the 16 emotional states rated by participants after 
viewing footage of a fishhook being removed from a patients eyeball. 
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TABLE 3.2S ANOVA – DECISIONS TO DECIDE IN THE FUTURE 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 4.99 .02 .04 
Condition .88 .42 .02 
Age*Condition 1.27 .29 .02 
 
TABLE 3.3S ANOVA – CORRECT STICK AND SWITCH DECISIONS 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 1.45 .23 .01 
Condition 24.07 .09 .04 
Age*Condition 4.97 .01 .08 
Correct Choice*Age .04 .84 .00 
Correct Choice*Condition .19 .83 .00 
Correct Choice*Age*Condition .99 .38 .02 
 
TABLE 3.4S ANOVA SHOWING THE NUMBER OF TIMES PARTICIPANTS 
CHOSE TO STICK ON EASY AND DIFFICULT PROBLEMS 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 2.11 .15 .02 
Condition .8 .45 .01 
Problem Difficulty .54 .46 .01 
Age*Condition .07 .93 .00 
Problem Difficulty *Age .08 .77 .00 
Problem Difficulty *Condition .5 .61 .01 
Problem Difficulty *Age*Condition .49 .62 .01 
 
TABLE 3.5S ANOVA SHOWING THE NUMBER OF TIMES PARTICIPANTS 
CHOSE TO DECIDE IN THE FUTURE ON EASY AND DIFFICULT PROBLEMS 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 4.92 .03 .04 
Condition .91 .41 .02 
Problem Difficulty 10.8 .00 .09 
Age*Condition 1.2 .31 .02 
Problem Difficulty *Age .01 .94 .00 
Problem Difficulty *Condition .74 .48 .01 
Problem Difficulty *Age*Condition 1.23 .3 .02 
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TABLE 3.6S: ANOVA (AGE X CONDITION) FEELINGS WHILE VIEWING 
FILM 
 
TABLE 3.7S: ANOVA (AGE X CONDITION) HIDE EMOTIONS 
 
TABLE 3.8S: ANOVA (AGE X CONDITION) SPONTANEOUS REACTION 
 
TABLE 3.9S ANOVA (AGE X CONDITION) DIFFICULTY PERFORMING 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
TABLE 3.10S ANOVA (AGE X CONDITION) TIME TAKEN TO COMPLETE 
TASK 
  
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 16.2 .00 .12 
Condition 2.49 .09 .04 
Age*Condition 2.36 .1 .04 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 8.38 .01 .07 
Condition 3.9 .02 .06 
Age*Condition 2.43 .09 .04 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 56.6 .00 .13 
Condition 4.47 .01 .07 
Age*Condition .16 .86 .03 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 11.31 .00 .13 
Condition 2.31 .13 .03 
Age*Condition .19 .67 .00 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 29.68 .00 .21 
Condition .41 .67 .01 
Age*Condition .61 .54 .01 
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TABLE 3.11S: ANOVA (AGE X CONDITION) POSITIVE AFFECT 
 
TABLE 3.12S: ANOVA (AGE X CONDITION) NEGATIVE AFFECT 
 
TABLE 3.13S: ANOVA (AGE X CONDITION) FATIGUE 
 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 47.16 .00 .29 
Condition .39 .68 .01 
Age*Condition 2.39 .1 .04 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 6.59 .01 .06 
Condition .39 .1 .01 
Age*Condition .62 .54 .01 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Age 18.04 .00 .1 
Condition .45 .64 .01 
Age*Condition .5 .61 .01 
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Experiment 4 
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TABLE 4.1S: ANOVA (CONDITION X CORRECT CHOICE)  
 
TABLE 4.2S: ANOVA (CONDITION X CHOICE)  
 
TABLE 4.3S: ANOVA (NUMBER OF STICK CHOICES X CONDITION)  
 
TABLE 4.4S: ANOVA (GRE RESPONSES X CONDITION)  
 
TABLE 4.5S: ANOVA (MANIPULATION CHECKS X CONDITION)  
 
TABLE 4.6S: ANOVA (TIME X CONDITION) 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Correct Choice 3.72 .06 .06 
Condition 7.06 .00 .2 
Correct Choice*Condition .04 .96 .00 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Choice 4.9 .05 .06 
Condition .00 1 .00 
Choice*Condition .05 1 .00 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Number of Stick Choices 6.18 .02 .1 
Condition .04 .96 .00 
Stick Choices*Condition 1.08 .35 .04 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Number of Correct Items 1.72 .19 .06 
No of Items Attempted .56 .56 .02 
Proportion of Items Attempted .26 .78 .01 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Number of Stick Choices .39 .68 .01 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Question 1 3.94 .03 .12 
Question 2 6.17 .00 .18 
Question 3 2.36 .1 .08 
Question 4 2.3 .11 .07 
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Experiment 5 
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TABLE 5.1S: ANOVA (CONDITION X CORRECT CHOICE)  
 
TABLE 5.2S: ANOVA (CONDITION X CHOICE)  
 
TABLE 5.3S: ANOVA (NUMBER OF STICK CHOICES X CONDITION)  
 
TABLE 5.4S: ANOVA (GRE RESPONSES X CONDITION)  
 
 TABLE 5.5S: ANOVA (TIME X CONDITION) 
  
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Correct Choice 4.79 .03 .05 
Condition 3.25 .04 .07 
Correct Choice*Condition .99 .38 .02 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Choice .01 .94 .00 
Condition 2.21 .12 .05 
Choice*Condition 1.46 .24 .03 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Number of Stick Choices 8.85 .00 .09 
Condition .54 .59 .01 
Stick Choices*Condition 1.86 .16 .04 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Number of Correct Items 3.99 .02 .09 
No of Items Attempted .37 .7 .01 
Proportion of Items Attempted 2.4 .1 .05 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Number of Stick Choices 1.42 .25 .03 
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Experiment 6 
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TABLE 6.1S: ANOVA (CORRECT CHOICE X AGE X CONDITION) 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Correct Choice 268.91 .00 .69 
Age 9.64 .00 .08 
Condition 3.52 .06 .03 
Age*Condition .32 .58 .03 
Correct Choice *Age .4 .53 .00 
Correct Choice *Condition .03 .86 .00 
Correct Choice *Age*Condition 1.71 .19 .01 
 
TABLE 6.2S: ANOVA (PROBLEM DIFFICULTY X AGE X CONDITION) 
 F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Problem Difficulty 477.8 .00 .8 
Age .00 .96 .00 
Condition .04 .85 .00 
Age*Condition 4.9 .03 .04 
Problem Difficulty *Age 2.35 .13 .08 
Problem Difficulty *Condition 2.18 .14 .02 
Problem Difficulty *Age*Condition 1.02 .31 .01 
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